The Indo-Pacific Scoreboard

“Sovereignty” and “power” are perhaps the most frequently used terms in the vocabulary of international relations. Their persistent recurrence underscores a fundamental principle: nation-states are free to act as they please − a system that modern scholars observe to be a “polite label for international anarchism.” In the course of interminable tug-of-war for power and resource to realise one’s national interests, nations forge bonds and on occasions, invite adversaries with conflicting interests. Thus, amidst this international anarchy, the most reliable break on the power of a state is the power of other states. This restraining mechanism essentially refers to the “Balance of Power” doctrine – trailing its efficacy right from the Treaty of Westphalia through the World Wars to the Indo-Pacific geopolitics, thus, warranting a sufficient emphasis.[i] 

Eagle and Dragon in the Indo-Pacific

The dawn of Chinese economic prosperity in the coming century coupled with the steady breakdown of unipolarity into a multipolar world order has made the Indo-Pacific chessboard a contested one. Patrick Leoni astutely points out that, ‘The history of US’s grand strategy has never truly been isolationist. It actively seeks to sponsor a post-imperial, globalized order while maintaining national geopolitical supremacy.”[ii] Thus, the US in Indo-Pacific seeks to be an “overstretched hegemon” whilst securing the interest of its allies and foster global peace and deterrence to Chinese expansionist aggression. Both the sides have realised their respective goals by instruments like economic integration and minilaterlism to counter each other, thus, knitting a dense network of political, military, and cultural alliances. Instances like the IPEF bloc and reviving the Quadrilateral dialogues continue to substantiate Washington’s commitments for “free and open Indo-Pacific” while the RCEP and ASEAN’s cohesion quietly welcome dragon’s investments and give way to its expansionist schemas.[iii]

A Message You Can’t Ignore…

Acclaimed to be “possibly the largest and most unique Elephant Walk in Air Force history,” this exhibition of power at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan on May 6th, 2025 made headlines in global media. This ‘walk’ was rather more strategic than an insipid spectacle for the world, as Kadena is positioned 400 miles away from the Chinese coastline and 600 miles from Taiwan – thus, constituting the ‘first island chain’ of major archipelagos of defense and frontline base. In layman terms, Kadena would be the first to respond in an event of conflict in East Asia. However, before understanding the vivid shades of this Elephant Walk, it is important to grasp the basics of the same.

Broadly, “Elephant Walk” refers to a specific exercise by the USAF amongst other forces to demonstrate their combat capability and teamwork to perform a given operation. This exercise is thus, characterised by a large number of aircraft taxi sequenced on a runway. This terminology owes its origin to WWII, wherein, 1,000 aircraft would mass to attack in a single mission resembling a herd of elephants. [iv] In recent years, the frequency of such instances of power parade has substantially increased. Some of the most notable walks down the lane are; Misawa AB, Japan (2020), and RAF Mildenhall, UK (2020), Sheppard AFB, Texas (2023), Andersen AFB, Guam (2024), etc.[v] The most recent Elephant Walk in Japan’s Kadena, comprising of an array of advanced aircraft and platform like; F-35As, Air Force F-15Es, HH-60 Jolly Green and MQ Reapers, KC-135 Stratotankers with two US Navy EA-18 Growlers and P-8 Poseidon amongst others. Accordingly. It highlighted “the strength of US’s integrated air and missile defense and its commitment to joint operations.” [vi]

Strategic Implications

Strategic deterrence in Indo-Pacific

One can conclude that the expanding economic, political, and military presence of China in IOR, South Asia, Africa and beyond has been the major trigger for reconceptualization and diffusion of Indo-Pacific in the US strategy.[vii] From the US perspective, building a collective deterrence and multilateral security architecture in the Indo-Pacific is both − imperative and realistic so as to compete effectively against the aggressor, i.e. China. An observation made by an exemplary report by University of Sydney narrates that, “a strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.” [viii]

It must also be noted that a secondary driving factor is the increasing alignment between the authoritarian powers in this region. A cohesive arrangement between China, North Korea, and Russia complicates the strategic calculations for other countries as it raises the prospects of coordinated aggression.[ix]

Widening the lengths of trade and investments

With the growing recognition of a multipolar world of which the US is no longer the singular anchor; US’s deterrence in Indo-Pacific not only facilitates a counterbalance to China but also engages a variety of stakeholders to address regional challenges bilaterally while securing the American affluence in Far East. As Indo-Pacific hosts half of the world population and global GDP, this region opens up unprecedented opportunities for the players. US’s constant stress on “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” also reiterates the overwhelming importance of resources in this region.

A ‘rules-based’ Indo-Pacific would secure economic security for global investors amidst regional dependency on China. Military manoeuvres as the Elephant Walk also indicates towards a subtler undertone − strategic market alternatives, Washington’s priced assets in this region and conditions requisite for larger trade integration of the Indo-Pacific in US’ favour. Initiatives like the Blue Dot Network and PGII [x], aims at providing a geoeconomic deterrence to Chinese expansionist tendencies like the BRI. [xi] 

Forging a broad-based military presence

Wiśniewski in ‘Handbook of Indo-Pacific Studies’ underscores the multi-dimensional strategic rationale behind a sustained and geographically dispersed military footprint in the Indo-Pacific. This presence is not just about power projection or operational readiness − it functions as a structural pillar of geopolitical stability in a region marked by regional competition, overlapping territorial claims, and asymmetric power dynamics. Thus, by embedding air, naval, and surveillance capacities throughout the region, a broad-based presence ensures the safeguarding of strategic maritime chokepoints − like the Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait, and South China Sea − which are vital for global trade, capital and energy flow.

This could directly alarm PRC with a nuanced Chinese reciprocal retaliation by defence budget hikes, re-assessment of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) stance in the region, overcome and examine the “encirclement anxiety” with US becoming the supremo in the littoral region and diplomatic recalibration of the “extended hegemon” at regional forums.[xii]

Reinforcing alliance commitments

Twenty first century is arguably the most notorious century in the history of mankind. This is because of the increasing global rivalries, contested interests, armament race, acquisition of critical resources, technological revolution, and so on. Thus, friends and foes amidst this international mayhem becomes the bulwark for one’s survival. Later this week when the amassed taxi aircraft rallied on Kadena’s runway, it herald an encrusted message for the world – “it shows our airmen, allies, and adversaries that we’re united, capable, and ready, thus, challenging the Chinese armed bases in East Asia.” As noted by Chief Master Sgt. Bradon Wolfgang.

Therefore, this demonstration is a credible symbol for tangible commitments, mutual allied relations and multilateral defense obligations bringing together the “friends” on one table while embodying “synchronized and integrated deterrence.” The allied group including India, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia act as neutralising force on behalf of the shared idea that Indo-Pacific should be free, open and inclusive with real opportunities for all. Secondly, while strengthening the regional security architecture and collective defense, this ingenious power projection would also etch Beijing’s behaviour and policy formulation towards allied group and thereby, restructure Sino bilateralism and regional commitments.[xiii]

Advancing Human Rights and Democracy

“At the heart of the new era of geopolitical competition is a struggle over the role and influence of democracy in the international order.” Therefore, the US is embedding democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific region in order to force posture, creating normative pressure on Beijing’s regional narrative. [xiv]

The White House Indo-Pacific Strategy of 2022 has magnified the States’s goal of securing “democracy and human rights, countering authoritarianism, and supporting good governance and rule of law.” Thus, it is clear that, not only on a strategic, offensive, and geo-economic front, the US has been an active facilitator of independent political choices by aiding partners to root out agencies and organizations threatening democratic values. Additionally, the US is also partnering with governments, civil society, and journalists to ensure they have the capability to expose and mitigate the risks from foreign interference and information manipulation as the world evolves into a more interconnected village.

Some scholars have adequately queried about the idea of a world order with China as its axis. However, the prenominal apprehension is thought to be the founding principles of PRC and its instruments of operation that has little space for domestic sovereignty and independent foreign policy. Notwithstanding the moral inclinations and the majoritarian consensus on China’s implicit participation in aiding regime change and engineering instability in strategic chokepoints by various means like debt-trap diplomacy, land hunger, investment traps, amongst others; US and its allies seek to deter the increasing coercive diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, beyond readiness and miliary signalling, the Kadena’s Elephant Walk stands as a testament of an ideological rebuke to aggressor’s ulterior agenda.

Establishing International law and its obligation

“America’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific is a signal that freedom of navigation and lawful access to the global commons are non-negotiable.” [xv]

Our collective reminiscence vividly recalls China’s expansionist ‘Nine-Dash Line’ and illegible claims over South China Sea, which rather compelled the Permanent Court of Arbitration to rule in favour of Philippines and thus, reiterate a binding obligation towards UNCLOS. The normative alliance in the Indo-Pacific strives for emphasizing compliance to international laws, rules and mandates for lawful operation of trade, commerce and exchange across the lengths and breadths of this region.[xvi] By engaging democratic stakeholders, exercises such as the Kadena Elephant Walk serve as “mechanisms of norm internalization and legal signalling to constrain coercive actors.” [xvii]

Chinese reactionary policies and initiatives, and various methods of advancing like debt-trap and wolf war diplomacy, investment traps, supply chain conundrum, and others undermines the Beijing’s pursuit to shape global governance narratives and diminishes its credibility as a responsible power amidst the juxtaposed US-led adherence to internationalism.

A number of stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific like Australia, Japan, and India have found common ground with the US in their desire to secure rules-based world order. It is rather imperative from a lens of academic and political enquiry that US involvement in the region is not simply a deterministic consequence of Machiavellian requirements for containing an ascending China, but rather a strategic initiative to claim America’s share of the spoils.

In conclusion, the Indo-Pacific strategy undertaken by the Biden and Trump administration and the calibrated power projection exercises for collective deterrence adds a new chapter to South Asian security narrative and infrastructure. Amid these developments, the role of India is rather extrapolated. New Delhi has to play a proactive role within the Indo-Pacific milieu to furthering towards peace and regional stability. This would also include maintaining regional deterrence from immediate neighbours, preserve the status quo and navigate the fragile geopolitical stream. [xviii]

 References

[i] Goldstein, Joshua S., and “International Relations 2012–2013.” 10th ed. Boston: Pearson Longman, 2012.

[ii] Kratiuk, Barbara, and Günther Hauser, eds. “Handbook of Indo-Pacific Studies.” London: Routledge, 2023.  

[iii] Sato, Yoichiro,  “Southeast Asia and U.S.-China Competition: Contours, Realities, and Implications for the Indo-Pacific,” Wilson Center,   https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/southeast-asia-and-us-china-competition-contours-realities-and-implications-indo-pacific.

[iv] U.S. Department of Defense, “An Elephant Walk to Remember,” May 4, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/Story/Article/3375434/an-elephant-walk-to-remember/.

[v] U.S. Air Force, “News,” https://www.af.mil/News/.

[vi] “The U.S. Air Force and Navy Conduct the Largest Elephant Walk in Recent History,” The National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/the-u-s-air-force-and-navy-conduct-the-largestelephant-walk-in-recent-history.

[vii] Sato, Yoichiro , “Southeast Asia and U.S.-China Competition: Contours, Realities, and Implications for the Indo-Pacific,” Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/southeast-asia-and-us-china-competition-contours-realities-and-implications-indo-pacific.

[viii] Hemmings, John , “Making Collective Deterrence and Defense Work in the Indo-Pacific,” Pacific Forum, 2023, https://pacforum.org/publications/issues-and-insights-making-collective-deterrence-and-defense-work-in-the-indo-pacific/.   

[ix] Center for Global Security Research, “Extended Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific: Report,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2024.

[x]  U.S. Department of State, “Blue Dot Network,” https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/.

[xi] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indo-Pacific Deterrence Report, 2023.

[xii] U.S. Department of State, “Blue Dot Network,” https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/.

[xiii] Pant, Harsh. “Understanding America’s Enduring Interest in the Indo-Pacific,” Observer Research Foundation. 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/people-expert/harsh-v-pant

[xiv] Thomas Wright, “Democracy Disorder: The Struggle for Influence in the New Geopolitics,” Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-disorder-the-struggle-for-influence-in-the-new-geopolitics/.

[xv] U.S. Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 2019

[xvi] Andrew Chubb, “Coercion in the South China Sea,” in China’s Gambit, Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/chinas-gambit/coercion-in-the-south-china sea/0373AF11C9D9505072AB4AAD84BD308F.

[xvii] CSIS, “Powers, Norms and Institutions: The Future of the Indo-Pacific – A Southeast Asia Perspective,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/powers-norms-and-institutions-future-indo-pacific-southeast-asia-perspective.

[xviii] Khan, Mahrukh. “US Indo-Pacific Strategy: Implications for South Asia.” Strategic Studies 41, no. 1 (2021).. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48732268