Geopolitics in Concrete: India, China, and the West’s Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Game

Divya Singh
Jul 30
9 min read

In the twentieth century, the Indo-Pacific region evolved as a major arena of inter-state contestation and competition, as well as collaboration. The phrase 'Indo-Pacific' has been coined by several of the region's important stakeholders, including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, and is defined as a combination "of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean," or "these two oceans and their surrounding countries." However, while it is usually considered "an interconnected space between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean" by most states, its geographic expanse is variable.

Infrastructure projects by Indo-Pacific governments have proliferated in recent years. The traditional discussion of regional connectivity, which focuses almost entirely on the motivations for and consequences of China's Belt and Road Initiative, ignores the scope and complexity of the infrastructure initiatives in the modern Indo-Pacific.

The geo-economics of infrastructure can be better understood by adopting a regional viewpoint, which places the BRI within this larger framework of efforts.

Official development funding has long been provided by Western governments, mostly in the form of grants but also through more general financial tools like loans, equity investments, and guarantees. However, infrastructure spending had slipped off the top of the priority list for a while. This has altered with China's emergence as a significant financier of infrastructure development and the introduction of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) nearly ten years ago. Other governments have attempted to respond with their own increased infrastructure efforts, sparked by worries about the geostrategic ramifications of China's abroad infrastructure activities.

Western governments have historically supplied official development assistance, primarily in the form of grants, but also through more broad financial mechanisms such as loans, equity investments, and guarantees. But for a long time, infrastructure expenditure has fallen off the top of the list of priorities. With the launch of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) about ten years ago and China's rise to prominence as a major infrastructure development financier, this has changed. Concerns about the geostrategic implications of China's infrastructure endeavors abroad have prompted other governments to try to respond with their own enhanced infrastructure projects.

India’s Push for Quad Connectivity Leadership

The US, Japan, Australia, and India's foreign ministers met for the tenth time since 2017 on July 1 in Washington, DC. China's aggression in the South China Sea, Pakistan's state-sponsored terror attack in Pahalgam, and China's weaponization of supply chains in crucial minerals and advanced manufacturing were all sharply denounced in the joint statement. The remark supported the current US administration's position, which emphasizes the connection between national security and the economy and sees China as a strategic adversary.

The lack of emphasis on infrastructure development and connectivity, which are essential for thwarting China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was noteworthy, though. This gap is seen as a strategic oversight by India, which is becoming a more dominant force in the area. Ignoring Beijing's economic power might lead to a $4.5 trillion development finance deficit in the Indo-Pacific by 2030, further strengthening regional reliance. India has a chance to direct the agenda toward more infrastructure and connectivity cooperation to support a free, open, and resilient Indo-Pacific as the 2025 Quad Leaders' Summit in New Delhi draws near.

Quad’s Connectivity Challenge: Countering BRI with Transparent Alternatives

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has surpassed Quad endeavors in scope and scale, making connectivity and infrastructure crucial arenas for geopolitical influence. The Quad's combined on-ground presence is still quite minor, consisting of only a few small projects valued at about US$0.5 billion, despite Beijing having funded over 20,000 projects and frequently capturing critical assets like Pakistan's Gwadar port and Sri Lanka's Hambantota port.

Challenges and Possibilities

In today's global geopolitics, connectivity, collaboration, and infrastructure development are hotly debated topics. Multifaceted interconnectedness can be used to obtain geopolitical influence, as demonstrated by China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Each Quad country has responded by launching its own connection programs, most of which are local in scope. The Quad's combined impact is still quite minor, though, consisting primarily of a few small-scale green energy facilities and a subsea cable project in Palau, totaling only about US$0.5 billion.

The BRI, on the other hand, has greatly increased its worldwide footprint. Through its policy banks, China has funded more than 3000-4000 projects by 2023, most of which were carried out by Chinese private or state-owned enterprises. Beijing now has significant geoeconomic clout as a result. This leverage is best exemplified by Sri Lanka's debt crisis, which culminated in a 99-year lease of Hambantota Port to a Chinese corporation, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which provides access to Gwadar.Local economies in Asia and Africa are becoming more and more linked to Beijing's objectives due to Chinese-funded infrastructure in the energy, transportation, and digital sectors. There is limited room for rivalry because the scope and pace of BRI implementation frequently surpass Western efforts.

Nevertheless, there are also opportunities for strategic involvement due to the ongoing Sino-Quad rivalry. Many countries are becoming more wary of the BRI's opaque agreements and debt risks. The Global South's economy continues to depend heavily on infrastructure development, so there is a clear need for sustainable, transparent alternatives. By coordinating their foreign policy with their development assistance programs, which are mostly based on Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows, the Quad can satisfy this desire. By emphasizing strategic investments that benefit partner countries and US interests, the recently established "America First Foreign Assistance" policy stance, a replacement for USAID could be extremely helpful in this regard.

There is an opportunity to improve coordination of foreign aid in areas of shared interest, such as the Gulf and Southeast Asia, during the upcoming Quad Leaders' Summit in New Delhi. Initiatives like the Critical Minerals Alliance, Quad Ports of the Future (QFPF), and the Blue Dot Network might be the focus of future cooperation between the Quad's Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). These initiatives might provide a strong and convincing substitute for the BRI if they are coordinated under a more comprehensive connectivity framework. It is encouraging to note that a number of countries in the Global South have already shown interest in transparent, high-quality infrastructure projects, demonstrating their readiness for this kind of strategy.

The Indian Ocean Region's Growing Strategic Footprint

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has rewritten India's destiny in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) after two trips to two southern neighboring countries in less than a month. In mid-March, the Prime Minister of Mauritius elevated his earlier SAGAR plan to MAHASAGAR. nFollowing this, he signed the first-ever defense memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Sri Lanka in early April, this time with the center-left JVP, which has long been an India-baiter, and its president, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in power and fully controlling the 225-member Parliament.

For the uninitiated, MAHASAGAR means "ocean," while SAGAR means "sea" in several Indian languages. Aiming for South Asia, Modi's 2015 acronym SAGAR meant for "Security and Growth for All in the Region." After that, MAHASAGAR reads, "Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions," in 2025, ten years later. The phrases "Region" in the first and "Regions" in the second are the obvious changes or upgrades, even if the essence of the two terminologies is essentially the same.

Both suggested that India was assuming the lead and accountability for mutual development and safety. However, throughout the ensuing decade, the Indian side was indicating that it was ready to assume more responsibilities, extending beyond the immediate South Asian region to a wider geopolitical space, or "regions."

Possibilities and difficulties

It is easy to find the reasons for this level of readiness. The SAGAR program, which formalized what India had been doing in the region for ten years, achieved the purpose to a larger extent and more quickly than may have been anticipated, according to the ground realities. Although India did not actively pursue those prospects, it was perhaps the only country prepared to provide medical kits and vaccines to both neighbors and distant allies when the global economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 epidemic struck.

When the human crisis grew out of control, India alone saw possibilities in the challenges that the pandemic presented, while other countries that were better positioned and supposedly better equipped found challenges in opportunities, though this is not the correct word to use, to assist their brother nations. No, unlike many others, India was not using the pandemic to play geopolitical games. If only they had stepped up to the challenge.

Rather, it was a translation of the centuries-old national ethos of "Yaadum Oore, Yavarum Kelir" in Tamil and "Vasudeva Kudumbakam" in Sanskrit for India. The "world is only a large family," according to both. Additionally, it suggested that everyone must assist one another.

Prime Minister Modi's visit to Mauritius as the chief guest at the National Day celebrations on March 12 will always be remembered for his more significant statement, in addition to further strengthening bilateral ties in terms of strategic cooperation and developmental aid.

The renaming of India's "holistic" approach to bilateral and, more recently, multilateral cooperation—which encompasses development and security together—seems to have been the result of much consideration. In a sense, it's India's reaction to China's Belt and Road Initiative. It was asserted at the outset that the BRI embodied China's intention for international developmental cooperation.

However, China's checkbook diplomacy on white elephant projects, particularly in Third World countries that are headed toward debt and economic collapse, has featured strategic forays that the latter were unable to reject, even without mentioning the Belt and Road Initiative. Even worse, the BRI failed to devastate national economies because of a glaringly defective design. It involved a large Chinese loan line with comparatively higher interest rates and strict repayment plans, and it produced enormous assets that had no real use.

The Hambantota experience in Sri Lanka is the most well-known example in the area. It goes without saying that the initial agreement resulted in Sri Lanka ceding a portion of its territory since the Chinese loan was not paid. Despite its alleged 99-year duration, the Hambantota lease is meaningless. Furthermore, more than ten years of Chinese investments have not produced any jobs for the local population, incomes for families, or revenue for the Sri Lankan government. However, the first result of such Chinese support is familiarity with the host countries and an awareness of their institutional flaws, which the opponents of the Cold War had exploited. Similarly, the goal appears to suffocate the host countries.

More recently, the so-called Chinese research vessels have ventured into the Indian Ocean. India, one of the IOR countries in the near neighborhood, believes that China is using the research ships for two reasons, despite denials to the contrary.

Countries such as India see two elements, one of which is a spy element. It goes without saying that, with 149 members compared to the UN's 193, the BRI was formerly praised as the greatest international assembly of countries outside of the UN system. The host countries, however, cannot stand Beijing's attempts to intimidate them into joining or creating space in any other way, thus it is already failing. Another nation in the immediate Indian Ocean region where China's aid-turned-strategic aim has led to avoidable internal unrest is the Maldives.

PGII: The West’s Transparent Alternative to China’s BRI

At the 48th G-7 Summit, the United States and its G7 partners announced the ambitious Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). The United States and its allies announced the launch of the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative in 2021, with the goal of closing the $40 trillion infrastructure gap in developing countries.

The Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment is thus a relaunch of the B3W initiative. The PGII is considered as the G7's response to China's multitrillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to create connectivity, infrastructure, and commerce projects throughout Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America.

The PGII is a transparent and values-driven infrastructure partnership that addresses the infrastructure needs of poor and middle-income nations while also supporting the economic and national security goals of the US and its allies. Under the PGII, the G7 will raise 600 billion dollars by 2027 to fund "game-changing" and "transparent" infrastructure projects in poor and middle-income nations. The President of the United States declared that the country will channel $200 billion USD in grants, public financing, and private capital to the PGII over the next five years. The President of the European Commission announced Europe's resolve to mobilize 300 billion euros for the partnership over the same time period.

In addition to these PGII projects, the EU's Global Gateway is developing connectivity infrastructure, upgrading roads, laying undersea and terrestrial optical fiber cables, and improving port infrastructure in 29 African countries. Some of these major projects include a critical raw minerals supply chain development partnership with Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, a 10,000-kilometer 6-country optic fibre cable with the DRC, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mozambique, and multiple renewable energy projects in 21 countries that will add 15.5GW of renewable energy capacity by 2027.This is where Italy stepped up in 2024 with its Mattei Plan for Africa, which will inject $8.2 billion in investments, loans, and equity into Africa's education and training, agriculture, health, water, infrastructure, and energy sectors to support economic growth.