THE STRUGGLE FOR SOUTH CHINA SEA : GROWING TENSIONS AND LEGAL CHALLENGES
- Swetang Choubey
- 19 hours ago
- 6 min read
INTRODUCTION South China Sea (SCS) is a region of immense geographic importance including its strategic location, fishing zones and tressures of natural resource (e.g. oil, gas and Rare Earth Metals / Elements). This obviously make it a point of attraction on a geopolitical map [1]. Nonetheless, as the Dragon encompasses global economic and military standards the vast SCS struggles with the ‘one-power dominance’. Historically, due to such significance, countries have claimed several locations- mostly the islands like Paracel (disputed between China, Vietnam and Tiawan) and Spratley islands (disputed between the Philippines, Taiwan, China, etc). China had enounced its Nine-dash line in the mid-twentieth century under Chairman Mao [2]; but with the passage of time, claims have got more strength and international laws have been challenged by growing Chinese dominance across the SCS and the world. China has not just pushed the United Nations Convention on the Laws Of the Sea (UNCLOS) back here, but also humiliated sovereign claims of littoral states of this region. On other sides, like degradation of marine environment, states of SCS figure each other for the recent damages while fishing or tapping natural resources [3]. World economic powers like Japan, USA and Australia have utter concerns regarding emerged Chinese assertiveness and so are monitoring and raising objections frequently.
CHINA’S ASSERTION IN THE SCS IN RECENT YEARS : Even though UNCLOS provided states to adhere with a 200 nautical miles’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) decades back, China dominates entire SCS that is scattered across an area of more than 3.5 million km2. As decades passed, this region acclaimed a major status in terms of money generated by trade through its maritime routes. Nonetheless, it is notable that China has pinched the freedom of navigation of nearby littoral states and led to their strategic and particularly economic opportunities’ loss [4]. Rejecting Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) ruling of 2016 had officially emerged China as the hegemonic state in the SCS. More so, it has been headlined multiple times that China launched ‘anti-diplomatic’ steps against the ASEAN members; most notable ones have been witnessed by the Philippines with whom People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has conflicted many a times on the sea itself [5]. Also, by building artificial islands over the sea, China is now ‘evidently’ proving its EEZ in the entire geopolitical sphere of SCS, that too in and around most profitable areas of the SCS (e.g. presence of natural resources and variety of fishes near Scarborough shoal). In addition to the profits, militarization of these islands is also observed in the recent years [6] . Such activities are reflecting the assertive nature and concrete commitments of China in order to fulfil its future goals while ignoring international laws.
RESPONSES OF EXTERNAL POWERS : Intensity of tension has rapidly advanced across west Pacific, one thing to note here, China has grown immensely in every eminent context and with such aura it has become more capable of supressing the weaker ones in the region. So undoubtedly, external powers are finding ways to build worthy and deepen relations with ASEAN. Fulfilling own interests and combating Chinese aggression in the SCS are primary goals of such external entities. As ex-deputy NSA of India SD Pradhan once accounted Vietnam’s bamboo diplomacy (while describing its strategic importance) – its foreign policy of deep-rooted cultural values (like bamboo itself), principle of persistence and mutual respect for independence – it becomes necessary to understand such an emerging player in the region is facing assertions along its own EEZ [7]. Activities related to illegitimate intrusion in sovereign EEZ by PLA Navy have been raised and summoned by more ASEAN members in recent years and so there is a gap between aggressive Chinese strategies and control over the SCS; this can be filled by external powers and so we can witness diplomatic and military engagements of not only major but even emerging powers of the Indo-Pacific (such as India, Australia and South Korea).
Since the victory of PLA navy in the Paracel islands’ standoff of 1974 – when the U.S had lessened military assistance to south Vietnam’s security (due to the Paris peace accord of 1973) and deduction of Vietnamese forces from the islands were done [8] – Chinese movements have been interestingly monitored by major powers of the Indo-Pacific rim like U.S, Japan, India and Australia. It is notable that there had been a mutual defence treaty signed between the U.S.A and the Philippines in 1951 only; accepting ASEAN’s weak diplomacy with China on SCS disputes (referring to ASEAN being unable to negotiate with the People’s Republic of China since the beginning of this diplomatic process in mid-2000s), Indo-Pacific giants are therefore eminently playing role in delimiting Chinese assertive control on the region [9]. Not even a couple years ago, SQUAD was initiated reflecting high-intensity military check-up in the SCS region grouped by the U.S, Japan, Australia and the Philippines.
It is also evident now, that this vast Indo-Pacific region is no more undermining China’s aggressive approach towards ASEAN members in the SCS; India is one prime example which was not as active as today. When QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) got established more that one and a half decade ago, other Pacific-shored democracies were participating in dialogue-exchanges, while India maintained diplomatic and a quite neutral stance with due respecting the original motive of the grouping- that was to ensure humanitarian assistance (mainly caused required at disasters) [10]. Nonetheless, in the Modi-era, a second version of India’s role in QUAD is observed that engages itself in military exercises like ‘Malabar’. More so, India is exporting military equipment to the Philippines in the very recent years and also expects more selling in upcoming years [11]. Such strategic developments have come after China’s several debatable map-releases and standoff with India. Thus India’s response in the SCS can be understood.
INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND WAY FROWARD : As discussed earlier that China does not just claim almost entire SCS on the basis of it’s historic ‘nine-dash line’ but now, even has constructed artificial islands to concrete such claimant. When Permanent Court of Arbitration or PCA had ruled against Chinese historic claim on the SCS in 2016 through UNCLOS annexure VII, it was itself contradictory to the UNCLOS. Firstly, “PCA clearly denied China’s historic claims by referring activities conducted- such as fishing and else- by different littoral states’ people throughout evident history (not just exclusively those of by Chinese population in SCS); more to this, tribunal court even declined ‘extra’ EEZ claims of China that exceeded Spratly islands’ capabilities. In simple terms, Philippines’ EEZ was safeguarded from Chinese assertiveness” [12].
Here, UNCLOS has put some limitations regarding states’ sovereignty that basically lets any state protect its sovereign rights in the sea up to its respected border line. This thoroughly fails Tribunal ruling and only questions the living and non-living features in the SCS used by China [13]. Although, relating with the last statement, PCA’s question reflected the environmental concerns in the region. Construction of islands have severely damaged reefs of many natural islands, over-fishing (done on the name of EEZ) by China is also leading to the extinction of several marine creatures, and more such visible dangers are occurring in the SCS [14].
In the meantime, there has to be some responsible gesture from all states indulged in the SCS disputes because this vast region shelters hundreds of millions of people and holds a significant economic status (particularly in terms of the trade routes lying within the region).
Concluding the article with following points for a way forward :-
1. International entities (including countries) should step ahead to negotiate with dispute-involved states like China, Vietnam and the Philippines since mostly have precise trade interests diluted inside SCS.
2. China should accept reasonable global norms as its assertiveness and non-accepting approach would ultimately stretch disputes into major conflicts or war.
3. Some viable actions shall be taken by international law bodies to compel aggressive or powerful states abide with the judgement.
4. Emerging external countries like India should emphasize implicating its Indo-Pacific strategies such as deepening ties with ASEAN members to maintain balance of power in (future) critical situations.
5. China shall exclusively protect marine environment (whatever areas it lawfully holds) to deter future consequences.
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