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The Geopolitical Competition Between China and India in the Indo-Pacific

Introduction

In recent times, the term Indo-Pacific has come into the spotlight within the maritime domain. Various countries claim credit for emphasizing its importance. America thinks it played a pivotal role, as the U.S. President Donald Trump used the term during the 2017 APEC Summit. However, Japan believes that the credit goes to them, since former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe invoked the concept in 2007 to highlight the convergence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a vital economic and geopolitical nexus. India has demonstrated a stronger attachment to the concept by establishing a dedicated Indo-Pacific division within its Ministry of External Affairs[1]. In contrast, Russia refers to it as a "divide and conquer" policy of the United States, aimed at deliberately increasing tensions between India and China by redefining the Asia-Pacific as an “India-specific” region[2].

 

These developments highlight the active participation of major world powers in the region. This is primarily because the area serves as both a significant source and destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). Most major global supply chains are connected to the Indo-Pacific, and the region’s vast Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and long coastlines give coastal nations a competitive advantage in attracting and exploiting marine and mineral resources[3]. Furthermore, there is intense power rivalry and strategic competitiveness in the region, making it a central theatre in global geopolitics.

 

According to a US Defense Department report, China has the biggest navy in the world today, with more than 370 vessels[4]. By 2030, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is expected to gradually increase its size to 460 ships. The current vessels include major surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships and fleet auxiliaries[5]. China is also increasing its influence in the Indo-Pacific region through its strategic initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), String of Pearls Policy, which include military and infrastructure investment. Chinese interests in the "far seas" were first elevated to the level of national security in 2015, which aspired to establish the Blue water navy by offshore waters defense and open seas protection[6].

As one of the world's fastest-growing economies and the second-largest military spender in the Indo-Pacific, India has emerged as a crucial player in countering China’s growing influence[7]. As per the Global Military Net report of 2025, India is ranked ninth in the world with more than 280 vessels. The current vessels include patrol boats, support ships, submarines, corvettes, amphibious ships and aircraft carriers[8].  In response to China, India is adopting a multifaceted strategy by strengthening its role as a “Net Security Provider” to become a regional leader by advancing naval modernization, and pursuing diplomatic initiatives such as the Necklace of Diamonds[9].  


South China Sea Dispute

The South China Sea is bordered by mainly eight states: the PRC; the Republic of China (ROC), or Taiwan; the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; the Republic of the Philippines; Malaysia; the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam; the Republic of Singapore; and the Republic of Indonesia. The region holds immense importance as it is rich in resources, holds high potential to be a source for hydrocarbons, and has significant strategic and political importance[10].

 

Source : U.S. Geological Survey, World Bank, ESRI, and U.S. Energy Information Administration

 

 In 2019, it held an estimated 12 percent of the world’s total fish catch. Further, more than  40 percent of the world’s liquified natural gas passed through the South China Sea, and The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that there are 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas beneath the South China Sea[11].

China transports most goods through the South China Sea and hence is the most active player in the dispute. The Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands are the main regions of contention which China claims to own as per its nine-dash line. However,  Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam have overlapping claims in the region[12]. The most recent is that of the Philippines, where President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr made a strong statement at the 2nd ASEAN-GCC Summit. His focus was on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea[13].


India's policy on the South China Sea mainly revolves around the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While India has no territorial claim in the region, it firmly upholds the right to freedom of navigation and overflight, considering the South China Sea a global common which is crucial for maritime trade and regional stability. India has expressed concern over unilateral actions that undermine the rules-based order. On the ground, India has actively engaged through naval deployments and strategic partnerships. The Indian Navy has enhanced its presence in the region by participating in exercises like Malabar and conducting regular port calls. Additionally, India’s state-owned ONGC Videsh has maintained oil exploration activities in Vietnamese waters despite Chinese opposition, asserting its rights under international law. Strengthening bilateral ties with countries like Vietnam, India also provides defense equipment and training, contributing to the region's maritime security architecture. Overall, India's approach balances legal principles with cooperation, aiming to maintain peace, ensure free sea lanes, and counter coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific[14].

 

India and China Border Dispute

In 2017, the Doklam issue arose because of the Chinese policies of Salami Slicing and the Finger Strategy. China attempted to build a road in the area, and Indian troops, in support of their Bhutanese counterparts, objected, resulting in the standoff. It resulted in a 73-day standoff between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army, which ended in August 2017 after mutual disengagement.

 


Source: BBC News. "Map Showing the Location of Doklam Plateau and Nathu La Pass near the India-China-Bhutan Trijunction."

 

In May 2020, Indian and Chinese troops clashed at several locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), including Pangong Tso, Galwan Nalah, Demchok in Ladakh, and Naku La in Sikkim. The tensions escalated into a violent confrontation in Galwan Valley on June 15, 2020, resulting in casualties and heavy troop deployment with advanced weaponry from both sides. In the security aspect, the key challenge is the disagreement between LAC, this changes the territory from an actual territorial dispute to a state of militarisation.

 

Source :  BBC News. "Map of Kashmir Region Showing Areas of Conflict and Control among India, Pakistan, and China.”

 

It took around four years from 2020 for a diplomatic engagement and political agreement on patrolling arrangements in the disputed borders of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The BRICS Summit that happened in October 2024 gave a platform to India and China to finalise their militaries’ disengagement in Ladakh and restore regular, high-level dialogue on border management[15].

In the past too, China and India have had tough exchanges regarding Beijing’s attempts at so-called “standardisation” of names in Arunachal Pradesh. Similar attempts were made in April 2024, when Beijing announced the renaming of around 30 places in Arunachal Pradesh. In April 2023, China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs said it had “standardised” the names of 11 places, including several mountain peaks in India.

 

Due to the increasing interdependence on each other, armed conflict should be an unlikely possibility, as it will lead to heavy costs across both spheres. However, this does not stop China from participating to hamper the security of India in any dispute. In the recent Operation Sindoor, China showed direct support to Pakistan by providing them satellite and air defense support[16]. Post the operation too, China extended direct support to Pakistan as the officials met on 16th May to enhance satellite and 5G support for the Pakistan Army[17]. On the other hand, competition with China has led to India entering additional partnerships with countries across the Indo-Pacific and Europe to counter China’s rising regional diplomatic, economic and defence influence.


Regional Influence


CHINA

China’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is based on economic, diplomatic and military factors, with a special focus on regional-level strategy. Here, the main focus was on “strong points” with proximity to its borders and to its neighbouring countries. This goal was achieved through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013[18]. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) comprises two major components: the Overland Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. Strategically, the BRI is perceived as a Chinese effort to overcome the “Malacca Dilemma” by establishing alternative trade routes and enhancing connectivity[19]. In the Indo-Pacific region, China has made significant infrastructure investments, particularly in port development, many of which are viewed as having potential dual military and civilian uses. Key examples include the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, and the Djibouti Logistics Facility.

 

Critics from India and the West have frequently raised concerns regarding the BRI. Particularly, issues of “debt-trap diplomacy”, the dual-use nature of infrastructure projects, and the lack of transparency. The Hambantota Port is a prominent example where Sri Lanka was unable to repay Chinese loans; this led to the leasing of the port to China for 99 years. In 2022, the docking of the Chinese research vessel “Yuan Wang 5” at Hambantota was perceived by India as an act of strategic surveillance[20].

The Gwadar Port mirrors China’s dual-use strategy. Located near the Strait of Hormuz and in close proximity to India, the deep-water port is capable of accommodating submarines and aircraft carriers. Additionally, China has developed Hangor-class submarines for Pakistan, which are the export variant of China’s Type 039A (Yuan-class) submarines, reinforcing concerns over strategic military cooperation[21].

Similarly, the Djibouti Logistics Facility, initially presented as a support base for anti-piracy efforts and UN peacekeeping missions, has evolved into a fully operational Chinese military base[22]. Its establishment reflects not only China’s interest in securing access to raw materials but also the strategic significance of Djibouti's location at the western edge of the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa.

 

India

India has focused on strengthening regional partnerships to counter China's growing regional assertiveness, uphold the international rules-based order, and maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific, mainly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Act East Policy.

 

Revived in 2017, The Quad brings together four major powers: India, the United States, Australia, and Japan. With a shared goal of enhancing maritime security, the Quad members have engaged in joint naval exercises, such as the Malabar Exercise. In addition, the Quad has launched the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative, including a new regional training program MAITRI, to help partners effectively utilise tools for maritime surveillance and cooperation. The Quad Investors Network (QUIN) has also foregrounded key areas like cybersecurity, renewable energy, and aerospace, promoting increased investment in critical technologies[23]. Moreover, the Quad has initiated the Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aiming to secure undersea communication cables and strengthen safe internet connectivity across the region. Although China has labelled the Quad as an "Asian NATO", this is a mischaracterization. The Quad is not a military alliance. In fact, China's defense expenditure surpasses the combined military budgets of Japan and Australia, underscoring the inaccuracy of such claims[24].

 

Alongside the Quad, India’s Act East Policy has significantly expanded its engagement with Southeast Asia. A major milestone has been India’s ascension to a strategic partner of ASEAN, resulting in a doubling of bilateral trade. This policy also marked India’s formal entry into the Indo-Pacific strategic discourse, emphasizing a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based regional order. India’s Indo-Pacific outreach is centred on maritime security cooperation, with a strong focus on defense capacity building[25].

India’s formal entry into the Indo-Pacific also underscored its vision of becoming a net security provider in the region. This shift signifies India’s efforts to expand its diplomatic and strategic reach in response to the ambiguity and challenges posed by China’s growing assertiveness.

 

 

Global Implications

The continuing rivalries between India and China have led to the involvement of superpowers in the Indo-Pacific. The USA wants to counter the growing opportunistic aggression of China to prevent it from becoming a global player and hence supports India. For this, the USA has participated in many regional organizations like ASEAN, the Quad, and APEC. During the Trump administration, the USA focused on advancing the rules-based regional order, rebranded as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). The Biden administration further created an Indo-Pacific Action Plan to drive new resources to the region, leading to initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and reinforced deterrence. The USA’s emphasis on collaboration with regional stakeholders shows that the Indo-Pacific has become a key region for cooperation. Even during the Russia-Ukraine war, it has not disengaged from this important region.

 

Australia was initially ambivalent regarding the protection of the rules-based order and was the first country to withdraw from the Quad when it was conceptualized in 2007. By 2010, its policies towards China shifted to disillusionment. Eventually, to counter China’s regional dominance, Australia joined the USA’s FOIP. This was further solidified in 2021 with the establishment of AUKUS, strengthening Indo-Pacific military ties with the USA.

 

Japan has always been a key ideologue for the preservation of the rules-based order and was the country to ideate the Quad in 2007. Japan’s maritime proximity to China and ongoing territorial disputes have remained central to its Indo-Pacific policy[26]. It remains a key ally in the region, with cooperation further expanded by the signing of the U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience Partnership in 202.

 

This partnership demonstrates how the major players in the Indo-Pacific region are working together to counter the rise of China.

 

Conclusion

The geopolitical rivalry between China and India clearly highlights the complex and many-sided relationship shared by the two countries across various domains. Both nations exert influence in the Indo-Pacific region through different means and are increasingly using the domain of navigation to expand their interests. The latest BRICS summit also reflected the involvement of the two in the peaceful resolution of border disputes.

 

While border tensions, military and naval strategies, and influence over regional players continue to define their rivalry, these challenges have not entirely hindered opportunities for cooperation in other areas such as trade and manufacturing. This is especially important during the Trump 2.0 administration, which is marked by rising tariffs and the U.S.-China trade war. Moreover, India and China often share common perspectives when representing the Global South on international platforms.


 

References:

 

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