US - Venezuela Tensions: How Close is Open Conflict?
- Kunwar Chaitanya Sah
- 18 minutes ago
- 5 min read
Tensions between Venezuela and the United States are now at their highest level in years. The Trump administration has sent more military assets to the Caribbean, expanded sanctions and officially labelled key Venezuela-linked criminal networks as terrorist groups. At the same time, Venezuelan leaders claim Washington is looking for a pretext to topple Nicolas Maduro and grab the country’s oil.
The risk of limited strikes or deadly incidents at sea and in the air is real. However, a full-scale US-Venezuela war still appears less likely, mainly because of regional diplomacy, Venezuela’s weak conventional forces are bolstered unintentionally by the huge political and economic costs that a large war would impose on Washington and its allies. A cost they are not willing to pay as of yet.
What is driving the escalation?
Several overlapping moves from Washington have pushed the confrontation into a more dangerous phase.
In early 2025, the US formally designated Tren de Aragua, a Venezuela origin gang, as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO).
In November 2025, the US also designated Cartel de los Soles, a shadowy network allegedly embedded within the Venezuelan state, as an FTO and a “Transnational terrorist group”.
US officials argue that both groups are deeply involved in drug trafficking and cross-border violence and that senior Venezuelan officials benefit from and even direct these networks. On the other hand, the Venezuelan state rejects these allegations outright and says Cartel de los Soles “does not exist”.
These designations sit on top of an already dense sanctions regime. Since 2024, the US has reimposed strict sanctions on Venezuela’s oil and gas sector after accusing Maduro of breaking electoral promises. The new “narco-terror” framing allows Washington to justify further financial pressure and even authorize the use of force under counterterrorism and counternarcotics narratives.
For Carcas, this looks like the legal and propaganda groundwork for regime change in all but name. Venezuelan officials link it to a long history of US interventions in Latin America and argue that oil, not drugs is the real driver.
Military moves and war signals
The military signaling is unusually heavy for a confrontation that is still formally “peacetime”.
The USS Gerald R. Ford, the world’s largest aircraft carrier, is now deployed in the southern Caribbean, along with other US warships and aircraft. Some estimates say about a quarter of all US warships currently at sea are concentrated near Venezuela, the biggest regional deployment since the 1989 Panama invasion.
The US carried out at least 20-21 strikes on suspected drug-smuggling vessels in and around Venezuelan waters in recent months. One particularly deadly attack is now under scrutiny: a second strike allegedly hit survivors in the water, raising possible war-crime concerns under the law of armed conflict.
A new US radar installation in Trinidad and Tobago, staffed by Marines has sparked debate across the Carribean. The host government calls it part of anti-drug efforts, but critics say it quietly ties Trinidad into a US campaign against Venezuela and increases the risk of the Caribbean being militarised again.
On 29 November 2025, President Trump went further and ordered Venezuelan airspace treated as closed, warning airlines, pilots and ‘traffickers’ to stay away and hinting that US land and air strikes could come “very soon”. This kind of language is extremely rare in US-Latin America relations and signals a willingness to use force.
Venezuela, by contrast, is in no position to fight a classic state-on-state war. Years of crisis, sanctions and under-investment have weakened its conventional forces. Caracas appears to be planning instead for “prolonged resistance”: irregular warfare, militants and guerrilla tactics designed to make any invasion costly and messy, not to defeat the US in open battle. A lesson many have learned from the decades of conflict in the Middle East.
Wider regional and energy stakes
The standoff is tightly linked to other disputes and to global oil markets.
Venezuela’s long-running territorial dispute with Guyana over the oil-rich Essequibo region has exacerbated regional tensions ever since major offshare oil finds were announced by ExxonMobil. In 2023-2024, the crisis led to an international Court of Justice case and US-Guyuna joint military exercises, prompting Brazil to reinforce its border and regional blocs to urge restraint.
Today, Guyana quietly welcomes US pressure on Maduro, seeing it as a way to deter Venezuelan moves on Essequibo and safeguard its new oil wealth. Caribbean states such as Trinidad and Tobago are more divided: they fear being dragged into a confrontation but also depend on Washington for trade, finance and security.
Experts state that any serious disruption of Venezuelan or Guyanese exports would send a signal echoing through the already tight global oil market. US decisions to reimpose or relax sanctions on Venezuelan crude have direct effects on prices and supply expectations, which in turn are a major deciding factor in gauging how far Trump is willing to go.
How likely is war?
Most experts see a spectrum of risk, not an automatic slide into a classic interstate war. On one side, the US now has:
Legal tools: terror and sanctions designations that frame certain Venezuelan networks as legitimate military targets.
Military tools: a strong naval and air presence, radar sites and a pattern of strikes against alleged smugglers.
This creates the capacity and narrative for limited campaigns, for example, a wave of strikes against “narco-terrorist” assets or state linked facilities, possibly even a short push aimed at toppling Maduro.
On the other side, there are strong constraints:
A major invasion would be costly and unpredictable and could trigger a long insurgency inside Venezuela.
Many Latin American governments and European partners oppose Maduro but do not want another Iraq or Libya style war in the region.
There is emerging legal debate, even inside the US, over whether a war-like campaign against cartels and gangs is lawful without explicit authorisation from congress.
The most immediate danger is not a planned invasion but miscalculation. A deadly incident at sea or in the air, a strike that kills many civilians or foreign nationals, or a sudden Venezuelan move in the Essequibo area could lock both sides into a cycle of retaliation that is hard to stop once it begins.
Gray-zone conflict, Not yet open war
In the short term, the most realistic scenario is continued gray-zone confrontation:
More sanctions and financial pressure.
Ongoing covert and intelligence operations.
Selective strikes on ships, airstrips, or suspected cartel sites, framed as counter-drug or counter-terror missions.
Intense information warfare and legal battles over war-crime claims and the status of non-state armed groups.
Venezuela will likely continue to lean on partners like Russia and Iran, seek diplomatic cover from friendly governments, and invest in militias and irregular forces to deter or complicate any external attack.
Therefore, a full-scale US-Venezuela war remains a low-probability but high-impact scenario. For now, the Caribbean is caught between the classic adage of “ a well behind me, a creek ahead”. Narratives of Counter-Narcotics, Energy Security, and the risk of becoming a frontline in a new American intervention have ensured that an entire continent is now holding its breath, fearing what is to come.
References:
Al Jazeera. (2025, November 29). Trump declares all airspace over and around Venezuela closed amid anti-drug operations. Live Mint. https://www.livemint.com/news/us-news/trump-declares-airspace-above-and-surrounding-venezuela-to-be-closed-in-its-entirety-amid-anti-drug-operations-11764420940904.html
Reuters. (2025, October 31). Did the US military commit a war crime in boat attack off Venezuela? The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/dec/04/venezuela-boat-strikes-legality-hegseth
Reuters. (2025, November 11). US aircraft carrier moves into Latin America as Venezuela announces big military deployment. Dawn https://www.dawn.com/news/1954492
Reuters. (2025, November 24). US labels Venezuela's Cartel de los Soles as terrorist organisation. India Today https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/us-labels-venezuelas-cartel-de-los-soles-as-terrorist-organisation-2825320-2025-11-24
Rubio, M. (2025, November 16). Terrorist Designations of Cartel de los Soles. United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/terrorist-designations-of-cartel-de-los-soles
The Hindu. (2025, November 24). U.S. set to label Maduro-tied Cartel de los Soles as terror organization. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-label-cartel-de-los-soles-terror-organisation/article70316573.ece
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