"Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The New Game of Power"

 Introduction

China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific has become one of the most defining shifts in global geopolitics today. What once was a primarily economic rise has evolved into a broad, strategic push through trade, military strength, and diplomacy to shape the region on China’s terms. From building ports and infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative to asserting sweeping claims in the South China Sea, China is working to secure both economic and strategic advantages. At the same time, its rapid military modernization especially the expansion of its navy and long-range capabilities signals an ambition to project power well beyond its borders. On the diplomatic front, China engages in a careful balancing act using platforms like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to win influence while building partnerships that counter the presence of the U.S. and its allies.[1] This mix of cooperation and competition defines China’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. For countries across the region and for the world understanding this approach is key to navigating the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead.

China’s refusal to accept the South China Sea ruling in 2016 pushed many countries in the Indo-Pacific to form smaller, focused groups to deal with rising tensions. As China’s influence grew through projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, the U.S. tried to strengthen its old alliances by connecting them for example, through the Australia–Japan–U.S. trilateral dialogue. But these efforts were not strong enough to stop China’s growing presence.[2] This led to the creation of new minilateral groups like the Squad and AUKUS and revive the existing like Quad. These groupings are more flexible and faster in responding to shared concerns like security, technology, and China’s assertive actions in the region. These arrangements are not formal alliances but flexible partnerships built to respond to China’s growing assertiveness in the region. They help countries coordinate more closely on defence, intelligence, and maritime security without the slow pace of larger multilateral institutions. The Quad, for example, brings together four major democracies to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, while AUKUS focuses on advanced defence technologies. These smaller, focused groupings often called “minilateral” platforms offer quicker decision-making, stronger trust-building, and a shared sense of responsibility without directly threatening other countries, making them a practical response to today’s regional challenges.[3]

Flexible Partnerships for a Fragmented Indo-Pacific

China’s growing assertiveness and the global disruption caused by COVID-19 have reshaped the Indo-Pacific’s strategic landscape. Many countries have begun shifting away from relying solely on traditional multilateral institutions, which often struggle with slow decision-making and broad consensus. Instead, they are increasingly turning to minilateral groupings into smaller, more flexible partnerships like the Quad, AUKUS, and the U.S.–Japan–ROK trilateral.[4] These formats allow like-minded countries to act quickly and focus on shared challenges such as regional security, climate change, and critical infrastructure. While minilaterals aren’t a replacement for multilateralism, they help fill the gap between bilateral ties and large global forums. Their informal nature allows for quicker cooperation and more targeted outcomes, making them well-suited to respond to the Indo-Pacific’s evolving geopolitical realities.

As the Indo-Pacific becomes more contested and complex, minilateralism offers a realistic and adaptable path forward. These smaller frameworks not only reflect shifting power dynamics but also demonstrate how countries are rethinking diplomacy and security cooperation in a way that balances flexibility with strategic intent. In this evolving order, minilaterals are likely to play a growing role in shaping the region’s future.[5]

Strategic Minilaterals Shaping the Indo-Pacific

These minilateral initiatives offer agility, strategic clarity, and faster coordination. Unlike broader multilateral forums, they are purpose-driven and action-oriented.Below are three key minilaterals reshaping the Indo-Pacific security landscape.

QUAD

The Quad has come a long way from Shinzo Abe’s original idea to becoming a key minilateral group shaping the Indo-Pacific. Its informal structure gives it the flexibility to respond to evolving regional challenges without the rigidity of formal alliances.[7] It started as a loose coordination has now developed into a platform with clear strategic intent. A major example of this is the Malabar naval exercise, which showcases increasing trust, coordination, and operational synergy among the four navies. These aren’t just routine drills but a strong message about the members’ shared commitment to regional security.

 The Quad’s consistent emphasis on a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, especially on maintaining freedom of navigation, reflects its growing alignment on key maritime issues. Quad’s actions and language clearly reflect shared concerns over China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and across the broader Indo-Pacific.[9] In this context, the Quad has moved beyond being just a diplomatic forum but it has evolved into a strategic counterbalance to China’s unilateral moves in the region. By reinforcing principles such as freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and maritime security, the Quad plays a crucial role in promoting a rules-based order and ensuring that the Indo-Pacific remains open, stable, and multipolar.[12]

AUKUS

While the Quad is built around shared values and common interests, AUKUS brings in the missing piece with a clear-cut security alliance between the U.S., the U.K., and Australia. Where the Quad focuses more on diplomatic coordination and regional principles, AUKUS takes a sharper approach by strengthening military capabilities, especially in areas like nuclear-powered submarines, cyber security, and advanced defence technologies. It adds a hard power edge to the Indo-Pacific strategy that complements the Quad’s softer framework. [10]

AUKUS is perhaps the most direct example of how the U.S. is building a web of minilateral partnerships to respond to China’s rising military and technological clout.[14] Alongside initiatives like the Quad, IPEF, and Build Back Better World, AUKUS reflects Washington’s Strategy. Instead of acting alone, the U.S. is now focusing on working closely with trusted allies to shape a more secure and balanced Indo-Pacific, where power and responsibility are shared, and no single actor dominates.

SQUAD

The creation of SQUAD bringing together the U.S., Japan, Australia, and the Philippines marked a significant development in Indo-Pacific security, especially for smaller states directly threatened by China’s actions. For the Philippines, facing repeated harassment in the South China Sea and limited support from ASEAN's soft diplomacy approach, this minilateral provided much-needed strategic backing. The turning point came after the 2016 arbitral ruling and more recently, when a physical clash with Chinese forces injured Filipino personnel and damaged vessels.[6] President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. responded by vowing proportional countermeasures, signaling a tougher line.

SQUAD complements existing frameworks like the EDCA with the U.S., giving Manila stronger leverage in defending its maritime claims. For the Philippines, the South China Sea lies at the heart of its security concerns, and SQUAD reinforces its capacity to push back. More broadly, it shows that minilateralism is not exclusive to major powers but it also gives smaller states a stronger voice and deterrent capacity in shaping the regional balance of power.[10]

India’s Minilateral Turn in the Indo-Pacific

India is adjusting its foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific by turning to minilateralism into small, focused partnerships with like-minded countries to deal with specific regional issues. Since large international groups often move too slowly, India prefers flexible arrangements like the Quad (with the U.S., Japan, and Australia) to work on important matters such as maritime security, disaster relief, and supply chain stability.[5] In parallel, India has strengthened bilateral defense cooperation with countries like Indonesia and the Philippines, while also expanding its role in humanitarian and disaster response. Its growing collaboration with Australia further supports joint efforts on climate change, cybersecurity, and infrastructure development. These minilateral frameworks offer India a more agile and responsive diplomatic path, allowing it to contribute meaningfully to the region’s evolving security architecture while reinforcing a rules-based, inclusive Indo-Pacific order.[13]

Way forward: Toward a Balanced and Resilient Indo-Pacific

In the face of China’s rising influence and growing strategic uncertainty in Asia, minilateral frameworks like the Quad, AUKUS and SQUAD have emerged as key instruments of regional cooperation. Moving forward, these minilaterals are likely to expand their scope into cyber security, critical technologies, and maritime domain awareness further consolidating their role as strategic stabilisers in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.[11] These minilateral partnership, while lacking formal alliance commitments, offer practical avenues for like-minded partners to coordinate on security, technology, and maritime stability. As these groupings deepen their engagement through joint exercises, policy dialogues, and capacity-building efforts, they are poised to play a critical role in shaping an Indo-Pacific order that is balanced, resilient, and rules-based.  In a region where traditional multilateral forums often face limitations, these targeted partnerships reflect a more pragmatic response to fast-changing geopolitical realities focusing on shared interests, quicker coordination, and the collective aim of ensuring peace and stability in Asia

References

1.      McGowan, Abi. 2025a. “China in the Indo-Pacific: March 2025.” Council on Foreign Relations, April 9, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/article/china-indo-pacific-march-2025.

2.      Analytica, Team Red Lantern. 2024. “Team Red Lantern Analytica.” June 26, 2024. https://redlanternanalytica.com/tracing-chinas-strategic-approach-in-the-indo-pacific-region/.

3.      Lee-Brown, Troy. 2018. “Asia’s Security Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific.” East Asia 35 (2): 163–76. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-018-9290-9.

4.      Koga, Kei. 2022. “A New Strategic Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific.” Asia Policy 17 (4): 27–34. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0063

5.      Chakraborty, Sreshtha. 2022. “Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: Is It the Future?” The Geopolitics. October 28, 2022. https://thegeopolitics.com/minilateralism-in-the-indo-pacific-is-it-the-future/

6.      Rainsy, Sam. 2025. Economy Archives - the Geopolitics. The Geopolitics. https://thegeopolitics.com/archives/topics/economics/.

7.      “The ‘Squad’ Is a Welcome Spin-off, But The Quad Is The Main Game.” n.d. Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/squad-welcome-spin-quad-main-game.

8.      “Sharma.” n.d. Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/squad-welcome-spin-quad-main-game.

9.      Tzinieris, Sarah, Rishika Chauhan, and Eirini Athanasiadou. 2023. “India’s a La Carte Minilateralism: AUKUS and the Quad.” The Washington Quarterly 46 (4): 21–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2023.2285540.

10.  Haldar, Sayantan. 2024. “Squad and the Rise of Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific.” Orfonline.Org. June 18, 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/squad-and-the-rise-of-minilateralism-in-the-indo-pacific.

11.  Day, Ainesh. 2024. “The Rise of Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (a Personal Reflection).” Regions Magazine, January. https://doi.org/10.1080/13673882.2024.12466430.

12.  Ghangla. n.d. “The Rise of Minilateral Alliances: Quad As A Case Study.” https://stratheia.com/the-rise-of-minilateral-alliances-quad-as-a-case-study/.

13.  Smack. 2025. “Embracing Minilateralism: India’s Strategic Edge in the Indo-Pacific.” April 13, 2025. https://policystability.com/post/2025-04/minilateralism-india-strategic-edge/.

14.  Wilkins, Thomas. 2024a. “What Is the Future of Strategic Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific? The Quad, AUKUS, and the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral - Australian Institute of International Affairs.” Australian Institute of International Affairs. December 19, 2024. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/what-is-the-future-of-strategic-minilateralism-in-the-indo-pacific-the-quad-aukus-and-the-us-japan-australia-trilateral/.