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China’s Iran Conundrum: Analysing China’s Position in the Iran-Israel Conflict

Amid the conflict between Iran and Israel, one country maintained a chilling silence. The lack of immediate response from the People’s Republic of China over the escalating attacks has raised many eyebrows and drawn even more speculations. Does the silence signal towards a confused Beijing or a long-term strategy? What are the variables at play, shaping China’s position towards Iran in the ongoing conflict? As we look at these questions, we arrive at the most important question that currently intimidates China: how one must offset a potential energy crisis?


The Linguistic Pivot 


The silence was finally interrupted when China released its official diplomatic statements - “China is highly concerned over the military strikes against Iran launched by the U.S. and Israel.” and with the most recent statement by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning’s in response to a question on politically supporting Iran - “China opposes the U.S. and Israel launching military strikes against Iran in violation of international law. We support Iran in safeguarding its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and national dignity and in upholding its legitimate and lawful rights and interests.”


The geopolitical world runs on its many undercurrents, whether social, economic or political. In this instant case, it is the linguistic undercurrents that warrants our attention. China has long been a defender of Iran’s desire to develop its nuclear capabilities. In September 2025, when President Xi Jinping met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, the Chinese President laid emphasis on how it respected Iran’s “right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy” This is highly contrasting to the language being employed currently, one which is devoid of anything nuclear. 


Additionally, China’s response to the entire conflict has also been rather bleak, having expressed being “highly concerned” over the missile strikes, Foreign Minister called the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “unacceptable”


The prolonged delay, the restrained language and the seemingly watered down response is rather confusing, considering the volatile circumstances Iran is currently in and seeing as the country has long been deemed as an ally of China. Even more so, when one thinks of China’s investments in Iran and the broader Middle East, and Iran’s role as the political counterweight against the United States in the Middle East, which again serves China’s interest. Wouldn’t it make more sense for China to vociferously aid Iran? Or least help in more tangible ways than lukewarm condemnation?


To understand, let’s delve into the variables that shape the dynamic between these countries.


The Political Variable


To begin with, China and Iran have enjoyed diplomatic ties since 1971 and these ties were elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2016. Despite sharing close ties this is not the first time China has refrained from backing Iran militarily. A similar restraint was practised in 2025 when Iran was attacked by Israel and the United States. 


Although this can seem puzzling at first since a weakened Iran would mean China’s already limited leverage in the Middle East would shrivel up as well. However, these decisions reflect China’s long-term objectives. Iran has already been facing crippling sanctions and these conflicts will further cause Iran to depend on China, both economically and politically. This dependency could also further prove advantageous for China’s trade with Iran, seeing as China already enjoys trade relations with Iran that are more favourable to it than the latter.


Furthermore, China has long been trying to establish itself as the harbinger of a new world order, and an alternative to U.S. hegemony that successfully undermines it. An engaged United States, entangled with the Middle East, leaves the Indo-Pacific unchecked since the US will be directing its sources towards the conflict, which could give China a chance to grow its influence without any hindrance, which may become a concern for India and the Global South as a whole. 


More importantly, China has been trying to bolster its presence in the Middle East, with its most recent example of sending an envoy for mediation in the Middle East (which countries specifically the envoy will be visiting or aiding has not been disclosed yet). Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun, in his Regular Press Conference held on 10th March 2026, remarked that China has been carrying out “intensive mediation efforts”, expressing grave concern over the tense situation in the Middle East. 


Back in 2023 as well, China brokered a “wave of reconciliation” between Saudi Arabia and Iran, mediated against the backdrop of years of hostility between the two countries which had destabilized the region increasingly. China’s mediator role found its genesis in the year 2003, with its role in getting Sudan to cooperate and agree to hosting a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. Its efforts remained confined to what was termed as “backseat mediation” - limited to UN resolutions, sending a Special Envoy for African Affairs and deployment of Chinese peacekeepers along with African Union troops. 


This gave way to China’s non-interventionist policy, that is, an approach that was severely apprehensive to externally caused regime change or military intervention. 


This policy extended to its involvement in the Middle East as well, with China’s involvement in the Syrian civil war where it focused on high-level mediation and using its veto against the sanctions on then Syrian President Bashar-al-Assad, while simultaneously increasing pressure on Assad to curb the regime’s violence. And more recently, China has used its influence amongst Arab countries to normalize relations with Syria.


This demonstrates the heavy influence that China holds in the Middle East. It invariably also brings into focus China’s economic investments in the region and the energy supply the Middle East provides China. These economic and energy variables are discussed in the following section.


The Energy & Economic Variables


China’s long-term Iran strategy does not diminish the importance of one pressing fact: China’s significant source of oil is based in Iran, therefore there is surely an energy crisis on its way if the conflict does not de-escalate soon. Even though China has diversified its channels, the dependency is too great to be countered by alternate sources, as China remains Iran’s biggest buyer for oil. In 2025, Iranian imports consisted of 13.4% of China’s overall import by sea. 


Furthermore, China promised to administer 400 billion dollars into Iran as part of its 25 year pact signed in 2021. This was done in exchange for oil supply at a significant discount, which once again, highlights the Chinese dependence on Iran for its energy security. Interestingly, China’s independent ‘teapot’ refineries (small, independent and privately-owned oil processors predominantly found in the Shandong province)  are heavily dependent on such discounted oil, which often comes from sanction-facing countries such as Iran and Venezuela. However, this may not be a strategic concern for China, since these teapots are not a national priority and instead, new policies and taxes have been recently introduced to drive these out. Despite this, the crucial importance of Iranian oil remains. 


Other investments in Iran include the Tehran-Qom-Isfahan high-speed railway, the Chery industrial complex, and the auxiliary projects of Chabahar port, all projects China has poured investments into to realize the Belt and Road Initiative in Iran. However, tangible infrastructure investments have been low due to US sanctions. It has been reported that actual investment in Iran has been under 5 billion dollars since 2007, as compared to the 15 billion dollars invested in Saudi Arabia. 


It would definitely be amiss not to analyze the political drift between China and Israel in this context and its resulting economic aftermath. While China remains one of Israel’s biggest trading partners, its growing close ties with the United States has increasingly created a widening chasm between two. China’s pro-palestine stance and its condemnation of Israel’s actions towards Gaza has further deteriorated its relationship with Israel. This has had a significant impact on trade relations that the two share. For instance, the technology sector witnessed cancelled deals with Chinese counterparts and semiconductor exports to China falling down to 11 million dollars in 2022, under increasing American pressure. However, this does not absolve the importance of Israel. Economic ties persist, with Chinese exports maintaining a stable inflow for Israel, amounting to 12.7 billion dollars and Israeli exports to China being 3.31 billion dollars in 2024.


When it comes to Israel, there is a significant trade relation that persists, but China has continued to expand its presence and trade relations with other countries of the Middle East. This in turn does contract Israel’s strategic weight in the conflict but does not diminish it completely. Economic ties and trade relations have stayed afloat despite growing political wedge - this has been the trend until now and this does not seem to be changing anytime in the near future.


Therefore, there is only one crucial variable that is most daunting for China, that is, the energy variable. The question that then poses itself is how will China offset the impending energy crisis?


Offsetting The Energy Crisis


China has already been working on its diversification of energy imports, with China’s Russian oil imports hitting a new record in February 2026 with an estimated 2.07 million barrels coming into China per day. As earlier mentioned, this alone may not be enough. However, China’s most formidable defence against an impending crisis rests with its crude oil reserves.


China has developed large crude stockpiles in the last few years, and possesses one of the world’s largest commercial crude reserves. Currently, it holds an estimated 1.2 billion barrels of crude stockpiles which translates to 3 to 4 months of reserve. This will allow it to cushion any short-term disruptions that the Middle East supply may encounter. 


Additionally, it has worked vociferously to reduce its dependence on maritime flows by investing in oil pipelines through infrastructure projects with Russia and Kazakhstan, which allow energy to flow directly into Chinese land, insulating from any shocks arising out of the naval disputes. However, increasing supply through Russian pipelines remains a limited option till the Far Eastern Route becomes operational in 2027. And while Kazakhstan is an important natural gas supplier through the Central Asian pipeline, it faces significant infrastructural bottlenecks. However, to make up for the shortage of energy supply from the Middle East, increased reliance on Russian and Central Asian countries might just be China’s best bet.


It has also added more renewable energy in its total energy demand, with China investing in its solar, wind and hydroelectric capacities, for instance its push towards electric vehicles which displaced over one million barrels of implied oil demand in 2025. The current geopolitical crisis is very likely to push China’s commitment to increase its domestic energy production.


However, such safeguards may fall short. The Iran conflict has engulfed other countries of the Middle East in the conflict as well, with its retaliatory missile and drone attacks targeting UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait. On the other hand, Israel also has launched attacks against countries like Lebanon. It is manifest that the entire Middle East is now caught between the countries. This has significant implications for China as the country cannot deny the fact that it still remains quite dependent on fossil fuel energy and even if it were to outweigh the Iranian oil loss through aforementioned methods, the precarious situation could still escalate and lead to a blockade around the Strait of Hormuz which hosts an estimated five million barrels worth of oil for China from other Middle Eastern countries. Iran has already effectively blocked off the Strait of Hormuz, and unless discussions are successful, 20% of the world’s oil remains stuck, including 45% of China’s oil. 


Additionally, the conflict spreading to the broader region of Middle East endangers the oil imports from other Middle Eastern countries apart from Iran. China imports 14% of its crude oil from Saudi Arabia, 11% from Iraq, 7% from UAE, 6% from Oman, 3% from Kuwait and 1% from Qatar. All these countries are currently entangled in the conflict. This is certainly concerning for China. Moreover, China imported approximately half of its crude oil in 2025. Further, it imports 31% of its LNG from the region, of which 28% is supplied by Qatar. 


Despite its talks with Iran to allow crude oil and Qatari liquefied natural gas vessels safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, it remains to be seen how China tackles the challenges to its energy security ahead. China’s diversification and large oil reserves certainly provide a safety net but it will have to navigate these turbulent times carefully to ensure energy stability. 


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