INDIA- ASEAN, EAS SUMMITS AND THE NSR: An Important Linkage

As PM Modi was addressing the gatherings in the India- ASEAN meet and the East Asia Summit (EAS) on 10 October, an important and significant agreement took place between India and Russia. An Indo- Russian working group on cooperation in the Northern Sea Route (NSR) framed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Governments of both the countries ‘for the development of cooperation in the cargo shipping in the waters of NSR’. The MoU also included aspects such as the viability of the NSR as a route for transportation of crude oil, liquified natural gas (LNG), coal and other cargo by 2035, the training of Indian sailors in polar navigation in the icy water of the Arctic and the joint development of ports and other infrastructure along the route. Most importantly, the meeting of the above working group saw Moscow’s acceptance of the Indian proposal to build non-nuclear ice-breaking ships put forth in 2023.

As part of the deal, New Delhi is in talks with two domestic shipbuilders− one government and the other private−to construct four non-nuclear icebreaker ships valued at over Rs 6000 crores ($750 million) for the Russian state-owned company Rosatom which is also the infrastructure operator for the NSR as the Russian government scouts for suitable shipbuilding yards in India for the construction. 

 The Northern Sea Route (NSR) refers to a shipping line through the Arctic Ocean connecting the countries of Europe with the markets of Indo- Pacific countries which passes through the four Arctic seas beginning at the boundary between the Barents and Kara seas (Kara Strait) and ending at the Bering Strait (Provideniya Bay). The route with the port of Murmansk as its starting point traverses around 5,600 km and includes the port of Vladivostok in the Russian Far East. The NSR is estimated to cut down the voyage time between Europe and Asia around 40% as compared to the traditional Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean and Red Sea. Moreover, given the congestion of the traditional route as well as the effects of the ongoing crisis in Gaza and the Houthi attacks over the Red Sea going vessels since 2023, the NSR has emerged as a route with the potential to serve as an alternative for oil and energy shipments compared to the Suez.

For India, the NSR’s importance lies in the latter’s linkage with the Chennai- Vladivostok Maritime Corridor envisaged as bolstering bilateral trade by enhancing the connectivity between the eastern coastline of India and the Russian Far East. Like the NSR, the above route is proposed to cut transit time between India and Russia by 16 days as compared to the Suez Canal. Hence the development and operation of the Chennai- Vladivostok corridor is intertwined with that of the NSR. Moreover, New Delhi’s involvement in the infrastructure development in the NSR is also crucial to furthering and cementing Indian position and ambitions in the Arctic and the Russian Far East− areas where China is also vying for influence in addition to the NSR. In addition, the deal involving the construction of non-nuclear icebreakers to be followed by possibly the order to build oil tankers for Russia is also crucial for India’s goals of becoming a major shipbuilding and transshipment hub. 

At first glance, there appears no apparent linkages between the Indian participation in the ASEAN and EAS summits. Nor between the NSR and Southeast Asia given the distance and differences in geography. However, a closer look reveals more than meets the eye.

The NSR, or its easternmost appendance, the Chennai- Vladivostok route passes through two critical regions which falls under the ambit of ASEAN− the South China Sea (SCS) and the Straits of Malacca. The SCS has emerged as a particularly vulnerable flashpoint against the competing claims of Brunei, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and especially China which claims the entire water body based on its interpretation of historical ownership over the latter through the nine-dash line. Recently, the water body has seen increasing instances of conflict and aggression as seen between the Chinese Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy and the militarisation of the disputed features such as the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Any kind of kinetic conflict in the region would have inevitable spillover in the Straits of Malacca and the Chennai Vladivostok route thereby raising questions as to the viability and usability of the route. 

Hence, in his address during the EAS the PM focused on the importance of maintaining ‘peace, security, and stability in the South China Sea’ which is ‘in the interest of the entire Indo- Pacific region.’ In addition, both the Final Statements of the India- ASEAN summit and the EAS reiterated the PM stresses the ‘importance of maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, safety, and freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea’ and recognise the ‘benefits of having the SCS as a sea of peace, stability, and prosperity’ while also stressing the urgent need to adhere to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) norms as well as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC). The above call by PM not only highlights India’s heightened interest in the SCS especially after the Sino- Indian border clash in Galwan in 2020 as seen in the frequent deployment of Indian naval asset to the above water body since 2021, but also can be interpreted as the subtle realisation of the intertwined linkage between a peaceful, secure, and stable SCS and the success of initiatives such as the NSR especially the Chennai- Vladivostok part of it. 

The linkage between NSR and the SCS could also be utilised by India as well as Russia to expand and deepen their connections with the countries of ASEAN. Given the volatility of the Red Sea and Suez Canal mentioned earlier, the Chennai- Vladivostok corridor could serve as an alternative waterway for vital energy supplies needed to sustain the economies of the ASEAN countries. The need for an alternative route becomes more urgent, for both India and the ASEAN nations, in the face of possible instability erupting over the Straits of Hormuz due to the recent escalation in Iran- Israel conflict. 

Moreover, the participation of ASEAN nations in the NSR or the Chennai Vladivostok route sits well with India’s ‘Connecting the Connectivities’ approach or the tapping of synergy between Connectivity projects as mentioned in the Act East Policy. In this regard, it could be explored whether the India- Myanmar- Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway, where discussions have also emerged of the IMT’s extension to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam could be linked with the above maritime route. This should also be seen in the light of the existing warm relations between Russia and ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and Myanmar despite the Western backlash against Moscow over the Ukraine conflict since 2022. However, the realisation of such an ambitious connectivity project is only possible after any resolution of the current crisis grappling Myanmar. 

At the same time, it should also be kept in mind that Russia, like India is also a key member of the East Asia Summit (EAS) which includes all the ASEAN countries. In recent years, as Russia has turned towards Asia as part of its ‘Greater Eurasia Strategy,’ the ASEAN constitutes an important partner of the above eastward re-orientation of Moscow which also includes India. Given the willingness of ASEAN countries to pursue connectivity with non- ASEAN EAS Participating countries, the Chennai Vladivostok corridor could provide the platform to realise the potential of synergy between India, Russia, and ASEAN.

Additionally, the above synergy could also be exploited to find convergence between India’s Act East and Act Far East policies. The Act Far East policy of 2019 envisages greater Indian involvement and participation in the development of Russia’s Far East which includes regions such as Vladivostok and is inseparable from New Delhi’s Arctic ambitions. The NSR and the Chennai- Vladivostok route could act as the bridge between the Acts of East and Far East. This convergence as well as the ASEAN countries’ interest in the NSR could be tapped by both New Delhi and Russia to foster joint Indo- ASEAN as well as Indo- Russian- ASEAN collaboration in the Arctic.

However, it should not be lost to sight that the potential synergies and collaborations outlined above appear ambitious or even utopian in light of the current global dynamics marked by the growing conflict and estrangement between US (the major security provider and treaty ally of many ASEAN countries) on one hand and Russia on the other hand, with its ‘no-limits partnership’ and increasing dependence on China (the most aggressive player in the SCS dispute as well as the largest economic and trade partner of the ASEAN bloc). Added to this is India’s ongoing confrontation with China and New Delhi’s delicate balance between the traditional Russian partnership and increasing strategic convergence with the US. 

Hence, only greater political will, political maturity and understanding of long-term benefits for all parties involved would ensure the fructification of above ideas.  

Anuraag Khaund is pursuing PhD in International Politics (IP), School of International Studies (SIS), Central University of Gujarat (CUG). 

He can be reached at khaundanuraag@gmail.com