Frankenstein & Game of Thrones: An analysis of KPK’s emergency situation

Here’s what the news says; On October 11 2026, state of emergency, and a subsequent governor's rule, was declared by the Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari following recommendations from the federal cabinet, which met in an emergency session chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), in all of the 12 districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, stronghold of jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan, by invoking Articles 232 & 234 of Pakistan’s Constitution. As stated by the PMO, the provincial government was deliberately disengaging from the fight against terrorism, prompting the federal government to exercise its constitutional authority due to the security situation.  But this is an emergency that is ‘convenient’ in itself given the long history of rivalry between the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) (In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) at the centre, and has more to it than what meets the eye.

To better understand the picture, it is important to go through the primary two triggers leading to this situation. Firstly, federal officials have cited a sharp rise in militant violence in KPK as the primary justification for the emergency. Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar told Parliament that 2,911 terrorist attacks occurred in the province between 2021 and 2024, a figure which surged to 3,787 between 15 October 2025 and 9 October 2026. According to statements made by the Law Minister and briefings from the Interior Ministry, there has been an increase of around 195-196% in terrorist occurrences over the previous two to two and a half years. Along with attacks on government buildings, vital infrastructure, and law enforcement agencies, officials also noted that a significant portion of attacks targeted police and security personnel. These patterns were specifically mentioned in the presidential proclamation as posing an “extraordinary threat to public safety”.

Secondly, KPK  is the only province still ruled by Imran Khan's party, the PTI, but the PTI-led provincial government and the federal government had been at odds for months, especially over security operations and counterterrorism policies. In early October 2026, PTI announced plans for a long march from KP towards Islamabad to demand Khan’s release and better medical access for him. On the other hand, the federal government's parallel attempts to obtain the provinces' complete cooperation on a combined counterterrorism policy were unsuccessful; leading the federal cabinet reach to the conclusion that the provincial government was purposefully withdrawing from the battle against militancy, a conclusion cemented when the negotiations between the center and the provincial leadership, including Chief Minister Sohail Afridi, broke down without reaching a consensus.  A report submitted by KP Governor Faisal Karim Kundi (PPP) to the President & Prime Minister which conveniently stated that there had been a total breakdown of constitutional machinery in the province and that the PTI-led government was no longer functioning in accordance with the Constitution served as the ultimate catalyst for this emergency declaration.

On the other hand, the legalities contain loopholes as well. The two articles that were invoked for the emergency address different circumstances and operate within distinct mechanisms; Article 232 grants emergency authority in times of serious internal disturbances, whereas Article 234 permits federal involvement when a provincial administration is unable to operate constitutionally. The main legal gap is if Article 234 together with Article 232 can override the necessity for a provincial assembly resolution during instances of internal unrest. Critics argue that this may allow for the political abuse of emergency powers and weaken provincial independence. Through the invocation of Articles 232 and 234, the federal government has undertaken a thorough endeavor to obstruct PTI from having any feasible chance of reclaiming political or institutional power in KP province in the short term. 

Along with these two articles of the law, Islamabad also invoked article 245 of the constitution to deploy the Pakistan Army in support of the civil administration in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, i.e the deployment was intended to assist in restoring law and order, protecting citizens, and safeguarding government installations, particularly in areas worst affected by militant violence. 

The situation on ground isn't stable either, a fact which allowed the Centre to legitimize its usage of such harsh constitutional measures. Problems plague even the state machinery for enforcing orders as despite orders warning of disciplinary action and departmental proceedings, 3,986 police personnel reportedly failed to return to duty after their approved leave expired in violations of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Act, 2017. The mass absence raises concerns about police discipline, staffing and the province’s capacity to tackle militancy amid escalating tensions between the federal government and Imran Khan’s PTI. 

The Centre has also established special administrative arrangements for the most vulnerable districts. An Area Development Secretariat (ADS), operating under the supervision of an Area Representative and Development Council (ARDC), was set up to oversee 12 high-risk districts: Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Bannu, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, North Waziristan, and both Upper and Lower South Waziristan

But behind the curtain of fighting against terrorism, hides the motives and often overlooked truths of the authorities of this nation which is ironically, infamous for harboring terrorism. If fighting terrorism was the original motive then why was Balochistan left out when instead it overtook KPK province in terms of violence-linked fatalities accounting for 59% of all in the country against 39% of  KPK, in the third quarter of 2026? 

The political implications of the intervention become clearer when viewed against Pakistan’s history of civil–military relations and federal interference in provincial governance. The removal of an opposition-led provincial administration is not without precedent; successive governments have used constitutional mechanisms to dismiss or curtail provincial governments when political interests and institutional power have come into conflict. In the present case, the timing of the emergency declaration, coinciding with PTI’s planned march towards Islamabad, has fuelled suspicions that security concerns may also have provided an opportunity to weaken the party’s remaining institutional base. The involvement of a coalition government consisting of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which are both political adversaries of PTI, introduces an additional layer to the controversy. Nevertheless, political motives cannot be established solely through timing or party rivalry; the government’s claims must be assessed against the available security evidence, the necessity of the measures adopted and the constitutional safeguards governing their implementation.

Historically, Pakistan’s military establishment has repeatedly followed a pattern of weakening established political leaders, cultivating alternative political figures and subsequently moving against those figures when they begin to challenge military authority. Experts also argue that Field Marshal Asim Munir and his army has been facing numerous attacks from the Baloch Liberation Army as well as the TTP and will not be able to afford enduring such long marches simultaneously; leaving him with the only solution of ousting the local government in place and taking the control all by himself. 

Ultimately, Pakistan’s emergency declaration in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa presents a difficult question: whether it represents a necessary last resort against escalating militancy or a disproportionate exercise of federal authority with significant political consequences. The rise in terrorist violence, reported police absenteeism and disagreements between provincial and federal authorities point to genuine security and governance challenges. However, these concerns alone cannot justify bypassing constitutional safeguards or weakening an elected provincial government without transparent evidence that such intervention is necessary and proportionate. The timing of the proclamation, which coincides with the PTI's planned march to Islamabad, emphasises the necessity for independent investigation of the government's objectives and actions.

Pakistan may well be approaching a moment in which the monsters it created have begun to turn upon their creator. Like Frankenstein, a state that has spent decades cultivating instruments of coercion, manipulating political loyalties and treating militancy as an instrument of strategic convenience may eventually discover that its creations recognise no master. And like the great houses of Game of Thrones, Pakistan’s political and military elite appear increasingly consumed by their own struggle for power, willing to weaken institutions, undermine rivals and gamble with the stability of the realm to preserve their place upon the throne. 

The tragedy of Pakistan is that its establishment may once again mistake the subjugation of a rival for the restoration of order, just as its political class mistakes survival for leadership; but history offers a grim warning: monsters do not remain obedient, and thrones secured through fear rarely remain secure for long. In the end, the question may not be who governs Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, nor even who commands Pakistan, but whether there will remain enough constitutional legitimacy, institutional credibility and national cohesion to govern the country at all.