Brotherhood Discourse of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan: An Analysis

Background: Rooted in Turkish Foreign Policy

The brotherly bond among Turkey, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan is deeply rooted in shared historical, religious, and cultural ties. However, this trilateral relationship gained significant momentum following the rise of the AK Party and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership in 2002.

Since its founding in 1923, Turkey had largely maintained a pro-Western foreign policy. However, relations with the West began to cool in the early 2000s due to several developments: Turkey’s refusal to allow the U.S. to use its territory for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, American support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Turkey views as linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the European Union’s continued hesitation to grant Turkey full membership.

In response, Ankara began shifting its foreign policy focus toward the Middle East and the broader Muslim world, a trend often described as “Neo-Ottomanism.” Tensions with Arab states intensified during the Arab Spring, when Turkey supported popular uprisings rather than backing authoritarian regimes. As a result, several Arab regimes distanced themselves from Turkey, prompting Ankara to focus more on non-Arab Muslim countries.

This foreign policy shift is not a move from secularism to Islamism but reflects a pragmatic, multi-dimensional approach. While earlier leaders like Turgut Özal also sought ties with Muslim-majority states, the AK Party's approach is more influenced by admiration for the Ottoman legacy, which it views as a golden era of Turkish history. Under Erdoğan, terms like kardeş (“brother”) are frequently used, particularly for Muslim-majority countries - Azerbaijan and Pakistan. For instance, in 2013, then-Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu called Azerbaijan an “eternal brother country,” and Turkish leaders have similarly referred to Pakistan as a “brother nation.”

While the brotherhood among the three countries is grounded in shared religious and cultural ties, it is now increasingly guided by pragmatism. The current trilateral discourse focuses more on strategic cooperation to advance national interests, marking a shift from symbolic rhetoric to practical collaboration.

Turkey–Azerbaijan Relations: From Cultural Kinship to Strategic Partnership

Turkey–Azerbaijan relations were primarily cultural until 1914, after which they deepened. During World War I, Azerbaijanis supported the Ottoman Empire, despite being under Russian rule, by forming the “Brotherly Help” organization, driven by both religious affinity and aspirations for its independence from the Russian empire. The founding of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918 marked a strategic alignment with the Ottomans to escape Russian control.

After gaining independence in 1991, Azerbaijan looked to Turkey as a cultural and religious model. It enacted a Law on Freedom of Religious Belief to limit foreign religious influence, particularly from the Gulf, creating space for Turkey’s Gülen movement to promote moderate Islam, through educational networks, countering radical Islam. In 1992, Azerbaijan declared “Turkish” (closely related to Azerbaijani) as its state language, reinforcing shared linguistic and cultural ties.

Over time, the relationship evolved from fraternal rhetoric, exemplified by President Heydar Aliyev’s phrase “One nation, two states”, towards pragmatic cooperation based on national interests. A core area of collaboration is energy: Azerbaijan supplies oil and gas to Turkey at competitive rates, allowing Ankara to diversify and negotiate better prices with Russia and Iran. In return, Turkey serves as a critical transit hub for Azerbaijani energy exports to Europe through pipelines like the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP).

In geopolitics, Turkey has offered unwavering support to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, labeling Armenia as the “aggressor” and affirming Azerbaijan’s territorial claims. Conversely, Azerbaijan has supported Turkey’s position on Northern Cyprus, aligning itself diplomatically with Ankara’s stance.

Mutual support on territorial issue: Azerbaijan – Pakistan Brotherhood

Pakistan and Azerbaijan share a strong brotherly bond, as reflected in President Ilham Aliyev’s statement: “Our relations are the relations between two brotherly countries.” Following Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991, Pakistan was one of the first countries, after Turkey, to recognize it.

The main cause that brings the people and leadership of Pakistan and Azerbaijan close is the Kashmir issue and NK issue respectively. Since 1996, Azerbaijan has been a member of the Contact Group on Kashmir in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), supporting Pakistan’s position. Azerbaijan maintains that international resolutions, such as those of the UN, should guide conflict resolution, a stance that aligns with Pakistan’s approach to Kashmir, over India's preference for bilateral talks.

Both countries’ leaderships have publicly affirmed their support for each other’s territorial integrity. For example, during bilateral meetings, President Aliyev and former Prime Minister Imran Khan expressed mutual solidarity. Pakistan is among the few nations that strongly and unequivocally support Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan, while maintaining warm ties with Pakistan, follows a more balanced approach, given India’s global standing and economic weight.

Dynamics of Turkey–Pakistan Brotherhood:

Turkey–Pakistan relations have deep historical roots, predating Pakistan’s formation in 1947. During the colonial era, Indian Muslims viewed the Ottoman Caliph as their spiritual leader, a bond that strengthened during the Khilafat Movement (1919–1924). Their protest against British policies toward the defeated Ottoman Empire helped spark the Non-Cooperation Movement, which saw strong Muslim participation and reinforced the shared sense of kinship between the two peoples.

After Pakistan's creation in 1947, its founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah admired Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s reforms and saw Turkey as a model for modernization. Since then, Turkey and Pakistan have maintained close ties. Turkey supported Pakistan during the Indo-Pak wars and has consistently called for peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. For example, in the 1965 war, Turkey and Iran jointly urged a ceasefire. Pakistan, in turn, has supported Turkey on the Northern Cyprus issue and other strategic matters.

In recent years, Turkey has also viewed Pakistan as a key partner in its bid to expand influence in the Muslim world, particularly in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. This has driven Ankara to bolster its ties with Islamabad through multiple avenues—supporting Pakistan in global forums such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), expanding defence exports, strengthening trade and economic cooperation, playing a mediating role between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and promoting cultural and educational exchanges.

A Critical Analysis of the Brotherhood and Future dynamics

o   Impact of domestic politics on foreign policy: If a party like the Republican People's Party (CHP) replaces the conservative AK Party of Turkey, religiously framed rhetorics such as calling Muslim nations “brothers” may lose significance. This could reduce the current emphasis on the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan “brotherhood.” This is exemplified by weakened Turkey-Azerbaijan ties after the Welfare Party’s 1995 victory, highlighting how ideological shifts in Ankara influence its foreign policy.

o   Limited Economic Ties Despite Strong Affinity: Despite long standing historical, religious, and cultural ties, economic relations within the Azerbaijan–Turkey–Pakistan triangle remain underdeveloped. There is still a significant potential to strengthen financial and trade cooperation among the three nations.

o   Shift in Rhetoric in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkey often uses fraternal language like calling Muslim-majority nations “brother countries”, to highlight close ties. However, this rhetoric is quickly dropped during political tensions. For instance, before the Arab Spring, Syrian President Assad was called “Brother Assad” and Syria “a second home.” After Assad’s violent crackdown on protesters, Turkey labeled him as a “dictator” and “murderer.” This reflects Turkey’s pattern of using fraternal language when relations are strong but quickly abandoning it when the relations sour.

o   National interests of Turkey and Azerbaijan do not always align as there are many instances where they prioritised pragmatic national interests over the brotherly bond:

A)   Armenian-Turkish rapprochement: Armenia and Turkey signed the Zurich Protocols in October 2009, through which both sides agreed “On the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” and “On the Development of Bilateral Relations.” In response, Azerbaijan criticized the move, stating that Turkey’s decision ran counter to its national interests and jeopardized the spirit of fraternal ties historically shared between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

B)    Kurdish issue in the bilateral relations: Kurdish population in Azerbaijan has historical ties with the ruling Aliyev family and holds influential positions within the state. Turkey has raised concerns over alleged links between some Azerbaijani elites and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it classifies as a terrorist organization. While Azerbaijan has verbally condemned the PKK and shown solidarity with Turkey, it has not formally designated the group as a terrorist organization, reflecting a pragmatic approach that balances internal ethnic dynamics with the strategic partnership.

C)   Strategic Divergence in Energy Relations: While Turkey and Azerbaijan share strong energy ties, strategic differences persist. Turkey aims to become a regional energy hub by influencing pricing, not just serving as a transit route. In contrast, Azerbaijan seeks to supply gas directly to Europe via projects like the Southern Gas Corridor and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), maintaining control over its exports. These differences surfaced during the 2009–10 gas negotiations, highlighting disputes over transit fees, pricing, and volumes.

o   Azerbaijan’s Balanced Approach to Kashmir: Azerbaijan’s diplomacy regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has consistently emphasized the principle of territorial integrity, which aligns closely with India’s stance on Kashmir. As India emerges as a global power, Baku has adopted a cautious and balanced position on the Kashmir issue maintaining its broader foreign policy tradition of neutrality in great power rivalries. In the case of Kashmir, Azerbaijan follows a pragmatic policy: not offending Pakistan, while not antagonizing India.

o   Stand on Northern Cyprus: Azerbaijan and Pakistan have not yet recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (which was created after Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974), due to their concerns that doing so could set a precedent for the international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh.  In 2004, during a vote on granting the TRNC representation in the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan missed the Parliamentary Assembly session, which led to criticism in the Turkish media, accusing Baku of betraying its "big brother".

In an anarchic international system, states often form alliances based on shared interests to enhance their security and ensure survival. Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, being Muslim-majority countries with strategic affinities, have come together under the banner of a “brotherhood alliance”. However, the realities of global politics mean that national interests ultimately drive foreign policy. These interests may, at times, diverge or even conflict, whether within the alliance or in relation to external partners. Therefore, assessing the practical functioning of this brotherhood provides valuable insight into its evolving dynamics and long-term viability.