The Unmaking of Punjab’s Bond with the Indian Army
The politics of alienation and the forces widening Punjab’s divide
When asked about the declining recruitment from Punjab in the Indian Army, particularly into the Sikh Regiment, the Chief Minister of Punjab explained it as a consequence of migration and drug abuse. While these factors are real, they do not explain why a community that has historically formed one of the strongest pillars of India’s military strength is slowly disengaging from an institution it once served almost instinctively.
Sikhs constitute roughly 2 percent of India’s population, yet for decades they have accounted for an estimated 7-10 percent of the Indian Army’s personnel. This contribution grew out of a longstanding martial tradition that placed honour in service and dignity in discipline. From the Guru’s Sant-Sipahi ideal to the Khalsa’s role as a protector of Dharma, Sikh martial service was embedded in a broader cultural ethos of defending society.
From the World Wars to 1947-48, 1965, 1971, Kargil, and prolonged counter-insurgency deployments, they earned thousands of gallantry awards, commanding deep respect across India. It is precisely because this legacy was so strong that its present weakening should concern us.
How grievances were weaponized
The crisis Punjab faces today is rooted in decades of unresolved political and constitutional grievances. Following Partition in 1947, the Punjabi Suba movement, led by Master Tara Singh, demanded a Punjabi-speaking state within the Indian Union. Beyond linguistic reorganisation, it reflected Sikh concerns over political representation and identity. The 1966 reorganisation created Punjab and Haryana and transferred the hill districts to Himachal Pradesh, but served largely as a political concession to contain discontent rather than resolve the underlying disputes. Legitimate demands concerning river-water sharing, Chandigarh’s status as a shared capital and the demarcation of Punjabi-speaking areas remained unresolved.
This gave the Akali Dal further ground to mobilise, culminating in the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution, which called for greater autonomy for state governments over legislation, administration and taxation, alongside greater control over Punjab’s water and agricultural resources. The Indira Gandhi government viewed the Resolution with suspicion, seeing secessionist potential in its demands. The Centre’s repeated unwillingness to engage meaningfully with these issues further deepened the political confrontation.
In the late 1970s, factional politics deepened trust deficits. Congress leaders in Punjab backed Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, initially a religious preacher, and candidates he supported in SGPC elections as a tactic to weaken the Akali Dal. His elevation from religious figure to political force inadvertently legitimised religious hardliners while marginalising moderate Sikh leadership, hollowing out democratic mediation.
It was against this backdrop that the events of 1984 unfolded, a traumatic turning point representing grave political failure. For many Sikhs, 1984 was not merely political failure but institutional betrayal that demands continued acknowledgment. Yet this rupture did not immediately sever Punjab’s relationship with national institutions. Recruitment into the Indian Army remained strong until the late 2000s, with Sikh soldiers serving extensively in counter-insurgency. This matters because it shows that one incident alone did not break the bond. What it left behind was an unhealed wound, an accumulation of grievance awaiting political direction, a gap later weaponised by actors who sought not repair but power.
Separatism as Instrument
The Khalistani movement gained traction by exploiting this chasm, appropriating Punjab’s grievances and reframing constitutional demands as existential threats. Negotiation was rebranded as betrayal, moderate voices were suppressed, and grievance itself became the organising principle of identity.
When militancy lost popular support in the 1990s, the Khalistani project did not disappear; it mutated. As its ideological base eroded, sections of the movement shifted overseas and came to rely increasingly on organised crime to finance their activities. In Canada and the United States, particularly in British Columbia, pro-Khalistan actors became enmeshed in narcotics and gang networks. The 1994 murders of Ron and Jimmy Dosanjh, traffickers linked to the International Sikh Youth Federation, exposed this nexus early, a pattern later reflected in Indian and Canadian security assessments tracing overlaps between narcotics routes, arms networks, and diaspora-based separatist financing.
That criminal turn reshaped Punjab itself. In the state, the infrastructure of violence left behind by militancy was taken over by criminal networks to facilitate drug distribution. Drug money sustained coordination from abroad while narcotics hollowed out society at home. Addiction, demoralisation, and outward migration weakened social discipline and eroded trust in institutions that demand long-term commitment. The drug crisis thus became both a social tragedy and a political instrument, allowing separatist grievance to persist long after militancy had ended.
This grievance is kept alive through calculated provocation and narrative control. Khalistani slogans raised on Republic Day year after year, including within Harmandir Sahib, are designed to blur the line between faith and separatist politics. Banned outfits such as Sikhs for Justice have replicated this strategy across diaspora communities, portraying Indian national identity as hostile to the Sikh faith. As former RAW chief Vikram Sood has observed, even mass movements such as the farmers’ agitation proved vulnerable to such reframing, with economic demands recast as identity conflict, leaving mistrust intact even after political resolution.
What Remains to Be Reclaimed
Sikh service in the Army carries a quiet authority that inspires without assertion. It radiates outward through conduct, a lived ethic referred to as Punjabiyat. Today, that radiance has dimmed, not dramatically but noticeably enough to be felt. This is not the result of a single rupture, but the cumulative outcome of unresolved grievances, political opportunism, drug abuse, and narratives that keep alienation alive. What was once a relationship built on trust and shared purpose is increasingly marked by distance and suspicion, even as efforts to rebuild civil-military confidence continue.
Reclaiming this legacy requires acknowledgment from multiple directions. State actions and institutional failures bear responsibility for repair, just as the community must reject the reduction of Sikh identity to permanent resentment. This does not mean abandoning legitimate demands for accountability, but refusing to let grievance become the sole defining feature of identity. Sikh history is forged in warrior spirit embodied by disciplined strength, moral restraint, and enduring responsibility to protect something larger than the self. That inheritance must be reclaimed by the Sikh community from those who profit from alienation, for institutional repair to meaningfully take hold and for the Khalsa spirit to be reawakened.
Reclaiming this legacy requires accountability from the state and political leadership, but also a conscious effort within Punjab to reclaim its own future. Legitimate demands for justice and institutional accountability must not be abandoned, but neither should grievance become the defining feature of Punjabi identity. Institutional repair can only take hold when the community refuses to let its history be reduced to permanent resentment and reclaims the courage, discipline and sense of service that once defined it. Punjab’s future depends on recovering its confidence and agency, not allowing those who profit from alienation to define its identity. The Khalsa spirit of courage, moral restraint and responsibility to protect something larger than oneself must be reclaimed by Punjab, for its own renewal and for the nation.

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