THE NEAR ARCTIC ILLUSION: A BRIEF ANALYSIS

The Arctic Circle, stretching across the northernmost latitude, encompasses more than a dozen countries and remains one of the coldest on the planet. Home to the North Pole, this region shelters a distinctive wildlife as well as indigenous human settlements which are a rare sight. However, over the decades, climate change has caused the glaciers to melt and thereby, alter the geography of this region forever.

This sensitive ecosystem has now opened up unprecedented economic opportunities, from emerging Trans-Arctic sea routes which would cut huge shipping distances between the Americas, Europe, and Asia to the exploitation of vast untapped energy reserves, both conventional and renewable. However, these prospects come at a cost: livelihoods are disrupted, and many species are facing extinction. Thus, to navigate through these complexities and address these challenges, the Arctic Council was established in 1996 as a multilateral forum for sustainable governance and dialogue among Arctic and observer states.

Over the years, the inclusivity of this circle expanded, thereby granting observer status to several non-Arctic countries, including China, India, and Singapore in 2013. For giants like China, this recognition is considered as a diplomatic breakthrough – a product of decades of lobbying and back-channel diplomacy. Since then, China has demonstrated a strong interest in the Arctic, collaborating with other countries on various agreements and projects. Notably, in 2018, Beijing announced its Arctic policy, outlining its main missions and declaring itself a ‘Near-Arctic State,’ which sparked debate in the West about whether China is an Arctic or non-Arctic country. Recently, several actions by China have drawn considerable Western attention, leading some to oppose Chinese ambitions in the Arctic in the name of national security.

China’s expansionism in the Arctic 

Joining the Arctic Council was not an easy task for Beijing. In 2012, Russia, seemingly China’s closest ally, expressed concerns about the involvement of non-Arctic states in the Arctic Council; for instance, it blocked Chinese vessels from conducting research in the Arctic waters. Even after China announced its status as a near-Arctic state in its official policy, highlighting its significant role in Arctic affairs, most Arctic Council members were hesitant to accept this.

Currently, Russia not only cooperates with China in the Arctic, but China also advocates for Russia’s presence in the Arctic Council. Additionally, many countries in the region have been working with China for over a decade in various sectors. Apart from external entities and programs, cities like Beijing and Shanghai host enormous events and many institutes focusing on polar research; China’s argument for its Arctic interests is supported by the Himalayas, which is also pronounced as the Third Polar Environment (TPE) in the geographic terminology; hence, funding in polar affairs and learning from it can be worthy to combat the effects of climate change in the TPE.

Claiming China as one of the most actively engaged players is no longer incorrect. China has made significant progress in this region. Beijing’s relations with Ottawa on Arctic matters might not be exceptional politically, but economically, both have collaborated to develop a strong energy market. Similarly, partnerships between China and Greenland in the mining sector have increased notably. In fact, on the Alaskan side of the U.S.A., China is involved in various projects. As a result, several bilateral economic agreements have helped China concretize its Arctic vision, or what experts call ‘the way towards the Polar Silk Road.’

Conceptualizing the Near-Arctic status

From a Chinese perspective, the continental boundaries of a state close to the Arctic, alongside its unique stakeholder position in Arctic affairs, are those of the near-Arctic states. Even from a geographic or geopolitical perspective, countries located within the Arctic Circle are referred to as Arctic states, and those located nearby can be more accurately described as near-Arctic. Noting here, China’s northernmost mainland part reaches 54 degrees north latitude, which goes further north than the Polish capital city of Warsaw (which is a key non-Arctic European observer member at the Arctic Council). However, the European Union (EU) defines the Arctic region as the part of the Earth encompassing the Arctic Circle, or 66 degrees 32 minutes North. This definition basically justifies the presence of Arctic Council members only. 

Northern members of the EU also use some similar terms when discussing their concerns or plans regarding sea-level rise caused by the Arctic’s ice melting. For example, the Netherlands and the Estonian foreign affairs ministry clearly state the direct impacts and consequences they will face if major Arctic developments occur. The Finnish Prime Minister called for the EU’s broad participation in Arctic affairs (more EU in the Arctic and more Arctic in the EU) at the European Parliament in 2019, which clearly indicated the EU’s future approach to the Arctic. These specific states do not mention the near-Arctic concept, but the EU as a whole does. These terms are largely acceptable because they are technically accurate, though when China uses its own definition officially, and considering its increasing global presence, concerns become imminent.

Paradox and an Illusion of the Near Arctic 

When the then-Scottish First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, spoke at the Arctic Circle Forum Scotland in Edinburgh (November 2017), she highlighted Scotland's geographic position, specifically its status as the closest neighbour to the Arctic. This was noted a year before China published its Arctic Policy. However, Britain was not being singled out for this, nor was it considered a ‘threat’ to Arctic security.

On the other hand, Russia had recently annexed Crimea, and a few years later, Russia further attacked eastern Ukraine, which ultimately prompted the U.S. and its allies to slow down Russia’s global ambitions. Notably, the Arctic Council excluded Russia, which prompted China’s support. These events eventually led Russia, which was initially opposed to expanding Arctic Council membership, to allow China to align with its own initiatives in the far north. Beijing now funds and participates in major Russian plans in the Arctic.

It was clearly observable how China has advanced in the Arctic since it gained observer status. Throughout the second half of the decade, China mainly focused on strengthening bilateral relations with Arctic Council members while participating in multilateral events. This ensured its involvement in mining and other cooperative projects. Despite significant pushback from the U.S., Canada, and Denmark on multiple occasions (e.g., not allowing China to purchase land in Greenland and not permitting China to be a dominant investor in the Canadian mining industry), China deepened its relations with Russia to further its own interests in the far north. Such processes reinforce the fact that China is no longer considered a Near-Arctic state, which, while not a geographic fact, is logically supported by its formal efforts and the undermining projections or neglect by the West.

India in the Arctic’s geopolitical sphere 

The vulnerability of the Arctic had begun capturing the eyes of the non-Arctic states much earlier. India was amongst those. Establishing a research station in 2008, named Himadri, was one major step; however, obtaining observer status in 2013 was a huge success. The ultimate efforts of India included cooperative actions (e.g., signing the Paris agreement in 2015) and climate diplomacy (e.g., hosting the CMS COP-13 in Gandhinagar).

These were done systematically and somewhat strategically to display its responsible approach as an Arctic Council observer. India formulated its Arctic Policy in 2022, which primarily outlined the country’s scientific, environmental, and economic objectives.

Even though India maintains quite friendly and cooperative relations with all the Nordic countries, and also India trades with Russia, Canada, and the U.S.A. on a larger scale, the recent developments suggest India is pursuing more success in Arctic geopolitics. A few days back, a topic began circulating across editorials about Russia’s willingness to expand relations with India on the Arctic front. Already, India holds a significant strategic position in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and such a diplomatic approach can help India strengthen relations with Russia based on the new trade route, called the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and also can help India fulfill its responsibilities in the Arctic.

In the meantime, it is notable that Russia’s frequent deepening collaborations with China and India alter its sidelined importance in the Arctic Council, which somehow proves the Western miscalculations in a bigger picture. Simultaneously, India, which is counted among the least CO2 per capita emitting countries, will expand hand towards the critical Arctic environment with technical, research-based, and financial support, and would signify its positioning as Vishwamitra while holding hands with old friends in tough times.