The Coco Islands Conundrum: A New Geopolitical Pressure Point in the Bay of Bengal

The tranquility of the Bay of Bengal, a vital global trade artery connecting Southeast Asia to the Indian subcontinent and beyond, is increasingly being challenged by a localized yet strategically significant geopolitical development on the Coco Islands. Situated less than 100 kilometers north of India's highly sensitive Andaman and Nicobar Islands command, this small chain, officially a part of Myanmar, has become the center of a deepening strategic friction involving New Delhi, Beijing, and Naypyidaw. As tensions simmer in the Indo-Pacific region, the Coco Islands represent a flashpoint that could alter the balance of power in one of the world's busiest maritime corridors, where over 50% of global container traffic passes through.

The long-standing rumors of a clandestine Chinese listening post on Coco, dating back to the early 1990s, were once dismissed as paranoia fueled by Cold War-era anxieties. However, in 2023, commercially available satellite imagery from Maxar Technologies provided compelling evidence that transformed suspicion into concrete alarm. The images documented a large-scale military modernization project, including the extension of an airstrip capable of handling transport aircraft, the construction of new barracks and sheds to accommodate over 1,500 personnel, and ongoing work to link Coco with the adjacent Jerry Island via a causeway. This comprehensive infrastructure upgrade points to a facility intended for advanced military use, far exceeding Myanmar's own operational requirements and echoing similar Chinese-built outposts in the South China Sea, such as those on Woody Island in the Paracels.

For India, the proximity and orientation of the Coco Islands constitute an immediate and severe security risk. The archipelago lies virtually in India's backyard, directly threatening the nuclear-powered submarine fleet stationed at the Andaman bases, a cornerstone of India's most secretive defense posture, often referred to as the "silent service." India's nuclear triad relies heavily on these submarines, which operate undetected in the Indian Ocean to deter adversaries. Any surveillance from Coco could compromise their stealth, potentially exposing vulnerabilities in India's second-strike capability.

Crucially, the Coco Islands share a similar latitude with both the Rambilli Naval Base in Andhra Pradesh, a key home port for India’s nuclear submarines, and the strategic Balasore missile test range in Odisha. This geographical alignment is paramount for signal intelligence (SIGINT) operations. A Chinese-assisted radar and surveillance facility at this location could provide an optimal vantage point to:

• Track Submarine Movements: Monitoring the ingress and egress of India's Arihant-class nuclear submarines, which are critical for maintaining a credible deterrent against China and Pakistan.

• Intercept Telemetry Data: Capturing sensitive missile performance and trajectory data from tests at Balasore, where India conducts launches of ballistic missiles like the Agni series.

• Monitor Naval Communications: Eavesdropping on encrypted signals from Indian naval assets, potentially revealing operational plans or technological secrets.

  
  

In essence, the Coco Islands offer a potential "Chinese eye" on India's strategic deterrent, making its modernization a fundamental national security concern. This development aligns with China's broader strategy of "string of pearls", a network of military and commercial facilities encircling India, from Gwadar in Pakistan to Djibouti in Africa. For Beijing, Coco represents a low-cost way to extend its surveillance reach into the Bay of Bengal, countering India's growing naval prowess and the Quad alliance (comprising the US, Japan, Australia, and India).

To fully grasp the Coco Islands' significance, one must delve into their historical origins. The Coco Islands, a cluster of 23 small islands and islets in the Bay of Bengal, were originally part of the British Indian Empire. During World War II, the islands were occupied by Japanese forces, who used them as a base for operations against Allied shipping. Post-war, in 1945, the British administration ceded the Coco Islands to Burma (now Myanmar) as part of the broader decolonization process, despite their proximity to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which remained under Indian control. This transfer, often described as India "gifting" the islands, was formalized without much fanfare, but it sowed the seeds for future disputes. Reports from sources like The Times of India (October 15, 2025) highlight this "untold story," noting that the decision was made hastily amid the chaos of partition and independence, with little foresight into their strategic value.

Myanmar's control over Coco has been tenuous at best. The country's military junta, which seized power in 2021 following a coup, has struggled to maintain authority over remote regions. In northern Myanmar, ethnic armed groups and China-backed militias operate with near-impunity, further complicating sovereignty claims. China's influence in Myanmar dates back to the 1990s, when Beijing provided economic aid and military support to the junta in exchange for access to resources and strategic locations. The Coco Islands fit neatly into this pattern, with allegations of Chinese involvement surfacing as early as 2018, when Indian intelligence reportedly detected unusual electronic signals emanating from the area.

The 2023 Maxar satellite images are not isolated; they build on a body of evidence from multiple sources. According to a 2023 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the runway extension at Coco, from approximately 1,200 meters to over 2,000 meters, suggests capabilities for landing medium-sized transport planes, such as the Chinese Y-9 or similar aircraft used for logistics in disputed regions. Additional structures include reinforced hangars and antenna arrays, indicative of SIGINT equipment. CSIS analysts note that similar setups have been observed at China's Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, another "pearl" in Beijing's strategy.

Despite these indicators, direct verification remains elusive. India's requests for on-ground inspections have been met with silence, raising questions about transparency. In contrast, China has denied any military involvement, labeling such claims as "baseless" in statements to the Global Times. Myanmar's junta, for its part, has oscillated between denial and deflection, as seen in its assurances to Indian officials.

The diplomatic engagement surrounding this issue has only amplified New Delhi's worries. During the annual defense dialogue in September 2025, India's Defence Secretary, Rajesh Kumar Singh, met with Major General Kyaw Ko Htike, Chief of Myanmar's armed forces training. As reported by the Hindustan Times (October 10, 2025), the junta assured India that "not a single Chinese national was present" on the Coco Islands. This public assurance was intended to allay fears, but it was undercut by Naypyidaw's response to a formal request. When India sought permission to dispatch a naval team for a verification visit, the junta offered a complete and unsettling silence. This refusal to permit basic transparency, despite the denials, strongly suggests a deliberate obfuscation regarding the true nature and foreign involvement in the facility.

This incident echoes broader tensions in India-Myanmar relations. Since the 2021 coup, India has supported anti-junta forces and ethnic groups, providing humanitarian aid and training to the People's Defense Force. Myanmar, in turn, has accused India of interfering in its internal affairs, while deepening ties with China. Bilateral trade between India and Myanmar has declined by 20% since 2021, per UN Comtrade data, as New Delhi imposes sanctions on junta-linked entities. The Coco issue risks further straining this relationship, potentially pushing Myanmar deeper into China's orbit.

China's diplomatic stance has been equally opaque. In multilateral forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum, Beijing has advocated for "non-interference" in Myanmar's affairs, effectively shielding the junta from international pressure. Meanwhile, India's "Act East" policy, aimed at strengthening ties with Southeast Asia, is complicated by these developments. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visits to Myanmar in 2024 emphasized cooperation on counter-terrorism and infrastructure, but the Coco impasse looms large.

New Delhi is presently engaged in a delicate "wait and watch" mode, prioritizing the rapid expansion of its own surveillance architecture from the Andaman and Nicobar Command. Under Project Seabird, India is upgrading its naval facilities at Port Blair, including advanced radar systems and satellite tracking capabilities. The Indian Navy has also increased patrols in the Bay of Bengal, deploying P-8I Poseidon aircraft for maritime reconnaissance. These measures aim to counter any SIGINT advantages from Coco, ensuring that India's submarine operations remain secure.

Beyond military responses, India is exploring diplomatic avenues. Engagement with ASEAN nations, particularly Vietnam and Indonesia, has intensified, with joint naval exercises like MILAN highlighting shared concerns over China's assertiveness. Domestically, the issue has sparked debate in India's Parliament, with opposition parties calling for stronger action, including potential sanctions on Myanmar.

The Coco Islands conundrum extends beyond bilateral tensions, potentially reshaping the security dynamics of the entire Bay of Bengal. The region is a hotspot for maritime disputes, with overlapping claims in the South China Sea influencing behavior here. If China establishes a foothold at Coco, it could disrupt trade routes, monitor energy shipments from the Middle East, and challenge India's role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean.

Economically, the Bay of Bengal hosts critical infrastructure like the Chabahar Port in Iran and the Sittwe Port in Myanmar, both with Chinese investments. Any escalation could lead to blockades or conflicts, impacting global supply chains. Environmentally, the islands' militarization threatens biodiversity, as Coco is home to unique ecosystems and migratory bird species.

Future scenarios range from diplomatic resolution, perhaps through ASEAN-mediated talks to military confrontation. India could leverage its historical ties with Myanmar or offer economic incentives to curb Chinese influence. Alternatively, if tensions escalate, the Quad could play a role, with joint surveillance missions. However, Myanmar's internal instability complicates any outcome.

At this stage, it is imperative to mention that while the narrative situating the Coco Islands squarely within China’s “String of Pearls” network is an analytical inference, not an officially substantiated strategy.

The term itself is a conceptual construct used by scholars and policymakers to describe China’s pattern of securing maritime access and influence points across the Indo-Pacific, from Gwadar to Djibouti, rather than a codified Chinese doctrine. While the recent infrastructural developments on Coco do fit within this strategic geography, direct documentary or operational evidence linking the project to a coordinated Chinese grand design remains unproven.

Recognizing this distinction between interpretation and documentation is essential for maintaining analytical rigor; the historical and strategic framing of the Coco Islands should thus be understood as an evolving analytical narrative informed by circumstantial indicators, rather than conclusive archival or policy evidence.

In conclusion, the Coco Islands embody the high-stakes game of shadows in the Indo-Pacific. As long as Myanmar continues to deny access, the evidence from satellite images, suggesting a permanent, strategic foreign-assisted presence, will continue to escalate tensions. The outcome will inevitably reshape the security dynamics of the Bay of Bengal, testing the resolve of regional powers and the resilience of global norms. For India, vigilance and strategic partnerships will be key to safeguarding its interests in this evolving theater.