Policy Pathways to Safer Gatherings in India

Introduction

Large gatherings at the religious festivals, political rallies, sporting events, or train stations are a part of India’s social fabric. Yet many of these gatherings turn tragic when the mass gathering control fails and a stampede or a crowd crush happens. These incidents are not random accidents but avoidable disasters that reflect the political choices of which events get permissions, whose rallies get policing, whether crowd limits are enforced, and also whether leaders prioritise safety over the spectacle.

According to the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) “Managing Crowds at Events and Venues of Mass Gathering” guideline, the crowd disasters are “man-made disasters which can be completely prevented with proactive planning and also flawless execution by the dedicated groups of well-trained personnel.” 

Often, the political leaders publicly endorse the massive gatherings to demonstrate strength, because political actors very well benefit from the large gatherings and rarely want strict controls that could limit crowd size, restrict rallies, or impose liability on influential organisers but the same enthusiasm is not shown in funding the safety infrastructure or even deploying trained personnel. This political–administrative mismatch actually widens the implementation gap.

This article argues that stampedes in India actually reflect the systemic governance, infrastructure and behavioural failures, not simply unfortunate accidents. Through the lens of policy theory and practical implementation, this article proposes the recommendations to prevent such tragedies in the future.

The Magnitude of the Problem

India’s recurring crowd disasters are not just administrative failures, they are deeply political. Take, for example, the recent tragic stampede in Bengaluru in June 2025, when 11 people died during a “victory” parade for Royal Challengers Bengaluru (RCB) following their historic IPL win was a celebration that lacked proper crowd-control, emergency planning, and infrastructure, yet was cheerfully endorsed by the political leaders riding the popularity wave.

Also consider the far more tragic rally in Karur, Tamil Nadu, in September 2025, where a political gathering for actor-turned-politician Vijay turned deadly: over 40 people, including many like the children, lost their lives when a crowd crush occurred.  The permitted crowd was reportedly 10,000, but nearly 27,000 showed up.  Political ambition seemed to outweigh safety: Vijay reportedly arrived hours late, and his team was later accused of failing to manage the surging crowd.

These tragedies expose a national pattern and zero political accountability, political spectacle prioritized over public safety, weak enforcement of even basic norms, VIP-focused security while common citizens remain unprotected, and a system where political influence often overrides the safety rules. They serve as the stark illustrations that crowd disasters in India are not just “accidents” but they are symptoms of systemic neglect, governance failures, and political risk-taking. 

India has witnessed a cycle of repeated stampede incidents. The July 2024 gathering in Hathras, Uttar Pradesh, reportedly had killed 121 people when over 250,000 attendees gathered, which was triple the permitted 80,000,  this gathering size vastly exceeded the permitted limits. Studies show common causes are - overcrowding and capacity exceedance; inadequate infrastructure such as narrow exits and weak temporary structures; poor risk assessment and planning; lack of trained personnel and communication failures among the stakeholders. Thus the problem is both frequent and systemic, not just isolated misfortune. In this case, too, questions were raised about the role of local authorities, the political protection enjoyed by the organisers, and the complete failure to enforce the crowd limits despite the prior warnings. Once again, both the political visibility and the local patronage networks overshadowed the basic safety norms.

Implementation Gap and “Street-Level Bureaucracy

From public policy theory, the notion of an “implementation gap” is crucial: the laws or guidelines may exist, but they end up failing due to weak institutions, lack of resources or poor coordination. In the stampede context, guidelines for mass gathering management exist, yet tragedies continue.

Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy also applies: the frontline actors (police, event organisers, volunteers) exercise administrative discretion in unpredictable scenarios. “When the training, role clarity and also the  accountability are weak altogether, the discretionary space may lead to ad hoc responses rather than the standardised safety protocols.”

Crowd Dynamics and Risk Theory

From the social psychology and gathering behaviour literature, when crowd density reaches critical levels (for example 4-5 people per square metre), movement becomes restricted and any trigger (panic, obstruction, collapse of structure) can lead to the cascade effects. Researchers term such events “crowd crushes” rather than classic “stampedes”. Computational studies confirm that when density crosses the approximate limit of 5 persons per m², the crowd behaves like a fluid and even a small trigger that can lead to ‘crowd crush’ rather than a traditional ‘stampede’.

The “Institutional Amnesia Theory” (from computational modelling of Kumbh stampedes) suggests that despite the repeated tragedies, institutions fail to learn and embed lessons, leading to recurrence. In other words, even though the same structural triggers that appear repeatedly, the institutional mechanisms for both capturing lessons and adapting policy remain particularly weak (“institutional amnesia”).

Thus preventing stampedes requires both, the structural and the infrastructural design and parallely also behavioural and institutional reforms.

Current Legal and Administrative Framework

There are several legal instruments and the administrative guidelines relevant to stampede prevention in India. For example, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has issued guidelines for “Crowd management at events/venues of mass gathering”.  Under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, authorities can actually declare a disaster and act accordingly as soon as possible. 

Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS, 2023), offences such as ‘causing death by negligence’ (Section 106) and ‘endangering life or personal safety’ may be applied to the organisers in the mass-gathering disasters. However, the enforcement remains sporadic.

However, while these exist, they are often weakly enforced, non-binding in many respects, and do not always provide the clear accountability or prevention-oriented legal standards that are required.

Identifying Policy Gaps

Building on the above, several major policy gaps emerge that are:

1. Standardisation and enforceability: Although NDMA guidelines exist, still they lack statutory force in many of the states and there is no unified national code for crowd safety. Organisers and authorities often treat them as just mere suggestions.

2. Capacity planning and infrastructure audit:  The venues still fail to adopt rigorous risk assessments and infrastructure audits (exit widths, multiple ingress/egress, signage, emergency zones). 

3. Multi-agency coordination and accountability: During the large gatherings, coordination among all the police, event organisers, disaster management authorities, health and transport is often ad hoc. The roles and responsibilities are also unclear  of these frontline officials.

4. Data, monitoring, and real-time management: Importantly the limited use of technology such as crowd-density sensors, GIS mapping, drone surveillance, real-time alerting systems. Without this, early warning and corrective action are even weak. Lack of centralised data and the knowledge-sharing due to which the Union government has acknowledged that no central database exists for both the deaths and injuries during the mass gatherings (e.g., at the Maha Kumbh Mela) and hence institutional learning is weakened.

5. Behavioural and civic culture issues: The public behaviour, lack of civic sense, panic responses, and organisers ignoring the rules, all contribute to this as a common problem. While the structural reforms matter, culture and awareness are also most critical. 

6. Victim redress and learning loop: After the incidents happen, the investigations and reports are done but systemic learning and transformation rarely follow; accountability is also weak. Institutional amnesia persists. 

7. Enforceability and legal bindingness: Existing the guidelines remain largely advisory; there is no uniformly applied statutory code for the crowd-safety across India in the entire nation.

Policy Recommendations

In light of these gaps, the following recommendations aim to build a more robust, preventive and a crowd-safety regime. They are structured into three phases for better understanding  and execution that are: Pre-event (precaution and prevention), During event (real-time management), and Post-event (redress & learning).

Pre-Event Precaution and Prevention

• Establish a National Crowd Management & Safety Code (NCMSC)

A statutory code should be enacted with the binding standards for all mass gatherings (religious, political, commercial, transport hubs), to provide binding standards nationwide, closing the regulatory gap.  This code would define event classification (low-, medium-, high-risk) depending upon the crowd size, venue characteristics, and also the vulnerability, prescribe minimum standards for the infrastructure, exits, signage, medical access, and delineate roles of organiser, local administration, police, disaster authority.

• Mandatory Risk Assessment and the Infrastructure Audit

For all events above a threshold (e.g., >5,000 attendees or certain mass gathering venues), organisers must submit an event plan including the estimated crowd size, ingress/egress routes, emergency medical facilities, evacuation routes, crowd-density modelling. A certified infrastructure audit must verify pathways, exits, barricades, ventilation (if indoor), slope stability (if outdoor/hilly).

• Event Registration and Permit Linked to Safety Criteria

Prior to the granting of permission, local authorities must verify compliance of plans with the NCMSC standards, infrastructure audit, manpower deployment, and coordination arrangements. Permits should actually specify maximum permitted crowd capacity; exceeding it should void the permit and invite cancellation or even increased liability.

• Capacity Building and Training

Police, municipal authorities, fire and health services should receive the compulsory regular training on crowd dynamics, early warning indicators, and the evacuation protocols. Organiser staff and volunteers should also be importantly trained in crowd management, communication, and emergency drills. In general the people should also be educated, trained to take necessary actions respectively for their safety.

• Public Awareness and Civic Behaviour Campaigns

Parallel to structural reforms, there should be campaigns (in schools, colleges, public service announcements) that educate citizens on safe behaviour in large crowds, importance of following instructions, avoiding surge, remaining calm. Civic sense forms the behavioural dimension of prevention.

During Event / Real-Time Management

• Real-Time Monitoring, Crowd-Density Management, Communication and Public Messaging

Deploy technology - CCTV with AI crowd‐density analytics, drone surveillance for large outdoor gatherings, mobile-signal data/movement tracking for transport hubs. When density crosses threshold (e.g., 4-5 persons per m²), alerts must trigger immediate mitigation – redirect flow, open additional exits, and communicate via PA systems.

Provide real‐time communication to attendees - display crowd density maps/screens, warnings of high risk areas, instructions to remain calm and obey marshals. Use multi-channel alerts (mobile app, loudspeakers, LED screens) and ensure messages are in local languages, clear and frequent.

• Centralised Event Command and Control Room (ECCR)

Each major event must have an ECCR linking police, disaster authority, health services, transport, fire brigade and organisers in real time. The ECCR monitors the crowd flow, has authority to stop the further entries, redirect the traffic, and then initiate evacuation if and immediately when necessary.

• Emergency Medical Access and Evacuation Corridors

Designate and enforce clear corridors for medical access and evacuation routes. In case of an incident, ambulances must have priority passage. Event layout must factor in safe zones for triage and immediate medical care.

• Dynamic Crowd Control Measures

Use staggered entry/exit times, controlled ticketing/entry passes even for “free” events, one‐way flows where feasible, visible marshals, crowd-flow signage, periodic public announcements updating attendees. Prevent chokepoints (narrow stairs, slopes, exits) by redirecting flow proactively.

Post-Event / Redress & Learning

• Accountability and Speedy Investigation

After any incident, a special inquiry (within 30 days) should assess causes: crowd size, organisational compliance, infrastructure, coordination failure. Findings must be public. Organisers, officials or contractors found negligent should face administrative and criminal sanctions as per law. (See Institutional Amnesia Theory: failure to learn leads to repeated disasters.)

• Victim Compensation and Restorative Justice

Both the “Victims and Families” must receive the timely compensation aligned with the severity (death, injury), and also the medical rehabilitation support. A national fund (e.g., as part of the NCMSC) can ensure uniformity in compensation across the states.

• Data Collection, Public Database and Research

A national database of mass gathering events, crowd sizes, safety audits, incidents and lessons learned must be maintained. Academics, disaster management authorities and urban planners should draw from this to refine crowd modelling and infrastructure planning (as suggested by computational studies of Kumbh etc.). 

The national database should feed into a biennial ‘Mass Gatherings Safety Index’ rating the every districts and venues, published publicly to incentivise the improvement.

• Continuous Learning and Safety Audits

Venues and organisers must conduct after‐action reviews; safety audits should become periodic rather than one‐off. Lessons should be fed into future event planning. Responsibility for this learning very well lies with the local disaster authorities and the NCMSC body.

• Establish a National Mass Gatherings Safety Observatory under the NDMA or similar body: This observatory will collate the datas from the states, publish annual reports on the mass gathering incidents, oversee implementation of the code, and then the feed back into policy revision.

• Integration into Urban and Mobility Planning

Cities must treat mass gathering safety as part of transport and urban planning. For example, if transport hubs, railway stations, or temple complexes frequently host large crowds, design standards must incorporate safe egress, structural resilience, gathering flow modelling, and emergency access.

Implementation Roadmap

To move from recommendation to action, here is a proposed roadmap:

• Short term (0-12 months): The NDMA, in direct coordination with the Bureau of Police Research & Development, finalises the NCMSC draft and circulates a model permit framework to all the States/UTs. States/UTs establish the “Mass Gathering Safety Cells” within the both district disaster management authorities and conduct the first-round capacity-building workshops.

• Medium term (1-3 years): All venues above risk threshold required to undergo infrastructure audit and crowd‐flow certification; ECCRs established in all major event districts; nationwide public awareness campaign launched; research partnership with academic institutes on crowd modelling. High-risk venues (pilgrimage sites, stadiums, major transport hubs) must obtain crowd-flow certification and ECCRs must be operational in all major event-host districts.”

• Long term (3-5 years and beyond): Full implementation of NCMSC across India; national database live and accessible; legal amendments to strengthen liability and enforcement; periodic national review of mass gathering safety; cities integrate gathering safety into master plans and transport networks. Cities must integrate the crowd-safety standards into both their master plans and the transport planning, making the mass-gathering risk part of the urban resilience strategy.

Challenges and How to Address Them

Implementing this agenda will face the several obstacles:

• Resistance from both the organisers and political actors - Some events are lucrative politically or commercially; enforcing caps on crowd size may be resisted. With respect to Mitigation - Strong legal backbone (via NCMSC), public transparency, linking permit refusal to liability.

• Resource constraints: Many districts may lack the technology, and the trained personnel. Mitigation: Central funding support, public-private partnerships for technology deployment, phased rollout starting with the high-risk areas.

• Behavioral change: Public civic discipline is harder to actually legislate. Mitigation: Long-term education campaigns, embedding event safety rules into the school curricula, visible enforcement of rules (don’t just punish after tragedies).

• Coordination across agencies: India’s federal structure means the responsibilities are split (state, local, central). Shared SOPs, defined roles in the NCMSC, multi‐agency drills and the joint training can build coherence.

• Data and legacy learning: Past tragedies often proceed without a transparent investigation or learning. Mitigation: Mandate publication of the inquiry reports, then integrate lessons into national databases, and reward venues for the safety compliance. Also, many tragedies proceed without both the transparent inquiries or the published lessons, perpetuating the institutional-amnesia cycle. Mitigation: Mandate publication of the inquiry reports within 6 months, incorporate the findings into the NMGSO’s annual review, and then host the regular public-stakeholder reviews.

• Political‐economic incentives: The large gatherings often generate political visibility, commercial sponsorship and patronage. This creates a resistance to the strict capacity controls or cancellations. Mitigation: The public disclosure of the event-organiser-politician sponsorship links, the transparency of permits, and linking the violations to liability.

Why this Matters: Rights, Governance and Ethics

From a rights perspective, mass gatherings are often rights-exercising (religious assembly, political expression). But when the safety fails, the fundamental right to life and security (under Article 21 of the Constitution of India) is compromised. The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly held that the State’s duty under Article 21 includes the ensuring both the safe public assemblies and protecting citizens’ dignity. Thus the crowd-safety failures are constitutional failures of the governance and the rights protection.

Stampedes thus represent a breach of not only the governance standards but also the citizens’ basic rights. From a governance lens, the recurring stampedes indicate failures of implementation, weak accountability and institutional inertia. The ‘policy cycle’ breaks down when the learning doesn’t translate into action.

Ethically, when public life is commodified (mass gatherings become spectacles for political or commercial ends), the dignity and the safety of individuals is sidelined. A more humane policy would treat crowd safety as a part of the social contract,  the state guarantees the safe assembly, and the citizens participate responsibly.

Conclusion

Stampedes in India are tragic yet avoidable. They result from the intersection of overloaded infrastructure, weak regulation, faulty planning, deficient coordination, and sometimes also mass panic. Yet by drawing on a policy implementation theory, crowd behaviour research and comparative practice, we can craft a strong preventive regime. The proposed National Crowd Management & Safety Code, mandatory audits, real-time monitoring, accountability framework and cultural education represent a comprehensive approach. “If these recommendations are thereby institutionalised and acted upon consistently, the mass gatherings in India from festivals and rallies to celebrations can help in shift from being the high-risk liabilities to the safe expressions of the civic life. In this sense, crowd safety becomes not just a technical checklist, but definitely a test of governance, institutional learning and also a public trust in the State.”

Ultimately, preventing the stampedes requires political courage and the willingness to prioritise citizen safety even if and when it means limiting the crowds, cancelling the unsafe rallies, or even holding the powerful organisers accountable.