Policy Pathways to Safer Gatherings in India

Understanding Stampedes in India: A Call for Action

The Political and Social Context of Mass Gatherings

Large gatherings at religious festivals, political rallies, sporting events, or train stations are a part of India’s social fabric. However, many of these events can turn tragic when crowd control fails, leading to stampedes or crowd crushes. These incidents are not random accidents but avoidable disasters that reflect political choices regarding event permissions, policing, crowd limits, and the prioritization of safety over spectacle.

According to the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), the guideline “Managing Crowds at Events and Venues of Mass Gathering” states that crowd disasters are “man-made disasters which can be completely prevented with proactive planning and flawless execution by dedicated groups of well-trained personnel.”

Political leaders often endorse massive gatherings to demonstrate strength. They benefit from large crowds and rarely want strict controls that could limit attendance or impose liability on influential organizers. However, this enthusiasm is not reflected in funding safety infrastructure or deploying trained personnel. This political-administrative mismatch widens the implementation gap.

This article argues that stampedes in India reflect systemic governance, infrastructure, and behavioral failures, not merely unfortunate accidents. Through policy theory and practical implementation, this article proposes recommendations to prevent such tragedies in the future.

The Magnitude of the Problem

India’s recurring crowd disasters are not just administrative failures; they are deeply political. Take, for example, the tragic stampede in Bengaluru in June 2025, where 11 people died during a “victory” parade for the Royal Challengers Bengaluru (RCB) following their historic IPL win. This celebration lacked proper crowd control, emergency planning, and infrastructure, yet was cheerfully endorsed by political leaders riding the popularity wave.

Consider the far more tragic rally in Karur, Tamil Nadu, in September 2025. A political gathering for actor-turned-politician Vijay turned deadly, claiming over 40 lives, including many children, when a crowd crush occurred. The permitted crowd was reportedly 10,000, but nearly 27,000 showed up. Political ambition seemed to outweigh safety: Vijay arrived hours late, and his team was later accused of failing to manage the surging crowd.

These tragedies expose a national pattern of zero political accountability, where political spectacle is prioritized over public safety. Weak enforcement of even basic norms, VIP-focused security, and a system where political influence often overrides safety rules illustrate that crowd disasters in India are not just “accidents.” They are symptoms of systemic neglect, governance failures, and political risk-taking.

India has witnessed a cycle of repeated stampede incidents. The July 2024 gathering in Hathras, Uttar Pradesh, reportedly killed 121 people when over 250,000 attendees gathered, which was triple the permitted 80,000. Studies show common causes include overcrowding, inadequate infrastructure, poor risk assessment, and lack of trained personnel. Thus, the problem is frequent and systemic, not just isolated misfortune. Questions were raised about local authorities' roles, the political protection enjoyed by organizers, and the complete failure to enforce crowd limits despite prior warnings. Political visibility and local patronage networks overshadowed basic safety norms.

Implementation Gap and Street-Level Bureaucracy

From public policy theory, the notion of an “implementation gap” is crucial: laws or guidelines may exist but fail due to weak institutions, lack of resources, or poor coordination. In the context of stampedes, guidelines for mass gathering management exist, yet tragedies continue.

Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy also applies here. Frontline actors (police, event organizers, volunteers) exercise administrative discretion in unpredictable scenarios. “When training, role clarity, and accountability are weak, the discretionary space may lead to ad hoc responses rather than standardized safety protocols.”

Crowd Dynamics and Risk Theory

From the social psychology and gathering behavior literature, when crowd density reaches critical levels (for example, 4-5 people per square meter), movement becomes restricted. Any trigger (panic, obstruction, collapse of structure) can lead to cascade effects. Researchers term such events “crowd crushes” rather than classic “stampedes.” Computational studies confirm that when density crosses the approximate limit of 5 persons per m², the crowd behaves like a fluid. Even a small trigger can lead to a ‘crowd crush’ rather than a traditional ‘stampede.’

The “Institutional Amnesia Theory” (from computational modeling of Kumbh stampedes) suggests that despite repeated tragedies, institutions fail to learn and embed lessons, leading to recurrence. In other words, even though the same structural triggers appear repeatedly, the institutional mechanisms for capturing lessons and adapting policy remain weak. Thus, preventing stampedes requires both structural and infrastructural design, as well as behavioral and institutional reforms.

Current Legal and Administrative Framework

There are several legal instruments and administrative guidelines relevant to stampede prevention in India. For example, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has issued guidelines for “Crowd Management at Events/Venues of Mass Gathering.” Under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, authorities can declare a disaster and act accordingly as soon as possible.

Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS, 2023), offenses such as ‘causing death by negligence’ (Section 106) and ‘endangering life or personal safety’ may be applied to the organizers in mass-gathering disasters. However, enforcement remains sporadic.

While these guidelines exist, they are often weakly enforced, non-binding in many respects, and do not always provide the clear accountability or prevention-oriented legal standards that are required.

Identifying Policy Gaps

Building on the above, several major policy gaps emerge:

1. Standardization and Enforceability: Although NDMA guidelines exist, they lack statutory force in many states. There is no unified national code for crowd safety. Organizers and authorities often treat them as mere suggestions.

   
   

2. Capacity Planning and Infrastructure Audit: Venues fail to adopt rigorous risk assessments and infrastructure audits (exit widths, multiple ingress/egress, signage, emergency zones).

   
   

3. Multi-Agency Coordination and Accountability: During large gatherings, coordination among police, event organizers, disaster management authorities, health services, and transport is often ad hoc. The roles and responsibilities of frontline officials are unclear.

   
   

4. Data, Monitoring, and Real-Time Management: The limited use of technology, such as crowd-density sensors, GIS mapping, drone surveillance, and real-time alerting systems, weakens early warning and corrective action. The Union government has acknowledged that no central database exists for deaths and injuries during mass gatherings (e.g., at the Maha Kumbh Mela), which hampers institutional learning.

   
   

5. Behavioral and Civic Culture Issues: Public behavior, lack of civic sense, panic responses, and organizers ignoring rules all contribute to this common problem. While structural reforms matter, culture and awareness are critical.

   
   

6. Victim Redress and Learning Loop: After incidents occur, investigations and reports are conducted, but systemic learning and transformation rarely follow. Accountability remains weak, and institutional amnesia persists.

   
   

7. Enforceability and Legal Bindingness: Existing guidelines remain largely advisory; there is no uniformly applied statutory code for crowd safety across India.

   
   

Policy Recommendations

In light of these gaps, the following recommendations aim to build a more robust, preventive crowd safety regime. They are structured into three phases for better understanding and execution: Pre-event (precaution and prevention), During event (real-time management), and Post-event (redress & learning).

Pre-Event Precaution and Prevention

• Establish a National Crowd Management & Safety Code (NCMSC): A statutory code should be enacted with binding standards for all mass gatherings (religious, political, commercial, transport hubs). This code would define event classification (low-, medium-, high-risk) based on crowd size, venue characteristics, and vulnerability. It would prescribe minimum standards for infrastructure, exits, signage, medical access, and delineate roles of organizers, local administration, police, and disaster authority.

  
  

• Mandatory Risk Assessment and Infrastructure Audit: For all events above a threshold (e.g., >5,000 attendees), organizers must submit an event plan that includes estimated crowd size, ingress/egress routes, emergency medical facilities, and crowd-density modeling. A certified infrastructure audit must verify pathways, exits, barricades, ventilation (if indoor), and slope stability (if outdoor/hilly).

  
  

• Event Registration and Permit Linked to Safety Criteria: Local authorities must verify compliance with NCMSC standards, infrastructure audits, manpower deployment, and coordination arrangements before granting permission. Permits should specify maximum permitted crowd capacity; exceeding it should void the permit and invite cancellation or increased liability.

  
  

• Capacity Building and Training: Police, municipal authorities, fire, and health services should receive compulsory regular training on crowd dynamics, early warning indicators, and evacuation protocols. Organizers’ staff and volunteers should also be trained in crowd management, communication, and emergency drills. Public education campaigns should teach citizens necessary actions for their safety.

  
  

• Public Awareness and Civic Behavior Campaigns: Campaigns in schools, colleges, and public service announcements should educate citizens on safe behavior in large crowds, the importance of following instructions, avoiding surges, and remaining calm. Civic sense forms the behavioral dimension of prevention.

  
  

During Event / Real-Time Management

• Real-Time Monitoring, Crowd-Density Management, Communication, and Public Messaging: Deploy technology—CCTV with AI crowd-density analytics, drone surveillance for large outdoor gatherings, and mobile-signal data/movement tracking for transport hubs. When density crosses a threshold (e.g., 4-5 persons per m²), alerts must trigger immediate mitigation—redirect flow, open additional exits, and communicate via PA systems. Provide real-time communication to attendees—display crowd density maps/screens, warnings of high-risk areas, and instructions to remain calm and obey marshals. Use multi-channel alerts (mobile app, loudspeakers, LED screens) and ensure messages are in local languages, clear, and frequent.

  
  

• Centralized Event Command and Control Room (ECCR): Each major event must have an ECCR linking police, disaster authority, health services, transport, fire brigade, and organizers in real-time. The ECCR monitors crowd flow, has the authority to stop further entries, redirect traffic, and initiate evacuation when necessary.

  
  

• Emergency Medical Access and Evacuation Corridors: Designate and enforce clear corridors for medical access and evacuation routes. In case of an incident, ambulances must have priority passage. Event layout must factor in safe zones for triage and immediate medical care.

  
  

• Dynamic Crowd Control Measures: Use staggered entry/exit times, controlled ticketing/entry passes even for “free” events, one-way flows where feasible, visible marshals, crowd-flow signage, and periodic public announcements updating attendees. Prevent chokepoints (narrow stairs, slopes, exits) by proactively redirecting flow.

  
  

Post-Event / Redress & Learning

• Accountability and Speedy Investigation: After any incident, a special inquiry (within 30 days) should assess causes: crowd size, organizational compliance, infrastructure, and coordination failure. Findings must be public. Organizers, officials, or contractors found negligent should face administrative and criminal sanctions as per law.

  
  

• Victim Compensation and Restorative Justice: Both victims and families must receive timely compensation aligned with severity (death, injury) and medical rehabilitation support. A national fund (e.g., as part of the NCMSC) can ensure uniformity in compensation across states.

  
  

• Data Collection, Public Database, and Research: A national database of mass gathering events, crowd sizes, safety audits, incidents, and lessons learned must be maintained. Academics, disaster management authorities, and urban planners should draw from this to refine crowd modeling and infrastructure planning. The national database should feed into a biennial ‘Mass Gatherings Safety Index’ rating every district and venue, published publicly to incentivize improvement.

  
  

• Continuous Learning and Safety Audits: Venues and organizers must conduct after-action reviews; safety audits should become periodic rather than one-off. Lessons should be fed into future event planning. Responsibility for this learning lies with local disaster authorities and the NCMSC body.

  
  

• Establish a National Mass Gatherings Safety Observatory under the NDMA or similar body: This observatory will collate data from the states, publish annual reports on mass gathering incidents, oversee implementation of the code, and feed back into policy revision.

  
  

• Integration into Urban and Mobility Planning: Cities must treat mass gathering safety as part of transport and urban planning. For example, if transport hubs, railway stations, or temple complexes frequently host large crowds, design standards must incorporate safe egress, structural resilience, gathering flow modeling, and emergency access.

  
  

Implementation Roadmap

To move from recommendation to action, here is a proposed roadmap:

• Short term (0-12 months): The NDMA, in direct coordination with the Bureau of Police Research & Development, finalizes the NCMSC draft and circulates a model permit framework to all States/UTs. States/UTs establish “Mass Gathering Safety Cells” within district disaster management authorities and conduct the first-round capacity-building workshops.

  
  

• Medium term (1-3 years): All venues above risk threshold must undergo infrastructure audit and crowd-flow certification; ECCRs established in all major event districts; nationwide public awareness campaign launched; research partnership with academic institutes on crowd modeling. High-risk venues (pilgrimage sites, stadiums, major transport hubs) must obtain crowd-flow certification, and ECCRs must be operational in all major event-host districts.

  
  

• Long term (3-5 years and beyond): Full implementation of NCMSC across India; national database live and accessible; legal amendments to strengthen liability and enforcement; periodic national review of mass gathering safety; cities integrate gathering safety into master plans and transport networks.

  
  

Challenges and How to Address Them

Implementing this agenda will face several obstacles:

• Resistance from Organizers and Political Actors: Some events are lucrative politically or commercially; enforcing caps on crowd size may be resisted. Mitigation: Strong legal backbone (via NCMSC), public transparency, linking permit refusal to liability.

  
  

• Resource Constraints: Many districts may lack technology and trained personnel. Mitigation: Central funding support, public-private partnerships for technology deployment, phased rollout starting with high-risk areas.

  
  

• Behavioral Change: Public civic discipline is harder to legislate. Mitigation: Long-term education campaigns, embedding event safety rules into school curricula, visible enforcement of rules.

  
  

• Coordination Across Agencies: India’s federal structure means responsibilities are split (state, local, central). Mitigation: Shared SOPs, defined roles in the NCMSC, multi-agency drills, and joint training can build coherence.

  
  

• Data and Legacy Learning: Past tragedies often proceed without transparent investigation or learning. Mitigation: Mandate publication of inquiry reports, integrate lessons into national databases, and reward venues for safety compliance.

  
  

• Political-Economic Incentives: Large gatherings often generate political visibility and commercial sponsorship. Mitigation: Public disclosure of event-organizer-politician sponsorship links, transparency of permits, and linking violations to liability.

  
  

Why This Matters: Rights, Governance, and Ethics

From a rights perspective, mass gatherings often involve exercising rights (religious assembly, political expression). When safety fails, the fundamental right to life and security (under Article 21 of the Constitution of India) is compromised. The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly held that the State’s duty under Article 21 includes ensuring safe public assemblies and protecting citizens’ dignity. Thus, crowd safety failures represent constitutional failures of governance and rights protection.

Stampedes breach not only governance standards but also citizens’ basic rights. From a governance lens, recurring stampedes indicate failures of implementation, weak accountability, and institutional inertia. The ‘policy cycle’ breaks down when learning does not translate into action.

Ethically, when public life is commodified, the dignity and safety of individuals are sidelined. A more humane policy would treat crowd safety as part of the social contract, wherein the state guarantees safe assembly, and citizens participate responsibly.

Conclusion

Stampedes in India are tragic yet avoidable. They result from overloaded infrastructure, weak regulation, faulty planning, deficient coordination, and sometimes mass panic. By drawing on policy implementation theory, crowd behavior research, and comparative practice, we can craft a strong preventive regime. The proposed National Crowd Management & Safety Code, mandatory audits, real-time monitoring, accountability frameworks, and cultural education represent a comprehensive approach.

“If these recommendations are institutionalized and acted upon consistently, mass gatherings in India—from festivals and rallies to celebrations—can shift from being high-risk liabilities to safe expressions of civic life. In this sense, crowd safety becomes not just a technical checklist but a test of governance, institutional learning, and public trust in the State.”

Ultimately, preventing stampedes requires political courage and the willingness to prioritize citizen safety, even if it means limiting crowds, canceling unsafe rallies, or holding powerful organizers accountable.