INDUS WATER TREATY: RISE OF WATER DIPLOMACY

A year after India placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance following the Pahalgam terror attack of 2025, the move remains a defining moment in the evolution of South Asian geopolitics. For decades, the Indus basin symbolized a rare paradox: India and Pakistan fought wars, suspended dialogue, and endured repeated crises, yet continued cooperating over rivers that sustained millions. In 2025, that paradox broke.

There is an old saying in the subcontinent: “Water remembers every wound.” The rivers flowing from the Himalayas into Punjab and Sindh have witnessed Partition, wars, insurgencies, and diplomatic breakdowns. Yet the waters continued to flow because the treaty governing them survived every storm. India’s decision to suspend the treaty after the Pahalgam attack therefore marked more than a diplomatic response, it signalled the collapse of one of the important institutional bridges between the two neighbours.

The Indus basin comprises six rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. Signed in 1960 under the mediation of the World Bank by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan, the Indus water treaty allocated the eastern rivers to India and the western rivers largely to Pakistan, while permitting India limited use for irrigation, storage, and hydropower generation on the western rivers. Key provisions of the treaty included the Permanent Indus Commission, annual data sharing, a three-tier dispute resolution mechanism involving Neutral Experts and Courts of Arbitration, and provisions for future cooperation.

For over six decades, the treaty was widely regarded as the world’s most conflict-resilient water-sharing agreement, surviving wars in 1965, 1971, and 1999, as well as major terror attacks and prolonged diplomatic freezes. Much of this resilience stemmed from India’s consistent decision to uphold the treaty framework despite repeated security provocations and deteriorating bilateral relations.

The events of 2025, however, changed that strategic thinking. Following the Pahalgam attack, India announced that the treaty would remain in abeyance until Pakistan took “credible and irreversible” action against cross-border terrorism. India subsequently increased operational regulation of western river flows through projects such as the Baglihar Dam, Salal Dam, and the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project. Reservoir flushing, sediment management, and short-term flow controls were accelerated within India’s existing infrastructural capacity.

However, this decision did not emerge in isolation. India’s concerns regarding the treaty had accumulated steadily over the years. After the Uri terror attack in 2016, the Indian Prime Minister famously remarked that “blood and water cannot flow together.” In 2023 and 2024, India formally sought modifications to the treaty under Article XII(3), arguing that changing demographics, climate pressures, and Pakistan’s repeated objections to Indian hydropower projects had rendered several provisions outdated. Disputes over projects such as Kishanganga and Ratle increasingly convinced India that Islamabad was using treaty mechanisms to obstruct legitimate development.

Thus, 2025 marked the beginning of overt water diplomacy in South Asia. Water was no longer insulated from geopolitics, in fact, it became an instrument of strategic signalling. India’s message was clear: cooperation cannot coexist indefinitely with terrorism.

For Pakistan, the implications are serious. Nearly 80 percent of Pakistan’s irrigated agriculture depends upon the Indus river system. Punjab and Sindh rely heavily on stable western river flows. Even limited upstream regulation by India creates uncertainty regarding irrigation cycles, reservoir planning, and hydropower generation. More importantly, Pakistan now confronts the reality that the treaty it long considered untouchable is no longer politically immune.

Expectedly, Islamabad strongly condemned the suspension, describing it as contrary to international obligations and warning against the “weaponization of water.” Pakistan approached international forums and reiterated that the treaty contains no unilateral withdrawal clause. Pakistani officials also argued that India’s actions could create dangerous precedents for global transboundary river governance.

Legally, India’s position remains contested. The treaty contains no explicit provision for unilateral withdrawal. India has therefore deliberately used the term “abeyance” instead of termination. Critics argue that such suspension challenges the sanctity of international agreements, while supporters contend that persistent cross-border terrorism fundamentally alters the basis of bilateral cooperation. In this context, several Indian strategic analysts have referenced Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which allows reconsideration of treaty obligations in cases involving a “fundamental change of circumstances.” While India is not formally a signatory to the convention, Article 62 is often viewed as reflecting broader customary principles of international law. However, invoking such reasoning would carry significant diplomatic consequences and therefore should remain a measure of absolute last resort rather than immediate policy.

Further, the regional implications of the suspension extend beyond Pakistan alone. Pakistan and China have attempted to portray India’s move as evidence of regional hegemonic behaviour. Simultaneously, some analysts revived the so-called “water bomb theory” regarding China’s upstream position on the Brahmaputra river. The argument is not merely that China could restrict flows into India, but that it could strategically manipulate upstream dams and release excess water during sensitive periods, potentially aggravating floods in downstream Indian states such as Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. However, this theory too requires careful scrutiny. The Brahmaputra is among the world’s most voluminous and sediment-heavy rivers, with substantial downstream tributaries originating within India itself. While upstream infrastructure can influence seasonal flow patterns to a limited extent, the idea of China singularly “flooding” India as a sustained geopolitical weapon remains operationally and hydrologically overstated. Moreover, any overt manipulation of transboundary rivers by Beijing would severely damage China’s global credibility and intensify regional anxieties regarding upstream river control.

But India’s credibility as a responsible regional power may still face scrutiny at global platform. Countries involved in transboundary river negotiations may question whether long-standing agreements can remain insulated from political disputes. Therefore, India must carefully balance strategic messaging with its image as a reliable international stakeholder.

Going forward, India’s approach must combine firmness with strategic maturity. The principle that terror and cooperation cannot go hand in hand is politically and morally understandable. However, India should simultaneously build diplomatic support among allies and utilize forums such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to increase pressure on Pakistan regarding terror financing and cross-border militancy.

At the same time, India should continue pushing for treaty amendments under Article XII(3) rather than permanently abandoning the framework altogether. Climate change, population growth, and evolving developmental needs require modernization of the treaty provisions. Importantly, India should also maximize its lawful utilization rights. Under the treaty, India is permitted to utilize nearly 20 percent of the waters of the western rivers through irrigation, storage, and hydropower-related usage. However, India currently utilizes only around 3–4 percent of this permissible share due to infrastructural and storage limitations. Expanding dams, canals, reservoirs, and hydropower projects within treaty limits would strengthen India’s strategic position without attracting unnecessary criticism.

And if Pakistan continues refusing meaningful treaty reforms while simultaneously enabling cross-border terrorism, India may gradually seek broader diplomatic support to reconsider the long-term viability of the treaty framework itself. However, such measures must remain calibrated and carefully justified under international law, since India’s stature as a responsible regional power depends not merely on coercive capability, but also on adherence to international norms and strategic restraint.

Ultimately, while the suspension of the treaty may have been strategically justified, water diplomacy alone cannot resolve the deeper structural issues between India and Pakistan. India’s long-term effectiveness will depend not merely on leveraging rivers as instruments of pressure, but on maintaining its broader geopolitical credibility as a responsible regional leader.

And perhaps that brings us back to the rivers themselves. A year ago, after the violence at Pahalgam, the waters of the Indus became entangled with the politics of terror and retaliation. The rivers that once quietly survived every crisis became symbols of strategic confrontation. Yet history teaches an important lesson: rivers can sustain civilizations only when managed with restraint and foresight. India’s message that terrorism and cooperation cannot coexist is valid. But as an emerging regional power, India’s strength will ultimately be measured not only by its ability to exert pressure, but also by its ability to shape a stable and responsible regional order.