India, America and the Recurring Illusion of Strategic Control

Recent commentary circulating in the Western and Chinese strategic circles argues that the United States has shifted from “strategic altruism” toward India to open coercion, especially under Donald Trump’s second term. Tariffs, visa restrictions, re-embracing Pakistan, loud-mouthing opposition to India’s energy imports from Russia, and so on, are all being interpreted as a sudden breakdown of goodwill between India and America. It is often attributed to the abrasiveness of Donald Trump or to America’s growing anxiety over relative decline. Some go further, arguing that this moment marks the takeoff point for India’s alignment favourable to China. 

This interpretation misreads both history and strategy. The U.S. has never practiced “strategic altruism” in its great power relationships. During the Cold War, Washington engaged with Beijing to constrain the Soviet Union. Economic opening and diplomatic normalisation were used as the instruments for balance, not generosity. It was also believed that the effort would pull China out of the communist morass and facilitate transformation into a liberal and democratic form of governance. Once the Cold War ended, that logic persisted until China itself emerged as a systemic competitor after the 2008 financial crisis.

Strategic Shift by US 

It is at this point that US strategy pivoted and India became the only possible long-term balancer in Asia. World’s largest democracy, geographically pivotal and rising demographically, was assumed to be the natural ally of US. It was also believed that given the geostrategic behaviour of China, India will always stay out of Beijing’s orbit. The tango began with a nuclear agreement and moved on in terms of deepening defense ties, lures of technology, and Indo-Pacific frameworks. Once again, this was not altruism; it was hedging or, at best, recalibration.

After 2020, the US faced simultaneous pressures in terms of sharpening rivalry with China, domestic political polarisation and declining tolerance for open-ended commitments. It was also felt necessary that the US and Russia need to be dealt with in a piecemeal manner. Hence, the weakening of Russia became an imperative before attempting to checkmate China.

In this context, the Ukraine war became a strategic instrument. Whether, US was instrumental in pushing both countries into a conflict is a matter of debate; however, it is amply clear that the conflict was deliberately internationalised to weaken Russia through sustained economic and military attrition.

The outcome, however, drifted away from the intended objectives. Russia did not fragment or retreat into irrelevance. Instead, it grew more dependent on and aligned with China. The result was a tighter Sino-Russian convergence, not a weakened adversary system.

Implications for India

This had implications for India. As US resources narrowed and uncertainty boomeranged, Washington changed the trajectory of expectations from its allies or “would-be allies.” A tigfhter and firmer alignment was preferred vis-a-vis the erstwhile model of “strategic partnership without obligation.” India was also assessed as a free-floater or free-loader. This led to an increasing demand for predictability, and the geometry of the relationship with India was altered from being a “China-balancer” to “US aligned.”

India Refusal to Ally with US

New Delhi’s resistance was not ideological but strategic. India has built its rise on autonomy, not alliance. It has cooperated with the US extensively while preserving diversified relationships, including with Russia. The Ukraine war reinforced this instinct. Watching how the US squeezes partners for short-term leverage or abandons them when costs rise, India chose not to trade a time-tested relationship for uncertain guarantees.

This refusal triggered pressure. Trade frictions, visa restrictions, outsourcing scrutiny, and sharper rhetoric were not aberrations; they were instruments. Economic coercion replaced diplomatic persuasion. At moments when pressure edged towards coercion, India widened its signaling space. It hinted at a renewed engagement with Russia and kept open the theoretical possibility of a Russia-India-China dialogue or doubling down on BRICKS. India, however, kept it abundantly clear that it would not enter them as a bloc, but use them as leverage against US coercion. For instance, if US choises to create obstacles against the India Middle East Corridor (IMEC), the effort toward deepening the International North-South Corridor (INSTC) would be accelerated. This should be read as strategic ambiguity, not alignment.

China’s Wishful Reading

China, however, has misread the manoeuvre or it is pretending to read it aloud as a fissure between India and US. Beijing’s narrative increasingly assumes that US-India friction will inevitably push India into China’s orbit. History suggests otherwise. India’s non-alignment has never meant acquiescence. A weaker US does not make Chinese primacy more acceptable. It makes India’s autonomy more valuable. Moreover, history also suggests that unless Beijing takes recourse to unseemly actions by resolving the border issues, the return of illegally occupied territories of Shaksgam, and unacceptable claims over Arunachal Pradesh, there can never be a reversal in the trajectory of India-China relations, irrespective of whatever shape India-US relations take.

Takeaways

What we are witnessing, then, is not the collapse of US-India relations, nor the dawn of a China-centric order. It is the friction inherent in India’s transition from a strategic beneficiary to an independent pole. Friction is not failure. It is the price of sovereignty in a multipolar world. The real danger lies not in US pressure, but in misreading it, more so in China’s misreading of India. Patience is not pliability. Strategic independence, once achieved, is rarely surrendered.