FROM INSURGENCY TO INTEGRATION: HOW INDIA IS WINNING THE BATTLE WITHIN

With the senior naxalite, Bhupathi surrendering along with 60 other cadres in Gadchiroli, followed by another mass surrender of over 140 maoist cadres including prominent Central Committee member Rupesh who laid down their arms in Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh and just days later, on October 26, 2025, another 21 Maoists including 13 women and Division Committee Secretary Mukesh of the banned CPI (Maoist) surrendered in Chattisgarh’s Kanker district, the threat of naxalism once spread across around 182 districts in 2014, has now been reduced to just 11 districts as of October 2025. This remarkable transformation has been made possible through continuous security operations, grassroots level governance and infrastructure led inclusion. This represents not just a territorial change but also a profound transition from insurgency to integration within India’s internal security landscape.

INTRODUCTION

Naxalism, also known as the Maoist or Left Wing Extremist (LWE) insurgency, has been one of India's most enduring internal security challenges. Originated in radical leftist ideology, the Naxalite movement has long operated in what is called the “Red Corridor”. For many years, the violence and extortion by such naxal groups paralysed development and even obstructed citizen’s rights such as casting their votes. However, a sustained and multi-pronged crackdown, especially since 2014 when NDA came at center, has dramatically changed the narrative. This transformation has not been limited to just counter-insurgency operations but has also involved a comprehensive policy shift combining security, governance, and also welfare delivery.This shift also very well reflects the constitutional responsibility of the Union under Article 355 to protect every State against internal disturbance and ensure that governance functions effectively throughout the territory. The evolving policy response to Left-Wing Extremism has thus moved beyond the mere law-and-order measures to actually become a coordinated exercise in the governance restoration. Through the central–state cooperation, institutional reforms, and targeted welfare interventions, the State reaffirmed its legitimacy in regions where the  alienation and administrative vacuum had long prevailed.

Today, the red corridor is shrinking, these insurgent cadres and groups are surrendering in large numbers and above all this, all previously conflict affected areas are being restored as new zones of growth and development. 

ORIGIN OF NAXALISM: A BRIEF HISTORY

It all started with the communist political and economic thought given by Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels in the later half of the nineteenth century after which diverse forms of communism or socialism including left wing extremism started to spread all over the globe. One such form Marxism-Leninism was developed by Mao Tse Tung or Mao-Zedong- the person behind anti-capitalist revolution in China, which stated that modus operandi of naxals or maoists includes glorifying violence and capturing state power through armed insurrections or guerilla warfare.

Roots of Naxalism in India dates back to the year 1967 with the Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal, led by Charu Mazumdar, where peasants revolted against zamindars. The fuel to this fire of Naxalism was further provided with the formation of Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004, following the accumulation of groups like People’s war, CPI(Marxist-Leninst) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India. Though the CPI (Maoist) and its affiliates are now banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, but there has been a highly structured hierarchy spanning through central to regional levels that made their network resilient, hard to infiltrate and their actions were further supported by local tribal populations residing over the red corridor.

THE RED CORRIDOR AND REASONS FOR NAXALISM IN INDIA

Red Corridor refers to a belt of districts with strong naxalite influence. These spread primarily across the states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, Kerala, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, and parts of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. The insurgency took root in central and eastern India due to historical injustices, socio-economic inequality, and weak governance in remote, resource–rich  tribal areas,  Maoists drew support by addressing local grievances through ‘jan adalats’ and land related mobilization. From a governance perspective, this definitely reflects the “vacuum theory” of insurgency where non-state actors fill spaces vacated by the weak or absent institutions. The absence of accountable governance mechanisms allowed the parallel systems of  both justice and resource control to gain legitimacy among marginalized groups.

THE UPA YEARS (2004-2014): STAGNATION AND FAILURE 

Under the UPA years, India’s response to the Naxalite insurgency was marked by indecision, ideological confusion and policy paralysis. Despite acknowledging Naxalism as ‘India’s greatest internal security threat’ by then Prime Minister in 2009, the government failed to act decisively to counter such insurgency. During the UPA tenure, this threat went ignored  or with little attention, as the soft approach allowed maoists to further control tribals and manipulate them to their own advantage. The government's false promises and no prioritization to the insurgency left communities feeling abandoned and stuck in fear with rebels controlling them in forgotten villages.

One of the most evident instances of their failure was seen in April 2010 in the forests of Dantewada, Chattisgarh where Naxalites killed 76 CRPF personnel- one of the deadliest attacks in India’s counter-insurgency history- shocking the entire nation.  Despite the scale of the tragedy, no major policy shift followed, and just three years later, in May 2013, the Darbha Valley attack targeted congress leader, killed 29 people, including Mahendra Kumar, the architect of the Salwa Judum anti-Naxal movement.These attacks exposed the limitations of India’s early counter insurgency strategies, highlighting the need for better intelligence, coordinated operations and security measures with development and government initiatives. 

Operation Green Hunt (2009), was India's largest ever counter- insurgency campaign in central and eastern India. Despite deploying thousands of forces, it still suffered from poor coordination, weak intelligence, untrained or underarmed forces and political disagreement, for instance,Home Minister P.Chidambran’s hardline approach was openly undermined and was called as ‘intellectually arrogant’ by party leader Digvijay Singh, limiting its impact. In regards, the continuous feedback mechanism demonstrates how iterative policy learning improves outcomes in conflict governance. In this regard, the continuous feedback mechanism demonstrates how iterative policy learning improves outcomes in conflict governance

Between 2004 and 2010, Naxalite incidents rose from 1,533 to 2,213 and deaths nearly doubled- proof of a crisis deepening under congress rule. 

In essence, the UPA era showed operations lacking direction and political contradictions among party and national leaders that failed to tackle such a major challenge in India’s peace and security.

NAXALMUKT BHARAT ABHIYAAN; FROM RED ZONES TO GROWTH CORRIDORS

A strategic shift after 2014: New Resolve, New Approach

The turning point came after 2014, when the NDA government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi made the full elimination of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) a central security priority. Under the leadership of Home Minister Amit Shah, New Delhi took a resolution to make red zones Naxalite free by March 2026 by adopting a zero-tolerance policy towards naxalism, backed by a holistic model combining security operations, development interventions and rehabilitation.

The core policy shift lay in treating Naxalism not merely just as a law-and-order issue but as a governance gap requiring a convergence between infrastructure creation, welfare access, and institutional presence too. This aligns with the government’s National Policy and Action Plan (2015), which emphasizes a “security–development–rights” triangle as the foundation for the lasting peace.

Key measures include deployment of CAPFs, 612 fortified police stations, offensive operations to cut Naxalite financing, and schemes like SRE, SCA, and SIS for strengthening forces. Development efforts focus on roads, telecom, financial inclusion, education, and skill development, including 14,618 km of roads, 7,768 mobile towers, 1,007 bank branches, and 178 tribal schools. The 2024 Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan aims to benefit 1.5 crore people through improved connectivity and amenities in 15,000 villages.

The approach combines enhanced security, infrastructure development, and community welfare, aiming to neutralize Naxalite influence and accelerate socio-economic progress in LWE-affected regions. 

Beyond security and development, the government’s anti-Naxal policy framework or naxal free initiative has evolved into a coordinated inter-ministerial model. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) leads the significant strategic operations under the National Policy and Action Plan (2015) while the Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MoTA) that ensures livelihood and welfare schemes, aligns with tribal rights under the Forest Rights Act (2006). Simultaneously, NITI Aayog and state planning bodies work on the district-level convergence plans to synchronize health, education, and also employment initiatives. This multi-level governance approach integrates policy instruments of law enforcement, social inclusion, and administrative reform as well  to ensure long-term stability.

OPERATIONAL SUCCESS AND GAINS

Operation Kagar also known as Operation Black Forest is a major anti-Naxal Campaign launched on 1 January 2024, targets Maoist strongholds in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar region and the Karregutta ranges, covering 800 sq km. It uses a four-pronged strategy: forward operating bases, advanced intelligence (drones, informants, intercepted communications), deployment of 24,000+ security personnel, and development projects to weaken Maoist support.

Since inception, the operation has killed over 400 Naxals, secured 1,646 surrenders, and reclaimed key strongholds including hills and forests used by senior Maoist leaders. In Chattisgarh, for instance, around 50 naxalites in Bijapur surrendered in March 2025. High-profile targets, such as CPI (Maoist) general secretary Nambala Keshav Rao, have been neutralized. Advanced surveillance, multi-force assaults, and local cooperation have crippled Maoist operations, leaving only 18 of the original 40 top leaders at large.

Operation Kagar is a turning point in India’s fight against Left-Wing Extremism, combining military action with socio-economic initiatives to dismantle insurgent networks.

HOW SUCH CRACKDOWN ENABLED DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT?

For such a long time, investors avoided conflict zones but the situation changed. With fewer violent incidents companies feel safer in investing in formerly turbulent zones. Road, telecom connectivity and power projects are moving ahead here. Public services are reaching remote tribal communities, boosting human development and trust in public institutions. As risks come down, such regions become more attractive for industrial and mining projects thus enhancing the ease of doing business.

Challenges Ahead: While the success is remarkable to an extent, sustaining potential peace will definitely require addressing the remaining challenges such as -

1.Rehabilitation gaps for the surrendered cadres and their reintegration into society.

2.Slow justice delivery in conflict-affected districts which can revive the local grievances.

3.Environmental and land conflicts due to mining and the industrial expansion that risk re-triggering discontent among tribal communities.

4.Capacity-building of local governance ensuring that the district administrations can deliver without actually relying solely on central interventions.

In addition, structural policy challenges still persist such as inter-departmental overlap in the program implementation, lack of context-specific data for LWE districts, and also the need for greater local participation in planning. Sustained success will depend on embedding policy both adaptability and institutional learning into the governance model of these regions.

From a policy lens, the decline of Left-Wing Extremism in India represents a shift that is from reactive counter-insurgency to proactive state-building. The focus moved from ‘security first’ to ‘governance first’, ensuring that inclusion, accountability, and service delivery replaced the alienation. Key lessons lie in the decentralization of implementation which will empower the local administrations and Panchayati Raj institutions in LWE-affected districts. Moreover, policy convergence between security, tribal welfare, and also digital inclusion marks a rare example of multi-sectoral success in India’s internal security policy.

CONCLUSION

Naxalism,which was once India's biggest internal security threat, was a result of decades of neglect, inequality, ignorance and weak governance. The UPA years reflected this neglect — marked by indecision, poor coordination, and a lack of vision that catered to the movement to deepen its roots across the Red Corridor. In contrast, the NDA government transformed the approach: bringing decisive security action with focused development, connectivity, and welfare outreach. Today, as the movement stands on the verge of extinction, the lesson is clear — lasting peace comes not just from guns and violence, but from good governance, inclusion, and unwavering political resolve.

The shift from the “hard power” to “governance power” demonstrates how an effective policy design, backed by political continuity and also local ownership, can help in transforming entrenched conflict zones into pathways of national integration.