Everybody's Partner, Nobody's Ally..Does India's Strategic Autonomy Still Mean Anything?

During a dialogue at the Economic Times World Leaders Forum in August 2025, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had to respond to the criticism by American officials on discounted Russian crude oil purchases from the nation. He did not flinch. The message for those who are facing difficulty in purchasing Indian oil and refined products is "Don't buy it! There is no compulsion to purchase it; but Europe is buying, America is buying – if you don't like it, don't buy it. Then, with characteristic precision, he added: "In my business, we would say that's what strategic autonomy is about.”

It was a lesson in one of the arts India has honed over the decades, when to be confident, when to be unapologetic, when to assert the right to choose and when to be without obligation to anyone and all powers. The audience applauded. The Americans noted. And the rest of the world watched a nation that is proving that it's strong to be non-committal. However, any strength constructed on a fence has a weight restriction. And, in the spring of 2026, India could actually be close to it.

The Convenient Fence

The concept of strategic autonomy or the Modi government's "multi-alignment" is nothing new, it is simply new clothing for an old concept. It is a philosophy that has its roots in Nehru's Movement of the Non-Aligned, through the Cold War to the present. The world that the doctrine has to deal with has changed, not the doctrine itself.

In early 2026, Jaishankar asserted that the world had entered into “an era of multipolarity” at the Munich Security Conference, not just an observation. The rationale behind this is that India is a complex nation of such size that it benefits more from multiple relationships rather than a single one in a multipolar world. It is really intellectually challenging argument. It is also one that's become easier to make as the pains of actual choice have increased.

India is being described by the Modi government as ‘Vishwamitra' which translates to ‘friend of the world'. It's a nice formulation. The issue with being a friend of the world is, well, you're not an ally of anybody. Friends offer goodwill. Allies offer commitment. But now, the world is in great need of commitment and is short of goodwill.

This deficit is more stark than ever in a foreign policy debate of three events that came nearly concurrently.

President Trump's first-ever presidential visit to China since 2017 was in Beijing in May 2026. The welcome was grand, with brass bands, waving crowds, even for dinner in the Great Hall of the People. But behind the showmanship was a more pragmatic deal: a pause was observing a cease-fire; 200 Boeing planes were being sold; and American technology firms were quietly talking about gaining access to the market. It was no grand resolution, but common ground was reached that resulted in what analysts gingerly termed "managed stability.

The summit posed a daunting question for New Delhi, which strategic autonomy has a hard time resolving. For the past few decades, India's balancing act has always relied on the need of Washington and Beijing to keep India in the middle as a counterweight, an alternative, a swing vote in the multipolar order. What will become of the two poles as they stop, even for a short time, tugging in different directions? India's position as a link between them does not disappear as soon as the conflict arises. But it diminishes. In diplomacy, as in physics, the power of leverage is completely based on distance.

Jaishankar, in the same BRICS foreign ministers' meeting in May 2026, invoked "freedom of navigation through international waters," which was a veiled reference to the Strait of Hormuz crisis and a non-committal gesture, but one that also meant that India had a stake in the resolution that came out of that week's discussion. Autonomy was performance, something that was visible and beyond question, so it wouldn't be caught. It was also, for the careful observers, a reminder of how much India is now reliant on others in order to maintain its energy arteries.

The Iran war and the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz through which about 20% of the world's oil and gas flows has exposed the awkward arithmetic of India's energy situation. Crude oil imports are almost 100% of India's needs. As the world's shipping traffic through the Persian Gulf breaks, Indian inflation moves. Indian manufacturing slows. It's felt at the pump by Indian households.

Jaishankar has been very plain about the way India is doing business in the energy sector. In August 2025 he said, "That's our right. They are purchasing oil "to stabilise the oil market. Yes, it's good for the country. We've never said it's not. It's refreshing when the candy is as straightforward as the world gets in the realm of diplomacy. But discounting Russian oil isn't the same as having a plan for when the discount's no longer there, when the price is collapsed by a blockage in the Strait and when the global energy market comes to an end.

In its extreme form strategic autonomy cannot resolve the energy issue. India must be proactive when it comes to geopolitics of the waterways it imports its survival needs from. Neutrality, at some point, and likely it may now be coming, is no option but reliance on others, in this case on the power of the United States Navy, to maintain those lanes open as India refuses to make a formal commitment to the architecture that makes them possible. Below the surface of independence in India is a hidden subsidy and it's in the form of US carrier strike groups.

India's Tightrope Has No Net

In the same week that Trump was in Beijing, however, Modi finished a five-country trip to the UAE, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Italy which told a different, equally significant story.

The Netherlands based semiconductor company Tata-ASML partnership continued India's journey into the most critical supply chain of the 21st century which is dominated by a single company that China has keenly sought access to but can't. The language of the alliance, deliberately omitted in the title, was elevated to a Strategic Partnership in Sweden, India and the government of Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, and a Joint Action Plan for 2026-2030 for trusted connectivity, emerging technologies and secure supply chains was adopted. In Italy, with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Modi talked about a "special strategic partnership" with four sectors in which Italy and India are already collaborating: defence, aerospace, digital sector and AI governance. A Green Strategic Partnership in Norway. Energy security issues and greater implementation of CEPA in the UAE.

The visits were each presented in a very careful manner as "economic diplomacy. The net result was a more difficult formulation of the combined direction, in terms of anything but a long-term institutional acceptance of the technological order of the West.

Not a criticism at all. India's semiconductor partnership with ASML is the strategic move that this country needs in a world where the availability of semiconductors is becoming a geopolitical weapon. The green industrial partnerships with Norway are helping India's energy transition for the long haul. The AI governance discussions with Italy are hugely important in a world where the laws of digital power are being crafted in the present. These are the right partnerships to have.

However, they have a conflict with the doctrine supposed to be represented. It is impossible to sign a 5-year joint action plan with Sweden, in which you pledge to work on secure supply chains and trusted connectivity, while at the same time maintaining the freedom to maintain connections with whoever you want, without question. Once there is a convergence of interests there is a convergence of alignment. India is steadily, thoughtfully and with some skill progressing towards the world's technocratic architecture of democracy. The issue is, is it able to claim it hasn't moved?

In December 2025, Jaishankar declared in New Delhi a new mantra: "No country has a say in the development of India's relationship with others, India has strategic autonomy in geopolitics and has a freedom of choice. It's a statement that works well in a press conference, but gets more complex in reality. The same minister was, at the same time, dealing with the backlash of Trump's tariffs on Indian imports, the pressure from Washington to curtail Russia oil purchases, the strengthening of US-Pakistani ties after Operation Sindoor and, with unfeigned bewilderment, Trump and Xi managing their relationship behind India's back in Beijing.

Strategic autonomy is more than a slogan. But it takes the ability, as one analyst recently said, to “say yes or no, on your own terms, back up those words with ability, and match those words with delivery.” India's foreign policy is also real life between the confidence of the declaration and the limitations of the reality.

Modi, who spoke to the nation in the Red Fort on Independence Day 2025, was more forthright than the diplomacy allows. India is capable of taking a decision and decisively countering threats as a result of its indigenous capabilities, such as Made in India weapons, he said. Foreign reliance is not the answer to national security". It was a declaration of Operation Sindoor, but also a declaration of principle: Strategic autonomy is meaningless if it's not backed up by material power.

He is right. And that is why the here and now is so vital. That is what India is developing in semiconductors, in defence production, in space, in digital infrastructure and at an even faster pace than 10 years ago. None of these are symbolic achievements, including the Chandrayaan-3 landing, the ASML partnership and the Production Linked Incentive schemes that are changing the way India makes things. They are the pillars that are to serve as the bedrock for true independence. However, it takes time to build up foundations. Nor is the world holding its breath.

India is everybody's partner and nobody's ally, it is a statement that has never been meant as a criticism, it is always meant as a compliment. It has been carefully tended by India, with its image that the nation is too precious to be captured, too vast to be ignored, too principled to be pushed around. It was the most elegant statement by Jaishankar who said "partners, not preachers" in every European capital and echoed him in every interview since then.

However, there is something that the compliment hides. Partners work together in common interest. Allies agree to each other's security, to risking together, to being there when it is inconvenient, expensive and unpopular. India has now got the knack of partnership. It has skilfully and intentionally steered clear of commitments to alliance. But in a world of increasingly tough decisions, tough alignments and tough encounters, the gap is widening between the two.

Part of India's strategic autonomy has been a free-rider on the international order constructed and sustained by other actors. India does not have to make a choice because of that very order which is being promised by American security guarantees, the opening of sea lanes, rules-based trade, and semiconductor chains that are based on democratic societies. It is increasingly a pressure-ordered system. The nations that constructed it are demanding, impatiently, who's there to support it?

There is no empty air on the pressure of multi-alignment. It's held up by the commitments of others, on both sides. India has yet to come out with an answer to a question it will not be able to ignore: What is it willing to sacrifice for in exchange?

No man's friend, no one's friend. A very unusual one to have built and maintained. Whereas principles are more stable than positions, which rely on the landscape surrounding them. But the landscape is changing, even quicker than the doctrine.