Check Mate? The Kunming Convention and New Frontiers for India

Introduction

In July 2025, as the diplomats from Islamabad and Dhaka gathered in Kunming, a subtler game unfolded beyond the summit halls quilled with new treaties and geopolitical realignments. For India, this summit was not merely another regional convention; it was a reminder of its stakes in the rapidly transforming regional landscape. With every signature echoing a conceited agenda and every handshake attuned to strategic intent, beneath this act of accord, India recognises the greater masquerade woven into a complex network of power and influence across the Indo-Pacific and South Asia.

The Chessboard, Reimagined …

Imagine India as the White King stationed at c1, sovereign, yet inescapably vulnerable. A king’s strength in chess is paradoxical: it anchors the entire board but is simultaneously circumscribed by his need for protection. Encircling this monarch are black pieces in opposition, moving with deliberate coordination to orchestrate a covert strategy rather than an outright assault. China, unmistakably, stands as the Black Queen at f3. The Queen is omnipresent, arduous, unpredictable, and proficient in asserting influence across multiple fronts, such as economic corridors, naval postures, military mobilisation, diplomatic signalling, etc. Thus, Dragon’s influence sweeps across the board corresponding to the Queen's diagonal strike, threatening not just borders but also reshaping the scenery of ‘India’s backyard.’

The game is not over yet. To the west, Pakistan emerges as the Black Knight positioned at b3; an appendage of frictional powers for asymmetric threat resonant to hybrid warfare via terrorism and fundamentalism. Meanwhile, our eastern borders, which flank Bangladesh, cannot be dismissed anymore. Once a passive, harmless black pawn (f1), Bangladesh has swiftly embodied the latency of the Bishop at f2. Strategically located at the Siliguri Corridor, the Bishop holds both agency and intent to sway over India’s northeastern access. Against this unforgiving backdrop, India turns to its long-standing ally, Russia, for material and diplomatic support. Russia, as the White Rook at b1, provides tangible cover to India through active defence cooperation, energy partnerships, and calibrated diplomatic engagement, thus providing steadfast support without provoking confrontation with China, yet shielding India from the Knight's aggression.

The Kunming Convention: A New Strategic Axis

On June 19, 2025, China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh inaugurated a trilateral meeting hosted by China in Kunming. Convened on the sidelines of the 9th China–South Asia Expo and the 6th China–South Asia Cooperation Forum, this meeting formally established a trilateral working group to institutionalise cooperation in trade, infrastructure, climate change, digital connectivity, and defence. What on paper appears to be a conventional routine dialogue might prove to be far more consequential: this troika aims to saddle India's strategic fate in hindsight. These are indicative of a departure from the erstwhile sporadic threats to a more sustained, legitimated, and multi-vector challenge posited for India’s regional and international posturing. [i]

This convention illustrates what scholars have dubbed Beijing's "Plus one" strategy, building upon the precedents of trilateral engagement, such as the Pakistan–Afghanistan and Pakistan–Nepal dialogues, among others. However, notably, there is one constant to this strategy: Pakistan. Pakistan remains the central anchor, while other neighbouring states are being methodically integrated into China's strategic orbit; likewise, each arrangement collectively dilutes India's regional influence. As noted by Mira Rapp-Hooper in Foreign Affairs, “China’s multilateral engagements in South Asia are less about cooperation and more about creating webs of influence that constrain India’s strategic options.”

However, the most geopolitically consequential development within this trilateral is the active participation of Bangladesh’s interim government. Traditionally cautious and hesitant in defence cooperation, Dhaka's renewed diplomatic and strategic debut with China and Pakistan in Kunming signals a substantial realignment in its foreign policy and bilateral relations with India. For India, this signifies a direct escalation; Bangladesh is now part of a platform that overlaps India's 'Chicken Neck', i.e., the Siliguri Corridor. [ii]

Thus, the evolving South Asian strategic landscape is no longer shaped by standalone bilateral rivalries but by “a lattice of multilateral engagements that complicate India’s traditional sphere of influence.” For China, South Asian states become ‘pawns or nodes in reshaping the larger geostrategic architecture refined by Beijing’s economic prosperity, supply chain access, security assurances and hard power.

Strategic Dimensions: Geopolitical Ring‑Fencing

The new trilateral axis is not just a diplomatic manoeuvre; it is a calculated strategy to reorder the regional chessboard, encircle India, and challenge New Delhi’s leadership in South Asia amidst the broader Indo-Pacific theatre. What was once conceptualised as the 2.5 front war[iii] By General Rawat, referring to the conventional threats from Pakistan and China, alongside internal insurgencies, has now unmistakably evolved into a 3.5-front configuration. With Bangladesh's emerging role in this triadic struggle, India finds its eastern flank increasingly compromised than ever, thereby stretching the geometry of encirclement into a multidirectional challenge. [iv]

As political strategists note, this marks the start of a South Asian concert, orchestrated not on India's terms but as a coalition that actively marginalises New Delhi's influence within its own subcontinental space. Therefore, this triad is not an episodic convergence among India's rival states, but rather it is an institutionalised means to exert simultaneous pressures from all directions. The Arabian shores on the west and the Himalayan valleys in the north remain tainted with the fear of Pakistani infiltrations and proxy wars, and more recently, narco-terrorism. [v] While Islamabad's nexus with China amplifies this by enhancing its military positioning and by attempting to pressure India's strategic lifelines in the Indian Ocean.

Likewise, on the eastern flank, vulnerability manifests around the Siliguri Corridor, one of the most critical chokepoints for New Delhi's access to the Northeastern states and Southeast Asia. With Bangladesh’s renewed nexus with Beijing, which is marked by profound diplomatic, infrastructural, and security cooperation, increasingly challenges “India’s traditional notion that her eastern periphery is a secure hinterland ”– C. Raja Mohan.[vi] Thus, Bangladesh’s strategic positioning might effectively tighten the grip on this critical choke point, threatening to sever India’s access and complicate logistics, trade, and military mobility in the northeast.  [vii]

Overarching both the aforementioned fronts is the formidable presence of the People's Republic of China, whose military and economic outreach extends right from the Indo-Pacific theatre to the waters of the Indian Ocean and Africa. Unlike conventional warfare, China pursues a strategy of deliberate opportunistic advancements, most often by leveraging multilateral platforms like the trilateral convention in Kunming, orchestrating a subtle encirclement strategy via the "String of Pearls" in the IOR and infrastructure investments like the BRI across South Asia. By harnessing new operational domains such as technology, water, and economic traps tangential to the modern century, Beijing has transcended beyond conventional geopolitical apparatus to a more nuanced but sustained encirclement strategy, thereby compelling and necessitating India to fundamentally rethink its security paradigm and strategic posture.

BRI’s Eastern Expansion: From Connectivity to Constriction

As we closely followed China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia, a distinct pattern began to emerge. What was once introduced as a development and connectivity project is now turning into something much more strategic. In Bangladesh, this shift is evident. The country, once on the sidelines of the BRI, is now at the centre of China's expanding reach towards the east. Furthermore, this is not the first time we are seeing such a pattern it mirrors what has already happened in countries like Sri Lanka.[viii]

Since 2015, Chinese investments across the region have followed a particular order. First, they build roads, bridges, and ports. Then come power plants, telecom networks, internet cables, and digital systems. Slowly, these are followed by security-related projects, including military maintenance sites, surveillance systems, and dual-use facilities that can be used for both civilian and defence purposes. [ix]When we put the pieces together, the design becomes clear. It is not just development it is strategy.

In Bangladesh's case, development began with commercial projects, such as Chittagong Port, and investments in the textile sector. However, since 2021, we have seen a deeper push: Chinese companies working on telecom systems, setting up satellite stations, developing innovative city tools, and even initiating quiet discussions around naval upgrades.[x] None of these projects are random. They connect like steps in a larger plan.

One major red flag is the possible extension of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Bangladesh. With over $150 billion already invested in Pakistan under CPEC, and another $200–250 billion possibly on the way, it is becoming clear that China may want to stretch this route across the subcontinent from Gwadar in Pakistan to Chittagong in Bangladesh.[xi] If that happens, China would gain uninterrupted access to both sides of the Indian Ocean. As Harsh V. Pant notes, “If China controls both entry points to the Indian Ocean, it becomes far harder for India to protect its maritime interests.”[xii]

This isn’t just about trade anymore it's about control. Countries like Bangladesh seek loans to build infrastructure, create employment opportunities, and enhance their economies. These are natural goals for a growing country. However, when these loans come with straightforward terms, limited transparency, and dependence on a single partner, especially one as powerful as China, it creates risks. These risks may not be immediately apparent, but they accumulate over time.[xiii]

We’ve seen what happened in Sri Lanka. Unable to repay loans taken from China for the Hambantota Port, the Sri Lankan government had to lease the port to Beijing for 99 years.[xiv] It didn't happen overnight, but slowly, financial stress turned into a strategic compromise. The concern isn't that the same thing will happen in Bangladesh but that the situation is starting to look familiar.

According to a report by AidData, almost 35% of China’s BRI lending is not fully transparent and often comes with high collateral conditions.[xv] That means countries may be putting key assets on the line without fully realising the long-term consequences.

From India’s side, this change is troubling. As Bangladesh’s economic and political links with China grow stronger, it affects how decisions are made in the region. It also raises a deeper question: At what point does building roads and ports stop being helpful and start becoming harmful? When does “connectivity” start turning into a “constraint”?

In simple terms, China’s expansion of the BRI towards the east is no longer just about building infrastructure. It is about slowly creating influence one deal, one loan, one port at a time. And unless countries are careful, this influence can quietly shape their foreign policies, strategic decisions, and even their autonomy. For India, this means navigating a region where old friendships may no longer be enough, and where every new partnership must be seen in the light of long-term consequences.

Security Dynamics: The Emerging Intelligence Triangle

As we traced the evolving trilateral between China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the most striking shift wasn’t in economic deals, but in how their defence and intelligence ties are quietly tightening. What began as routine military training between China and Bangladesh around 2020 has now deepened into something far more coordinated: drone technology cooperation, aircraft maintenance, and joint surveillance discussions. These aren't symbolic moves anymore they’re part of a growing operational partnership.

We observed a familiar pattern. China first supplies affordable defence equipment, including drones, patrol boats, and radars.[xvi] Then comes training, technical support, and long-term servicing, creating dependencies that are harder to break. Bangladesh's military inventory now includes a growing number of Chinese-origin systems, and Pakistan is actively reinforcing this cooperation, bringing Dhaka closer to a trilateral defence framework.[xvii]

This growing alignment carries profound implications for India. If these three countries begin sharing intelligence on border threats, maritime activity, or insurgencies, it would directly challenge India’s strategic space particularly in the east.[xviii] The SCO Summit in Qingdao offered a clear warning, where China and Pakistan jointly blocked India’s counterterrorism language.[xix] It wasn’t just diplomacy it reflected a shared strategic posture.

More worryingly, if Bangladesh begins to align its security outlook with China and Pakistan, India may need to reconsider how it protects the Siliguri Corridor, balances its troop presence in the northeast, and avoids alienating local communities.[xx]

This isn’t about a sudden military threat it’s about a quieter convergence. A new intelligence triangle is forming in South Asia, and India risks being left out of the room where critical regional security conversations are taking place.

India’s Strategic Challenges: Reaction vs. Proaction

As the trilateral between China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh gains traction, India finds itself facing not one but several overlapping challenges. These are not entirely new, but the pace at which they are converging is forcing a reassessment of India’s strategic posture. The gap between India’s stated priorities and regional realities is widening and much of it stems from the fatigue of maintaining a vision that others are now actively testing.[xxi]

For years, India has championed the “Neighbourhood First” policy, seeking to build trust, foster development partnerships, and promote regional solidarity.[xxii] But today, that narrative appears increasingly strained. Dhaka’s growing engagement with Beijing, particularly in infrastructure and security, marks a visible shift. This isn’t just about competition it’s about perception. As China steps in with ready capital, swift project delivery, and fewer conditions, India’s slower, process-heavy approach is beginning to look less attractive to some of its neighbours.[xxiii]

This challenge is not unique to Bangladesh. We’ve seen similar patterns in Nepal, where Chinese firms gained ground in energy, telecom, and transport, often bypassing India in key decision-making. And in Afghanistan, China used its ties with Pakistan to shape access and influence in Central Asia sometimes at India's expense. The lesson is clear: Beijing doesn't wait for the door to open. It builds its entrance.

On the security front, India faces a delicate balancing act. Reinforcing its northeastern flank especially the Siliguri Corridor has become a strategic necessity. Yet, this must be done without triggering local discontent or feeding the narrative that India is militarising its region.[xxiv] China, with its sophisticated messaging, is quick to portray Indian actions as heavy-handed, primarily when local grievances exist.[xxv]

This is where India's challenge deepens: how to act decisively without appearing reactive, and how to assert influence without relying solely on historical ties. In a region that is quickly evolving, India must move from a position of defensive response to proactive engagement, backed not just by power, but by persuasion, partnership, and presence. [xxvi]

Recommended Indian Countermeasures: Regaining Initiative on the Board

In this unfolding regional game, where coordinated moves by China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh threaten to close in on India’s flanks, the White King must no longer remain confined to cautious defence. It is time for India to shift from playing catch-up to reclaiming the initiative on the board. This begins with revitalising its forgotten regional groupings, such as BIMSTEC and IORA, which have remained underutilised until now. These forums must evolve from ceremonial platforms to active instruments of regional development. India must move beyond rhetoric and channel real resources into infrastructure, blue economy cooperation, and climate resilience areas where China has already staked its claim.

The next counter must come through subtle, deliberate placement of Bay of Bengal outreach programs that focus not on mega-infrastructure, but on micro-impact. Here, India must operate like the nimble Bishop reaching across borders with targeted grants in e-health, digital literacy, renewable energy, and rural electrification. By lighting up underdeveloped communities, especially in coastal Bangladesh and India, Beijing's influence can be softened without provoking confrontation. Development, when visible and personal, becomes more complicated to displace.

Simultaneously, India must activate its defensive Rooks through enhanced military diplomacy.

Joint coastal surveillance, tri-service exercises, and improved maritime logistics with Bangladesh can project security without intimidation. Strengthening the Andaman Command with assets like Newport-class lifters sends a message that India is ready to protect its eastern flank not just through troops, but through partnerships built on trust. In doing so, India creates a corridor of stability in a theatre increasingly shadowed by uncertainty.

Above all, India must reassert its narrative Queen not through force, but through the power of ideas. While China sells speed and secrecy, India must emphasise its model: a rule-based, inclusive approach that values sovereignty, transparency, and shared growth. This narrative must flow across South Asia and into the Indo-Pacific, reaching corners of the Global South that are growing wary of transactional diplomacy. In this recalibrated game, postures speak louder than pronouncements. And the most powerful move India can now make is to remind the region that it still holds both strategy and patience the twin assets of a king not yet cornered.

Possible conclusion dimensions

Thus, the Kunming Convention is not just about written agreements or the words of diplomacy, it represents the 'legitimisation' of a transformed chessboard. Postures, not pronouncements, dictate outcomes. The strategic calculus for India should now transcend isolated bilateral ties and necessities navigation through an increasingly choreographed encirclement. In this game, checkmate is no longer a single, dramatic event; rather, it is the gradual erosion of manoeuvrability, a danger India must guard against by wielding patience, resilience, and foresight as steadfastly as power.

[i]   Md. Himel Rahman, “Strategic Implications of the First China-Pakistan-Bangladesh Summit,” The Diplomat, June 25, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/strategic-implications-of-the-first-china-pakistan-bangladesh-summit/.

[ii]  Pant, Harsh V., and Yogesh Joshi. Strategic Significance of the Siliguri Corridor ("Chicken's Neck") for India: India's National Security - Annual Review 2024. New Delhi: Routledge, 2024.

[iii]  Kapur, Ashok. “India’s Strategic Challenges: From 2.5 to 3.5 Front Wars.” Journal of Defence Studies 18, no. 1 (2024)

[iv] Mohan, C. Raja. “South Asia’s New Strategic Geography.” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2022.

https://foreignpolicy.com/author/c-raja-mohan/.

[v]   Pant, Harsh V., and Yogesh Joshi. India’s National Security: Annual Review 2024. New Delhi: Routledge, 2024.

[vi] C. Raja Mohan’s commentary on South Asia’s strategic landscape

Mohan, December 6, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/author/c-raja-mohan/.

[vii] Islam, M. Shahidul. “Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy Shift: Engaging China and the Geopolitical Implications.” Journal of South Asian Studies 42, no. 3 (2023)

[viii] Hillman, Jonathan E. 2018. “Game of Loans: How China Bought Hambantota.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 2, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/game-loans-how-china-bought-hambantota

[ix] Rolland, Nadège. 2019. “A Concise Guide to the Belt and Road Initiative.” The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-guide-to-the-belt-and-road-initiative/

[x] Panda, Jagannath, and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan. 2023. “China’s Expanding Digital Footprint in South Asia.” ORF Occasional Paper, no. 399. https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-digital-footprint-in-south-asia/

[xi] Small, Andrew. 2020. The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. Oxford University Press.

[xii] Pant, Harsh V. 2022. India's Foreign Policy and China: Balancing Realism and Strategy. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation.

[xiii] Brautigam, Deborah. 2020. Will Africa Feed China? Oxford University Press.

[xiv] Abi-Habib, Maria. 2018. “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.” The New York Times, June 25, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html 

[xv] Malik, Ammar A., Bradley Parks, and Russell Yan. 2021. “Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a New Global Dataset of 13,427 Chinese Development Projects.” AidData at William & Mary. https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Banking_on_the_Belt_and_Road.pdf

[xvi] Brewster, David. 2020. India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean. Oxford University Press.

[xvii] Joshi, Manoj. 2022. “China’s Defence Diplomacy in South Asia: The Bangladesh Puzzle.” Observer Research Foundation, March 18. https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-defence-diplomacy-in-south-asia

[xviii] Pant, Harsh V., and Kartik Bommakanti. 2023. “India’s Strategic Anxiety in the Eastern Theatre.” ORF Strategic Studies Paper, No. 413. https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-strategic-anxiety

[xix] Singh, Sushant. 2018. “Why India’s Push Against Terrorism Was Watered Down at Qingdao SCO Summit.” The Indian Express, June 11. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/why-india-push-against-terrorism-was-watered-down-at-qingdao-sco-summit-5211195

[xx]Menon, Shivshankar. 2021. India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present. Brookings Institution Press.

[xxi] Pant, Harsh V., and Manoj Joshi. 2021. “India’s Foreign Policy Reset: From Idealism to Realism.” Observer Research Foundation Occasional Paper, No. 343. https://www.orfonline.org.

[xxii] MEA (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India). 2015. “India’s Neighbourhood First Policy.” https://www.mea.gov.in.

[xxiii] Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. 2023. “China’s Fast-Track Projects Changing Perceptions in South Asia.” The Economic Times, April 11. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com.

[xxiv] Rajan, Rajesh. 2023. “Securing the Siliguri Corridor: India’s Geostrategic Imperative.” South Asian Voices, March 19. https://southasianvoices.org.

[xxv] Madan, Tanvi. 2021. Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations During the Cold War. Brookings Institution Press.

[xxvi] Tellis, Ashley J. 2022. “India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/09/indias-strategic-choices-china-and-the-balance-of-power-in-asia?lang=en