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Between the Bay and the Border: How U.S. Footprints in Bangladesh Reshape South Asian Geopolitics

In recent months, Bangladesh has unexpectedly emerged as the new node of strategic competition in South Asia. For decades, Dhaka maintained a careful diplomatic balance, cultivating economic ties with China, relying on India for connectivity and trade, and welcoming developmental aid from the West. But the entry of the United States into Bangladesh’s military landscape marks a new, potentially game-changing moment.


This is not just about a few joint exercises. The U.S. military has begun conducting drills with Bangladesh under the banners of Operation Pacific Angel 25-3 and Tiger Lightning 2025, both of which highlight humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and inter-operability. American C-130J transport aircraft were recently spotted in Chittagong, raising questions about logistics access. Beyond these, there are reports of U.S. interest in expanding defense cooperation through training, equipment sales, and even limited infrastructure support.


These activities which may look small on its own, but when put together, show that the USA is steadily increasing its presence in Bangladesh, which is often seen as India’s exclusive backyard. But what does a “rising U.S. presence” mean for India? New Delhi sees it as alarm and with recent U.S. actions vis-à-vis India – including the imposition of 50 percent tariffs on India over the purchase of Russian crude oil, the growing warmth in Pakistan-U.S. relations, and the restrictions on H1B visas have added new complexities to the relations between New Delhi and Washington. Under these circumstances, concerns about the increasing Bangladesh-U.S. defense cooperation are understandable.


For India, this shift of Bangladesh gradually moving into the Indo-Pacific calculus of Washington, at the very edge of India’s traditional sphere of influence, matters heavily. Geography alone explains why; Bangladesh shares a 4,096-km border with India, more than any other country. India’s vulnerable Northeast is connected to the mainland by the narrow Siliguri Corridor which is just 22 km wide. A significant U.S. footprint in Chittagong or Sylhet places external power directly adjacent to these sensitive regions. And when adding the Bay of Bengal, which is a growing arena for maritime competition, the concern deepens.


The question is no longer whether Bangladesh will diversify its security partners, but the issue arising is how fast and how far and whether India is prepared to respond with nuance, rather than suspicion.



Historical & Geopolitical Background

India’s decisive support to Bangladesh, during the Liberation War, established deep goodwill. Yet, the subsequent decades have brought friction.

In the 1970s and 1980s, India accused Bangladesh of harboring insurgents from Nagaland, Mizoram, and Tripura. Dhaka, meanwhile, accused India of overbearing interference. In the 1990s - 2000s relations improved under democratic governments, especially with treaties on water sharing and trade. However, cross-border migration and river disputes remained irritants. With post 2009, Sheikh Hasina's government transformed cooperation, cracking down on anti-India insurgents and expanding connectivity projects.


This was marked as a “golden phase” in ties, though accompanied by rising Chinese influence through infrastructure investments. But with the fall of her government on 5th August, 2024, the relation has been under stress, Hasina had accused the United States of orchestrating her removal from power for refusing to allow a US airbase on St Martin’s Island, a strategic Bangladeshi location in the Bay of Bengal. She remarked that this refusal led to foreign interference in her country’s affairs, particularly in the form of the anti-quota student protests that, she alleged, were used to destabilise her government. And since the formation of an interim government, under Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, the siren has been going off.


It is believed that Md.Yunus is a close ally to the US, which was witnessed when Khalilur Rehman was appointed as NSA member although he’s considered to have US citizenship. This shows that although Bangladesh’s foreign policy is rooted in the principle of “Friendship to all, malice to none.” Yet in practice, Dhaka has long pursued a hedging strategy: With India, it shares deep geographic, cultural, and economic linkages. With China, it taps into infrastructure finance like Padma Bridge, ports and power plants and with the U.S.A, it engages for development, labor exports, and increasingly, strategic space. While with Pakistan, ties remain distant but symbolically relevant for certain constituencies.


Recent Developments on the Ground

The headlines of 2025 illustrate a clear trend that Bangladesh is no longer on the margins of Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Its Operation Pacific Angel 25-3 is focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster response, but in reality, it builds logistical familiarity, local contacts, and trust between U.S. and Bangladeshi forces.


The Tiger Lightning 2025 was a bilateral drill between the Bangladesh Armed Forces and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, involving both tactical maneuvers and cyber elements. Aircraft Movements such as the U.S. C-130J operating out of Chittagong is more than symbolic as it signals potential for future logistics access.


Along with this, the geographic significance is hard to overstate as Chittagong lies close to India’s Tripura and Mizoram while Sylhet borders Meghalaya and Assam. At the same time, The Bay of Bengal coastline provides staging grounds for maritime monitoring of Indian and Chinese activities alike.


Bangladesh is not building American bases, but it is incrementally opening space for U.S. engagement humanitarian, logistical, and eventually strategic. The dual-use nature of such cooperation means even disaster-relief facilities could be repurposed in times of conflict.


Strategic Motivations of the Stakeholders

Bangladesh’s Perspective

Bangladesh’s motivations are layered in diversification which includes avoiding overdependence on India or China by bringing the U.S. into play and economic incentives like U.S. aid, investment, and access to Western markets make defense cooperation an attractive diplomatic bargaining chip. In addition, domestic politics such as The ruling Awami League seeks international legitimacy amid opposition challenges. U.S. partnership projects strength and modernity. Along with security needs for Counterterrorism, border management, and disaster response are real priorities where U.S. expertise helps.


United States’ Perspective

For Washington, Bangladesh fits neatly into its Indo-Pacific Strategy for Countering China. China’s growing footprint in the Bay of Bengal, from the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka to Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, makes Bangladesh the missing link. The Strategic Access of Bangladesh is a boon and even limited logistics agreements in Chittagong or Cox’s Bazar could give the U.S. vital nodes between the Andaman Sea and Malacca Strait. Not to forget the soft power it holds in humanitarian drills which allows Washington to win goodwill without triggering alarm bells. The Regional Partnerships also make Bangladesh a good interest for the USA as by engaging Dhaka, the U.S. indirectly complicates China’s Belt and Road ambitions in the subregion.


India’s Perspective

India’s reaction is conflicted as New Delhi has long seen Bangladesh as part of its natural strategic space and a foreign military presence challenges that comfort zone. The security concerns in the northeast remain sensitive to insurgencies, migration, and resource stress. Thus, U.S. presence so close raises fears of surveillance or interference. At the same time, India itself is deepening defense ties with the U.S. in international forums like QUAD, LEMOA, BECA. It cannot oppose U.S. engagement outright but fears being sidelined in Dhaka. But the maritime anxiety can’t be ignored that, U.S. role in the Bay of Bengal could limit India’s ability to project itself as the primary security provider.


Comparative Cases & Precedents

South Asia offers cautionary tales, like:

  1. U.S. in Pakistan: From the 1950s to the War on Terror, American presence in Pakistan was seen by India as a direct security threat. That legacy colors today’s suspicions.

  2. China in Sri Lanka: The Hambantota Port lease to China became a symbol of India’s fear of encirclement, even though its operational use has been limited.

  3. China in Nepal: India reacted with alarm to Chinese infrastructure projects in Nepal, highlighting its discomfort with great-power entry into its neighborhood.

  4. Bhutan’s Example: Bhutan shows how small states can tactically manage external pressure by balancing while preserving autonomy.

  5. For Bangladesh, the lesson is clear: accept U.S. cooperation, but keep it limited and non-threatening. For India, the lesson is to distinguish between genuine encirclement and strategic diversification by neighbors.


Conclusion: What Should India Do?

The rising U.S. presence in Bangladesh is not a catastrophe but is a wake-up call. India cannot prevent Dhaka from diversifying its partnerships. Nor should it attempt coercion, which would only push Bangladesh further away.


Instead, India must pursue a layered strategy:

  1. Deepen Bilateral Ties: Invest in infrastructure, trade, and people-to-people exchanges that make India indispensable.

  2. Cooperate, Not Compete: Explore trilateral initiatives with the U.S. and Bangladesh on disaster relief, health security, and maritime monitoring.

  3. Manage Perceptions: Avoid public paranoia that alienates Dhaka. Quiet diplomacy is more effective than megaphone warnings.

  4. Maritime Posture: Strengthen India’s own role in the Bay of Bengal through the Indian Navy, BIMSTEC, and the Quad.


Ultimately, the U.S. presence in Bangladesh reflects a changing world: small states assert agency, big powers compete for space, and regional leaders must adapt. For India, the real challenge is psychological, moving from a sphere-of-influence mindset to a partnership mindset. Only then can New Delhi secure both its neighborhood and its global ambitions.



 
 
 

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